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Hardening Apache
Hardening Apache fills a huge gap in this sense, providing web administrators with a complete and yet concise book aimed to guide them from the very beginning of the installation process to the final steps of the server configuration. The author, Tony Mobily, is also the mind behind Professional Apache Security, a book published by Wrox Press which I reviewed on Slashdot about 17 months ago. Since Wrox's unfortunate closure, some of the material from that book has been moved into Hardening Apache. More specifically:
- The excellent chapter on "jailing" Apache is exactly the same;
- The chapter on XSS attacks has been slightly improved;
- The chapter on logging, which was nothing remarkable, has been greatly improved. It now includes a complete architecture to log on a remote host using encryption and a TCP/IP connection.
The first chapter of the book deals with deploying a clean and safe base installation, which will then be the grounds for adding extra functionality. Unfortunately, this task is often underestimated. What I liked in this chapter is the step-by-step guide to correctly downloading the source distribution and verifying its integrity (by checking its digital signature), as well as the clean approach to the creation of a lean, easily readable configuration file, which grants a painless maintenance. A highlight of this section is the use of Nikto to analyse and explain common weaknesses and to show how to fix them.
Chapter 2 presents some vulnerabilities and explains how to exploit them. The chapter doesn't have any "pearls of wisdom" (but it's nevertheless important to show that Apache can be vulnerable), and presents some important reference sites every web administrator should be aware of.
Chapter 3 definitely deserves a special mention: after introducing the "common" ways of logging and syslogd's architecture, the author describes a rational approach to realizing a complete logging solution which entails remote log servers, encryption of logs, and the use of a MySQL database to better organize them.
Chapter 4 is the only one which deals with the "programming" side of web security. It is not a comprehensive guide on how to write safe programs for the web, as it focuses on cross-site scripting attacks; it shows how to secure a simple and vulnerable message board written in PHP.
The following chapter talks about security modules: it presents an interesting overview of the most useful modules related to security, which will help administrators understand the importance of third-party modules and explains how to install and use some of them. I also liked Chapter 6, which deals with the installation of Apache in a secure, chrooted environment: the chapter does a great job in guiding the reader through the non-trivial steps required to get Apache, Perl and PHP working correctly in such a restricted environment.
The last chapter presents a number of powerful and well-written scripts which anybody can use to automate security and keep an eye on their web server (monitoring log growth, Apache's responsiveness, and so on).
What's to like Information throughout the book is very well focused and presented with a clean and friendly writing style. The book provides a clear and detailed walkthrough of the process of securing an Apache installation, covering both versions 1.3.x and 2.x and thus providing long lasting information. The book has lots of references and pointers to resources on the web, and - what's more important - instructions on how to read them. I also liked the "checkpoints" at the end of each chapter.
What's to consider Apart from chapter 4 on cross-site scripting attacks, the book does not cover secure web programming at all. It doesn't cover OS hardening either, which is out of scope but part of the game anyway. Going through the book requires some familiarity with Unix and Apache; otherwise you will have to resort to other books for the very basic steps.
All in all, I found this sort of "new edition" of the book by Apress to be greatly enhanced, more homogeneous and better focused than the previous book: I had been happy with Wrox's version, but I am enthusiastic about this one. This is a book which should definitely be included in any serious Apache administrator's bookshelf.
You can purchase Hardening Apache from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
In a way, Internet Information Services provides a more secure environment because an administrator gets a wealth of help and a decent initial configuration. In the end it's all about knowing your product, but it helps if the product helps you.
Try not. Do or do not, there is no try.
-- Dr. Spock, stardate 2822-3.
I wish web servers wouldn't advertise their version number be default (e.g. in directory listings or HTTP headers). It's like giving an attacker an exact list of the exploits that will work on your server.
There is a fundamental flaw with security hardening being in a separate book, sold by advertising and word of mouth, read separately and in a different medium than installation documentation, updated asynchronously, and expected to work. Would you accept a word processor with a separate book on "Master's Secrets on Keeping Your Word Processor From Crashing"?
With any luck, many hardening techniques will migrate towards the Apache installation process, or at least the Apache documentation.
Don't let not knowing about security hold you back from hosting your own site. Experiment, learn, have fun. Put an apache box up on a DMZ, put stupid content on it, see what happens. Look at your logs, see what's going on, learn from any mistakes you make along the way.
If you're in this industry, and are afraid to be the "fall guy" who has do deal with the inevitable attacks, or the "fall guy" in general, you'd better fasten your seat belt...you're in for a bumpy ride.
He who makes no mistakes makes nothing at all
The older I get, the less I like everyone else.
In short, find a hosting company with a lot of Windows servers nearby IP-wise. This is, sadly, not a troll or flamebait, it's my experience. Apache is not what you have to worry about, it's scripts you run. Every single non-targeted exploit of a Unix machine I've seen (that is, compromises that don't target a particular site or person) has been the result of a buggy script. And usually a script that's installed on a ton of systems, so the hackers can compromise many machines with the same attack. Most of them are looking for warez dump sites or launching points for DDoSes. It's not worth their time to target individuals.
here is a link about just that
They aren't very useful links, they're just the OpenBSD folks flaming the Apache folks.
Any better background?
There is one thing that makes apache very unsecure. Suppose that you have few users each having it's own virtual host. Apache is running from exactly the same UID/GID for each virtual host! There is no way in pure apache to prevent user A from looking into user B vhost files (containing for example php scripts, password to sql databases etc).
:/
You would need to run multiple apaches running from different UIDs for each user
That's bad. suexec it's not a option - it doesn't work with mod_python and other apache modules.
perchild MPM module that should do it doesn't work and apache developers are not interested in fixing that. No idea why.
metuxmpm MPM module was written instead perchild by external developers but it also doesn't work well unfortunately (for me it doesn't work at all).
Any RFC standard that breaks because it looks just like the computer on the other end of the line is turned off... needs breaking any way.
If you have a specific need to know I am here... it should be a part of your protocol.
Because, other than those things I want to work... my machine does not exist.
In short: I don't need ping replies to work. So, my machine does not do it.
--Phillip
Can you say BIRTH TAX