CERT Warns Of Multiple Vulnerabilities In Libpng
jefftp writes "CERT announced today that there are several vulnerabilities in libpng, one is a buffer overflow which could potentially cause a PNG image file to execute arbitrary code. Libpng release 1.2.6rc1 addresses the problems covered by this CERT announcement, and can be obtained from the libpng Sourceforge project. A fully tested version is to be released in the next few weeks."
Is Mozilla/Firefox/Thunderbird using this lib ?
So does mozilla statically or dynamically link with libpng?
...thanks to the Debian Security mailing list, my systems were secured against this hours before it even made it to /.
I just emerge synced and the latest version available is still libpng-1.2.5-r7
We've all heard about buffer overflow problems in countless programs and libraries again and again. I'm not a programmer, but as I under stand it, the problem is writing to unallocated memory areas. But this is not a new problem, it has happened for ages. Is it really that difficult to avoid? I understand that libpng as a "building block" library needs good performance, but is it really that much of a problem to write things in safer programming languages that don't allow these kind of problems? Can some seasoned programming gurus here enlighten me here?
Within an hour (or so) after the CERT-mail I also got the Matt Zimmerman-mail.
:)
Fixed
I love this!
Thanks Guys!
Privacy is terrorism.
I think it is time we started attributing vulnerabilities to the authors (just as we do with companies).
most of us should run with a no executable stack theses days
Ah, you mean the vast majority of people are now running Athlon64's? (tip: Plain IA32 CPUs don't support the NX bit).
http://blog.nexusuk.org
Someone who saw the leaked source code a while back happened to mention to me that Internet Explorer uses libpng for rendering PNG files--it's just broken because it uses such a friggin' old version of it. So there's a good chance that IE is affected too.
image bombs. basically, you create a 190000x190000 pixel monochrome image, save it, and it compresses to 43 kb
anyone opens it... *BAM* it expands into 2gb of ram.
On the other hand, it's quite difficult for a bug to creep into a compiler's bounds checking code (which is typically very simple). I know of no such historic examples, though perhaps this is because relatively few apps actually use safe compiled languages. (It would presumably have to be matched by a bug in the application code...) Interpreters and JIT compilers are much more subject to this kind of problem, particularly if they are written in C themselves. ;) There have been a few JVM exploits historically, though it is still much easier to make a secure JVM than to make tens of thousands of secure applications.
Finally, remember that even C has the burden of bugs in its compiler, runtime, and libraries, so this argument is useless at differentiating between C and safe compiled languages (unless you can argue that the latter have more complicated support code).