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Security evaluation of 802.11i
Uberhacker.Com writes "Server Pipeline features an interesting report on the security viability of 802.11i. As most observers of the WLAN industry are aware, the security features found in the original standard were woefully inadequate. To a certain degree, these deficiencies reflected the perception that security services are normally implemented at layer 3 and above. 802.11i's privacy services are built on top of AES, a strong encryption standard that passes muster with even the most paranoid security administrators."
Why is it that applying security at a higher layer is a bad thing? The data is what needs to be secured, not the headers of the packets... I don't care if people know I'm sending data to my credit card company, I do care if they know what my login and password is though... Am I missing something? Why is it so important to apply security to the lowest layer?
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Programming is like sex... Make one mistake and support it the rest of your life.
"AES, a strong encryption standard that passes muster with even the most paranoid security administrators."
If it's really secure, why does our favourite tree-letter-agency allow it for normal citizens? So much for paranoia...
All through the time I spent developing WLAN software, security was always the bottleneck. We always had to keep one thing at the back of our minds - if security isn't improved, all this work is gonna get flushed down the drain!
Fears about security have prevented WLAN from achieving all that it can potentially achieve. It was ridiculously easy for someone to break into a wireless LAN. 802.11i was seen to be the saviour, but the infighting among the various stakeholders always prevented the mechanisms defined under 802.11i from being accepted globally.
I hope things will change for the better now!
Is this new 802.11 product going to do well? With new technologies on the horizon such as WiMax will companies and businesses invest anymore money to upgrade or rollout an 802.11 product?
This is where 802.11i is a bit different, though, in that the new security features are mandatory. Missing small points, no matter how difficult, will fail the certification.
You can never go home again... but I guess you can shop there.
If I'm looking at your traffic, and your headers are not encrypted, then I can determine which packets may be interesting (the ones to credit card company, commercial sites, etc) and which packets aren't interesting (web surfing, MUDing, email). Makes the job of the hacker much easier, only needing to break the encryption on packets that have a much higher probability of containing good information
Don't pick up the pho*(@)$*@&@!@ NO CARRIER
We already have other and better options. Just disable WEP and use IPsec on your accesspoint.
:) - that should do the trick.
Yeah - it's a little bit slower when the en/de/cryption is done on the client but in most cases you won't notice. And on the AP you can use a crypto accelerator.
If you don't want to use a PC as AP just use http://www.m0n0.ch/wall/ in combination with http://www.soekris.com/net4501.htm (they ship with cases too
To be realistic, if you (as a programmer) are sending data that you know at the design stage that you want to keep private, you should be ancrypting it at the APPLICATION layer. If you are going to send data that you want transmitted securely, you shouldn't depend on the lower levels to do something which may or not be present. However, if you are using it as a way to keep unautorised user out of the network, you could do something similar by signing the packets as they are sent. This would cost you speed though, and it is easier to just encrypt with whatever cipher is in style at the time and check if the packet is valid.
There have been a few interesting ideas if not brilliant, but not properly executed. I'm no encryption guru, but simple username and password based security isn't all that bad, as long as the medium they're transmitted over is secure. The problem, though is how to "make" them secure.
At some point you have to start trusting the network, and stop worrying about how big your key is, or how long it takes to crack. Use a VPN for work. Use SSL for private email. Don't auto login to websites. If people start assuming they're secure because their first hop is, they're screwed, no matter how thick that first layer is to crack.
"During times of universal deceit, telling the truth becomes a revolutionary act" -- George Orwell
Correct. As I pointed out in this vitriolic posting last year, the security of AES is possibly weak. (See the citation).
As a relatively new cipher, this is not unexpected. The conservative security choice would have been to choose 3DES, as the new DES.
Although it's pure speculation, it's possible Rinjdael was chosen by interested parties and deemed 'strong enough for commerce' for reasons related to catching filthy cave dwelling scum.
Reality is that which continues to exist after you stop believing in it.
The weak key problem has been addressed by all manufacturers via firmware updates. You are now forced to do dictionary attacks which require a large number of packets and resources. Still hackable, but not nearly as easy.
You need to read the article (which I didn't read). I don't need to read it since I know about the changes already. You'll find the key exchanges when combined with a true AAA provide a secure solution.
With that said, we're talking about transmissions that are easily monitored and disrupted at will. So while 802.11i is a step forward for wireless, just being wireless means that it will always be less "secure". I certainly wouldn't want wireless as a part of a critical availibility network.
Well, there's this method for cracking AES called eXtended Sparse Linearization that came around in 2002 or so (the attack is a method for solving systems of quadratic equations). Problem is, we don't know if the attack works, but if it does work, it'll only get better. If the optimizations for the attack (assuming it works ...) get down to 2^70 or 2^80 or so complexity, AES will be obsolete by the end of the decade. And that's why I don't think AES should be widely implemented just yet.
In soviet russia, You ask not what country do for you, but what you do for country!
Oh wait...