Curing a Corporate Virus Infection
museumpeace writes "Over at Internet Storm Center Deb Hale's 'In search of the bot net' entry for September 25 recounts a grueling hunt for all the .exe's, reg entries and sources for a bot infection of a 60 server corporate network. What a nightmare! The story ends with an indictment of careless users and a suspicion that Ares, one of the sloppier Pirate2Pirate filesharing tools was the original souce of the extensive corruption that eventually even crippled the AV tools. How typical is this sort of grief? [More more frequent than reported, I would expect: the corporate victim demanded anonymity for the story to be told]."
Only slightly biased. I understand the annoyance of the admins over this screwup, but take deep breaths and count to 10 before you badmouth all P2P networks.
If you can use the 'protected port' option on e.g. cisco switches, TURN IT ON.
Essentially, it prevents the indicated ports on the switch from communicating with other ports that also have that protection set. Unless you have sloppy shared directories or some reason for the actual PC's to talk directly to eachother, it won't harm anything and will prevent the viruses from spreading pc-to-pc once (not when) they get in.
[disclaimer: i work for a major fortune 500 company with a large, 50+ distributed node WAN]
Everytime there's a big ass Windows vulnerabilty, there are security emails and IT manager emails basically saying "heads up, check your shit." But let's say somebody doesnt check his shit, and a site ends up infected. The WAN group watches the network, especially during times like this, and nodes are just dropped off routing from the rest of the network until they get their act back together.
I realize the article is talking more about the pains of these nasty new infections that mutilate machines, but the old saying works -- a good offense is a great defense. Assign local managers responsibility for the server boxen at their node, he/she should be keeping the machines patched, but when that fails, close the node off the network before it can damage anywhere else.
Of course the major server boxen have their own layer of network between them and the rest of the WAN, so they can be isolated if the worm is already rampant on the network. Doesn't hurt to access list transmission ports, either, icmp, tftp, foo...
Plenty of don't have that option. When management says "no, of course users should be able to install software on the machines they use," the IT shop has a bit more of an added challenge.
Mod point free since 2001
Blame your own policies, not your users. Users are not IT experts and will not be even with extensive training.
Restrict privileges. Don't allow anything that is not necessary...
...a grueling hunt for all the .exe's, reg entries and sources for a bot infection...
Wrong answer. If you have a compromised system, trying to clean it is (a) likely to be really difficult, and (b) not secure.
Wipe the system, reinstall, and recover from backups. (You do keep good backups, right?) It sounds pessimistic, but in most cases an attempt to "clean" a system is going to end up with you pulling out the OS reinstall disks anyway.
Tarsnap: Online backups for the truly paranoid
There are really times when I wish you could mod a submission as "Flamebait."
Just go back to the classic-server rule of thumb.
1.) Desktop machines can use windows
2.) Servers must be unix based.
The user can corrupt the hell out of their hard disk, and they have only themselves to blame.
We actually lock down our Windows XP machines pretty hard, yet for some reason a virus is capable of installing DLLs into the system folder on a non-priveleged account.
We've had a number of keylogger viruses and such pop up on local machines, even from machines with restricted permissions (i.e. can't even write to C:). I don't know what's wrong with XP, but this looks to be a pretty big flaw.
If the service that the viruses are using aren't enabled, they can't be exploited.
Here's one way to deal with this...
Isolate the client; vlan/router or yank the system and put it in an isolated environment (test lab, 2 system LAN, ...). Turn off the client XP firewall (if any), run Nessus on another system and point it at the client, go back to the client system and disable all services that Nessus reports -- even the ones that are not considered problems! Do any security hardening Nessus suggests. If you really need the detected services, write down what you would loose by disabling the service, what it would take to secure the service, and if there are any automated tools that can be run client side to clean up or better block hostile attacks.
Document what you needed to do, do the same to a few more systems, and then automate the process (registry files, boot scripts, policies, ...).
A firewall can not protect you from yourself. Turn off what you do not need. Do not use the firewall to do your work.
"Making up a new plural case of a word to try to sound cool", on "haxor.dk". That's a 15 yd. penalty and loss of down.
"Ask not what your country can do for you." --John F. Kennedy
The problem with this is that most applications for Windows don't consider the "multi-user" environment. There are a lot of apps that simply don't work well when it's not run by an Administrator account. Take for example Office 2000. I've installed this before on a Windows 2000 machine. When I run it as an Administrator, there is no problem. When I run it as a User account, it keeps asking me to insert the Office 2000 CD because there are missing components. WTF? Granted I installed it with only the features I need, but why the hell should it ask for the CD in the User account and not the Administrator account?
Another case... I used to program for a corporate environment. I was the only one who programs with conditions as to who is running the software, so I could save their data into their respective "Documents and Settings" folder, under Application Data. The rest of the developers don't care. I even set the installer to make sure only an Administrator account can install (using InnoSetup, great software).
So who's to blame? Users for running as Administrator (because they have no choice a lot of times)? Developers for not developing with multi-user environment consideration? Or Microsoft, for "hacking" Windows to become a horrible multi-user environment?