NeXTSTEP To Mac OS X
*no comment* writes "the folks over at OSviews have a nicely done article that explains the evolution of NeXTSTEP into Mac OS X. 'With the beginning of 1996, Apple realized that with the next generation PC's running Windows NT to be released within the decade, they would need a new, modern operating system to run on their machines. ... Amongst Apple's other options were to license Solaris from Sun, NT from Microsoft, or to purchase a small net services company called NeXT. Apple chose the latter.'" OSNews had another nice Mac-oriented look at NeXTSTEP last year; the Wikipedia entry is also worth looking through.
For awhile I was in search of the x86 version of Apple's Rhapsody DR2. Finally after speaking to a guy who created a page of screenshots, I found a beta software trading forum and grabbed an ISO of it. This guy also has screenshots of OpenStep too.. He's been running this site for years and its given me quite a nice look into the past. Its interesting never the less :)
Proceed with Format (Y/N)? Y
And of course, the choice of NeXTStep had nothing to do with Next also being owned by Steve Jobs!
"Freedom means freedom for everybody" -- Dick Cheney
They fail to mention that NeXT was the company set up by Steve Jobs after he left apple, with the mission to produce a next-generation Mac-like workstation with an OS called NeXTstep, based on mach, BSD and display Postscript
It means that I, for one, would not be using a Mac right now. The UNIX-ness is important to me.
I think they should have bought both, though -- maybe they would have come out with Spotlight sooner.
"[Regarding the 'cloud,'] ownership was what made America different than Russia." -- Woz
BeOS was a nonstarter.
The printing was horrid.
The development environment was awful, contrasted to the robust tools available on NeXTSTEP at the time.
NeXT had real mult-user capability. BeOS was only brought in as a bargaining chip and to entice Jobs to come onboard. BeOS at the time was really impressive on a Mac, especially if you couldn't stomach MacOS... but I ran BeOS @work and NeXTSTEP @home, the choice was readily apparent to people who actually used both systems.
--- I do not moderate.
As a licensed BeOS devloper who still has a Rev2 BeBox sitting around I must say you're wrong. BeOS was NEVER as far along as Nextstep was even when taking into acount the hardware transition. BeOS had poor to no network or print servies. We where promissed that they would be released "real soon now" for years. Granted what Be had was better then the same stuff on Next. But Be lacked a lot of very important stuff.
"Have you ever thought about just turning off the TV, sitting down with your kids, and hitting them?"
I first used NeXTStep in about 1989, when NeXT was still a hardware company.
NeXT made a big splash in the trade magazines by using standard UNIX industry hardware like the 680x0 processor, standard RAM, SCSI drives, etc. They did some neat stuff like having a 600M rewritable optical disk, unheard of capacity at the time. Unfortunately, no one else followed suit.
The big thing was the apps, though. Everything was done in Postscript, and there were several desktop publishing applications. As a math student at the time, Mathematica made my jaw drop. I figured out how to use it under ASCII mode via dialup, and checked all my homework that way.
The programming environment was interesting, though I never really delved into it. Underneath (or beside) the pretty GUI there was a 4.3BSD system with a Mach kernel. I was mostly interested in this compiler they had for it, gcc. They wanted you to copy it! And hunting around the ftp sites I found this new scripting language, perl, that was really great.
Too bad stuff like that will never catch on.
sigs, as if you care.
Now that Cocoa is finally getting its just dues how long before we see replacements to these Gorillas? They didn't want to invest in Cocoa programming then, but now six years later will they have taken the time to find the talent to do it now? Hard to tell but these are my predictions.
If they don't they'll be left behind. Adobe sees it by Apple entering into the market with better products.
Macromedia sees it but lets see if they really see it.
Quark seems to be the most cautious and I'm guessing they'll hedge their bets and have invested in such talent already.
Microsoft? Never. They'll figure that Office will always guarantee them supremacy in the platform. Then again I'm sure they'll be quite pissed if Apple releases a compatible Office suite worthy of knocking off Office. Afterall, XML is the measure of compatibility on all future Office suites.
The last section is obviously just conjecture but conjecture with history.For the x86 freaks, your only hope for an Apple menu on a bare metal x86
w _I n_DR2.html
They're making headway - mine runs.
http://www.rhapsody-project.tk/
A VERY cool resource.
http://www.shawcomputing.net/
Stone
http://www.stone.com/dev/StonesThrow21/Whats_Ne
~hylas
I can't let this topic go without a mention...
http://www.gnustep.org
Please take a look!
Thanks, GJC
Gregory Casamento
## Chief Maintainer for GNUstep
Well, Hank, I was the guy who wrote the report at Apple that recommended we buy NeXT. It was a simple choice, really, between Be and NeXTStep. NeXT had a much more complete offering, with actual commercial developers who had written really good stuff for it. Even better, it had had a number of releases, and had a mature system for handling version upgrades. Be, as many people will recall, tended to need an application recompile for every new version, and there way no obvious simple way to solve the problem. NeXT had a mature and battle tested kernel, and a real BSD layer, neither of which could really be said of Be at the time.
We considered a lot of other OSes. We looked at NT, but it looked like it would never be practical to port to a big-endian processor. We looked at Solaris, and it was a serious contender. There was no decent UI layer, though, by the standards we used to judge such things. Remember that things like KDE and GNOME were quite young and immature at the time.
Getting back Steve was a plus for the company, but wasn't a part of our deliberations as technical folks. NeXT Looked like the best technical choice, really. Linux was simply too young in 1996 to be a serious cnsideration, even though Apple had an internal mkLinux project.
Who knows what it might have been today, given a new shot at choosing. But back then, there was nothing that stood up to NeXT given the constraints of Apple's business.
Failed? It's hard to see Apple as a "failed" company with successes like the iMac, the iPod, iTMS and recent financial figures. I confess I haven't checked stock price and financial statements, but I understand anecdotaly that Apple is doing quite well, "niche" or not.
Don't make someone bust out the old argument of market share and comparisons to companies like Lexus, etc. etc. You're just not a "success" unless you become some sort of a monopoly, is that it?
I'd better go enjoy my G5 since Apple has so miserably failed and is, true to predictions since about 1990, about to close its doors.
WebObjects is still alive and kicking, at my company we use it for all manner of things. It has become a real workhorse and continues to evolve capability-wise and mature in terms of stability. As a J2EE certified platform (last time I checked), the thing that I find most overlooked about the package is its built-in GUI a la Dreamweaver, it is, however, much more effective at visualizing/previewing dynamic pages with active data than the Macromedia product. If you are developing database-tied web sites with Java you owe it to yourself to check out Apple WebObjects. (It is not strictly tied to the Apple platform BTW) Of all the J2EE APIs I have used it is by far the most friendly, due to a code-quality pedigree inherited from NeXT and extensively re-factored ObjectiveC MVC structures. thanks Steve, et. al. (the built-in multi-schema load-balancer is a nice finishing touch ;) /*
Can you tell your JVM controller to re-start (and pass off extant sessions to other instances) your application instances to account for what could (at any time) be(come) a buggy JVM by clicking on a check-box on an HTML config page? A non-elegant but eminently practical solution for inexplicable java memory leaks is built in to this package. I call Nice. Check it out.
*/
TTFN.
I worked on Copland. The failure of Copland was not really a failure of technology but a failure of management. There were a number of management failures that brought the project down.
In the winter of 1995 we got a mandate that the first Copland beta would be made available for the May 1996 World Wide Developers' Conference.
That winter two of the major tasks that were being handled were to bring in the new file system and the new I/O system, replacing the original Copland, hastily built, prototype systems. For the purposes of that build, Copland could be split into 4 major pieces: file system, I/O subsystem, kernel and higher level functionality.
We produced set of glue code such that either file system or I/O subsystem could be used together, allowing the new I/O subsystem to be tested without alterations to the rest of the system and the new file system to be tested with the old I/O subsystem.
In January of 1996, as we were approaching the end of that build cycle, the kernel team decided that they really, really, needed to change a bunch of API's that would break just about everything. At this point, a strong management decision would have been "WAIT - those changes can go into the next build, AFTER the I/O subsystem and file system have been tested". Instead, the kernel changes were allowed to proceed. At this point everything in the system was broken. Upgrading the old I/O subsystem to work with the new kernel API's was a huge amount of work so the ability to test the new file system against the old I/O subsystem was lost. Now, the entire system had to be tested together with every component in flux. Needless to say, the integration process for this build took forever and was probably the first death blow for the project.
As WWDC approached, we expected that pressure would be brought from management to make the deadline. Instead, as the time for all-nighters with free pizza came up in about March management looked at the schedule and decided that it could not be met. Having told everyone previously if this deadline was missed the company would be in deep doo-doo, management credibility went out the window. The number of late nighters (already not enough for a project so far behind schedule) dropped precipitously. This was the second death blow to the project.
Over the summer of 1996 we were very close to having the developer release ready. A senior engineer and tech lead had been on sabbatical and doing some serious thinking and came back with a paper that cast serious doubts on the approach that Copland was taking to emulating the Mac OS System 7 environment.
Classic Mac OS is more of a library than an operating system in that all of the operating system's data structures are in the same address as applications. Copland's approach to Classic Mac OS compatibility was to emulate EVERYTHING, including internal data structures that applications might use. For example, in Classic Mac OS there is a linked list (can't remember the name of the damned thing right now) of data structures for all of the open files. Applications would walk this list to find out who else had files open. In the Copland emulation environment the Copland file system would generate events for the emulation layer so that the emulation layer could keep this list current!
This approach was causing serious problems. The mandate from marketing was that 99% of applications had to run, warts and all and this was proving to be strictly impossible. The emphasis on providing an emulation layer had bushwhacked the "new api" such that there really wasn't much available to write apps that took advantage of the multi-tasking and memory protection that the OS provided. The paper written seriously critiqued this approach.
Unfortunately as this paper made its way up the management chain to people who did not really understand what it was talking about, the entire project began to be regarded as failed.
Copland had a number of technical failings, one of its