FairUCE - the Smart Email Proxy
Jestrzcap writes "This just posted on Freshmeat: FairUCE (which stands for 'Fair use of Unsolicited Commercial Email') is an SMTP proxy, running between multiple instances of Postfix, that verifies email by attempting to verify the sender through lookups (a user customized challenge/response). It claims to be able to 'stop a vast majority of spam' without the need for content filters, and 'virtually eliminates spoofed addresses, phishing, and even many viruses with a few cached DNS look-ups and a couple of if/then statements'."
No way will the spammers ever find a way around this. It's solid!
I've already had problems getting email from my government coworkers with spam validators like this. The military really doesn't like broadcasting who their email servers are... So they regularly get sent to Junk Mail.
If MTA's on the Internet required the forward and reverse DNS lookups to match ~70% of spam (and viruses) would disappear. This requires ISP's to correcty configure their DNS, which unfortunately doesn't happen because people are lazy.
FairUCE looks interesting but I'd be curious if it'd do a better job than milter-sender. About a year ago, before I installed milter-sender, I was receiving about 200-300 spams per day. Since installing milter-sender in March 2004 and adding the spamhaus SBL-XBL checks to sendmail, I've received (checking spam mbox) 1568 spam messages.
Slashdot: Failed Car Analogies. Amateur Lawyering. Anecdote Battles.
No kidding, I hate people with slanted views.
Doesn't this just create more traffic?
Jaysyn
There is a war going on for your mind.
Even though this is an interesting new tool, most e-mail users are tied to whatever backend their ISP supplies, which is a shame... Someone should whip up an end-user desktop version.
Can't wait to get my hands on a copy of the server version though...
One problem with challenge response is that Spammers not only send me spam, but send spam purportedly sent by me. I regularly get error messages about mail that could not be delivered. Now I'll get loads of challenge messages instead.
Of course if my MTA signed my messages with a random key, and the challenge message sent the key back, my MTA could filter out anything I didn't actually send. Unfortunately that requires coordination which the various email/spam task groups do not seem to be capable of.
Guess I'm asking at the wrong place, but does this mean if I send email using my uni's SMTP server with my Yahoo! E-mail address in the "from" field, I will receive a challenge? A challenge being an email to the sender's address so they know the address is active, I'm guessing..
And I read of a whitelist/blacklist. Does this mean the user having to manage this list? It looks like it's being done so that the user can reactively work about it though (instead of actively), maybe an email that says "You got email from xyz, Do you want this email?" Heh an email about an email, that'd be annoying.
I tried sending email using Yahoo!'s web interface with 3 addresses in the "To" field today, and when I clicked "Send" it asked me to answer a Captcha, interesting..
What time is it/will be over there? Check with my iPhone app!
1) Mobile user sets up notebook at new location and sends mail via the local mail relay.
2) FairUCE on recipient end bounces the mail because it can't find a relationship between the sender and the mail relay.
If the ISP blocks outbound port 25 access, you get a real catch 22. Can't use remote relay becuase of the port block. Can't use local relay because FireUCE will see that there is no relationship to the sender and block the mail.
This is an old idea. It can be implimented with procmail and a little perl. Few people do this, not for lack of tools, but simply because it is a bad idea.
). It claims to be able to 'stop a vast majority of spam' without the need for content filters, and 'virtually eliminates spoofed addresses, phishing, and even many viruses with a few cached DNS look-ups and a couple of if/then statements'.
Oh, yeah, and completely stop mailing lists from being usable. That, too.
FYI, any time (which is every time) I get a challenge for an email I didn't send, I immediately block the server because that kind of "solution" is nothing short of dropping their spam problem in my lap. Fair warning to anyone who thinks FairUCE is in any way a "Smart" answer to spam.
The only effective spam solution I've currently found is to have expiring email addresses. One easy way to set that up is to use subdomains that don't even resolve after a certain point. So you might have me@2004.example.com good for only three more weeks, or me@amazon.example.com good for as long as Amazon (or your "healthy" girlfriend) doesn't sell you out. You can get tricky, of course, and use subdomains that are not so easily subject to a dictionary attack or guessing.
Have we not established a few basic tenets of the spamademic?
1. Spammers make money by using a disproportionate amount of bandwidth than what they pay for. Stopping spam from entering peoples' inboxes is less than half the problem. 70% or more of all SMTP traffic is UCE and everyone pays for that in higher costs and slower performance regardless of whether they have spam filters in place.
2. The majority of the anti-spam solutions (with the exception of RBLs) including the one related to this article, require extra time, bandwidth and resources on the part of innocent networks to deal with the spam problem. This is a step backwards.
If you want to stop spammers you have to stop them from stealing bandwidth. To date, the ONLY effective solution thus far has been relay blacklisting. This has several added benefits including: stopping propagating of worms/viruses, and forcing ISPs to police the illegal activities of their users and shut down nodes which are spamming through their network.
As an ISP, I have no interest in yet another costly anti-spam solution that I have to install that doesn't address the larger issue of the tons of bandwidth spammers waste on my network and every one in between. This system wastes even more resources by attempting to verify the source of every e-mail in an even more detailed manner than before, so the end result is: more computing resources needed, more bandwidth needed and slower mail service.
No thanks.
I'll patiently wait until the *inevitable* SMTP whitelist scheme that is the only true solution to stopping spam (unless the authorities decide to actually start prosecuting spammers for their crimes).
This package just isn't going to get very popular. It is restricted to non-commercial use (perhaps you can buy a license for commercial use). And you have to sign up with IBM to get a download just to see if it's any good. And then there's a lot of extra stuff you have to have to run it. Maybe I should work on my own GPL open source version of this and do it as a pure TCP proxy front end so it works on any mail server (even for Exchange on Windows if on a different machine or under some emulator).
now we need to go OSS in diesel cars
Here in the Netherlands the government wants providers to keep a log of all mail (http, ftp, whatever) traffic that goes over their lines. The providers are complaining, but in the end they will simply raise prices to compensate. Effectively I will be paying to be spied upon. And in the case of email, I will be paying to receive spam and then store it for five or ten years.
"If we could just rewrite everybody mailer's with my new widget in illegible Perl or badly written C that breaks several RFC's I've never bothered to read, we will surely stop spam!" I've heard this sort of thing before, every few months for the past 10 years.
There have been dozens of these wildly espoused challenge/response systems over the years. They don't work because users hate them, because vital automated systems such as bill payment and delivery verifications can't get past them. Coupled with "sender pays" systems, they're almost always subverted within short periods and never can or will gain the acceptance of the user community enough to become effective.
Similarly, responsible blacklists will demand credible evidence before listing a domain as a spam source.
Could you name names, i.e. the blacklists that you have encountered that are not being responsible?
Female Prison Rape in NY
It would be a lot better if you rewrote the verse lyrics, too. As it's written, it's just a waste of space. No creativity is displayed at all.
Something like:
I've got the hacktitude of a Redmond pro
I've got the legacy devices of a billion sold
I got My Rights Online back, but I don't seem to care
I got the compressed jay-pegs of sex with a mare!
TFP. HAND.
Also, wouldn't this just create a rash of false challenges that lead to spamming type material or websites?
Luck favors the prepared, darling.
Some blacklists list known spammer domains, but these are fairly well confirmed via the ownership of the domain. Many lists skip the actual 'sending spam' part and just list all domains owned by certain spammers.
What you are describing sounds like what people who have IPs near spammers go through. Can you point to one of these hundreds of domain blocklists that has listed you incorrect at some point?
The only thing I can think of is that you're running an affiliate system and can't keep your affiliates under control.
If corporations are people, aren't stockholders guilty of slavery?
- If someone else has a different challenge/response system then the automated systems will ping e-mail back and forth to each other and humans will never see it. If the systems are sufficiently dumb, you'll get a nasty mailing loop and fill up both users' quota/hard disk.
- Most spam has a forged address. If someone sends e-mail to 10,000 users with a c/r system with *your* e-mail address in the from header, you get 10,000 e-mails that day. Your only solution to this obvious problem would be to blacklist anything that looked like a c/r e-mail, thus breaking the system entirely.
- It increases the amount of traffic on the 'net. This is bad.
- About five million other reasons to do with netiquette and common sense. Will people never learn?
I run a small web board, and already the e-mail address I use as the admin of that board gets flooded daily with crap like "I haven't actually received your message, click here to verify you are real". I finally got fed up with it and posted this response.
If you implement these, remember you get e-mail from more then just friends you know. Lets see, last week alone, I got 5 messages from companies like Dell from working on issues with them, and none of them are in my address book.
The proper solution is to ensure the outside world sees no difference unless it is spam. I never give my full address to a company, instead I use the postfix feature where anything after _ is ignored. Then I create a one letter alias for me to keep them short. If I get a lot of e-mail, it makes server side filtering into my IMap folders easy. And if one address gets hit by spam, I then block it on the server. It works well, and doesn't inconvenience the people e-mailing me.
"Thank you or ringing my doorbell. I am currently home, but did not hear the doorbell. To properly ring it, please run around my house, braving the dogs in back, and use the doorbell located next to the cat door on the deck. Then I might care enough to see who you are and let you in."
I haven't seen anyone post the BIG REASON why C/R systems won't work, so here it is again.
C/R relies on users being willing to respond to challenge messages, either by clicking a URL or by replying by e-mail.
As soon as C/R systems become commonplace enough, and users become accustomed to responding to the messages, spammers will simply craft their spam to look like challenge messages. Replying to e-mail will confirm the address (a win for the spammer), clicking the URL will deliver the reader to a web site full of pop-up ads and spyware (a win for the spammer).
Shortly after this, user willingness to respond to challenges will drop to zero, and challenge messages will be filtered out automatically by bayesian spam filters.
So, if there are any spammers reading this, PLEASE PLEASE start your next major spamming campaign by disguising it as a challenge message from one of these stupid C/R systems. That way we'll kill off the idea once and for all, people won't waste any more time building new (and mutually incompatible) C/R systems, and people with a clue won't have to put up with any more C/R advocacy from well-meaning idiots.
GCHQ Quantum Insert installed. If only our tongues were made of glass, how much more careful we would be when we speak