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Preview of New Block Cipher

flaws writes "Secure Science Corp. is offering a preview of one of the 3 ciphers they will be publishing througout the year. The CS2-128 cipher is a 128-bit block cipher with a 128 bit key. This cipher is proposed as a hardware alternative to AES, being that it is more efficient in hardware, simpler to implement, and comparably secure to AES-128. The preview of the CS2-128 cipher proposed is in html form and will be available in a published format at the end of April. At this time, requests are made for casual peer review and implementation. Secure Science will be offering a challenge at the end of April, introducing the cipher to the public. This ciphers implementation and usage will be offered in multiple hardware devices, such as wireless routers, cell-phones, and storage management hardware."

19 of 232 comments (clear)

  1. In case of Slashdotting... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

    MD5 of article text: 79592dc553067bfafaa07086c07d2c8a

  2. PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

    Hello,

    Recently I noticed that my teenage son Ezekiel had begun to encrypt
    his emails with a program called PGP. I was concerned because I'd
    always covertly monitored their email for any hints of illegal
    activity, drug use or interest in the occult - some of his classmates
    have begun playing Dungeons and Dragons and listening to KISS. Since
    Ezekiel was now using PGP, his activites were hidden from me!

    Additionally, I also overheard him talking of using a program called
    Stegasaurus to embed secret information into normal-looking pictures.
    Terrified that my son might be speaking in some sort of sinful code, I
    immediately grounded him for a month. He was only allowed to go to
    school and Bible study.

    Anyways, I've done several days worth of research on this and
    discovered a few things about PGP that I'd like to share with the
    readers of these newsgroups. To begin with, I realized that many of
    the claims made by the creators of PGP are blatently false. Although I
    do not have a background in mathematics (I have an AA in Photography)
    I was easily able to rebuild Ezekiel's private key via his public key
    and one of his encrypted messages.

    Of course I am above-average in intelligence, but PGP is supposedly
    unbreakable! Perhaps crytogrophers aren't as smart as they believe?
    Fortunately in this case Ezekiel was just discussing a girl he met in
    school - a situation I harshly reprimanded him for. However, while PGP
    may be a program with flaws, it got me thinking about other programs.
    Perhaps someone will construct a PGP-like program that cannot be so
    easily broken; one that would take days of computer time to hack!

    My concern with a program like this is that people who use
    cryptography always do so because they have something to hide. A sense
    of guilt and shame seems to drive them. They know that they are doing
    something wrong and desperately want to hide it from the eyes of the
    world (although hiding it from the eyes of God is another matter!
    LOL!)

    A study recently released by the Institute for Family Computing
    revealed that the top three uses of cryptography were for 1)
    "terrorist-related activity" 2) pedophillia and 3) drug abuse. In fact
    as far as I can tell, no legitimate use was on the top ten at all!

    What scares me about this is that law-enforcement agencies will be
    unable to sift through email to find people who are breaking the law,
    or otherwise engaged in suspicious activity. At a time when our nation
    is under siege, I find it disturbing that people are working on
    developing cryptography that cannot be broken, even by our protectors
    in the FBI and CIA! Only those with something to hide truly need
    cryptography.

    Thus I urge cryptogrophers world wide to refrain from working on such
    programs, until our nation is no longer at war. I would ask those of
    other countries to respect our right to self-defense and aid us in our
    time of trouble. Your cryptographic skills can be better put to use
    trying to find terrorists than to assist them.

    1. Re:PGP: A Dangerous Program for a Dangerous Time by maroonhat · · Score: 4, Funny

      Is your son a computer hacker?

      ...im quite sorry a site like the one my link points to exists but its hilarious none the less

      --
      The more I learn about Windows the more I am surprised it runs at all
  3. "provably just as secure as AES-128"? Bah. by Jepler · · Score: 5, Informative

    I read the paper. They devote, oh, a page or so to attacks. Proven as secure as AES? bah.

  4. Go with what is widely used by John+Harrison · · Score: 5, Insightful
    One of the advantages of AES, 3DES and DES is that as heavily used standards they attract a lot of research. You can have a lot of confidence that if there is a weakness it will be discovered and made public. The same is not true of proprietary ciphers. As a example look at the 40 bit encryption used by TI for RFID tags that was recently broken by a bunch of university students. If those students had been malicious they could have broken it and not told anyone. They could have then exploited the weakness for years because the cipher isn't widely studied so it is unlikely that someone else would have bothered to crack it. If TI had simply gone with 3DES there would have been no problem.

    The moral of the story: stick to the standards people.

    1. Re:Go with what is widely used by Zeinfeld · · Score: 4, Interesting
      As a example look at the 40 bit encryption used by TI for RFID tags that was recently broken by a bunch of university students. If those students had been malicious they could have broken it and not told anyone. They could have then exploited the weakness for years because the cipher isn't widely studied so it is unlikely that someone else would have bothered to crack it. If TI had simply gone with 3DES there would have been no problem. The moral of the story: stick to the standards people.

      Whenever a 40 bit cipher turns up the most likely reason is the export restrictions. When TI was doing its work they could not stick to the standard.

      Plus 3DES is not exactly a great cipher, the small block size means that certain attacks become possible after 2^32 blocks of ciphertext, that is only 32 Gb of data which is not a lot of data.

      The TI problem was due to using the same cipher for 15 years without periodic security reviews.

      --
      Looking for an Information Security student project suggestion?
      Try http://dotcrimeManifesto.com/
  5. Already cracked ! by MajorDick · · Score: 4, Funny

    Well, I called up DVD Jon , and within about 15 minutes he had a working exploit for the cipher.

    Oh well off to the next

    Nothing to see here already been cracked...move along....

  6. Snake Oil? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Top Questions:

    1. Is this a proprietary or patented algorithm?

    2. Has this algorithm gone through the usual rounds of analysis among the nations top cryptographers?

    3. Has it been implemented in a FIPS 140-2 certified cryptographic module?

    That should keep them busy.

    1. Re:Snake Oil? by flaws · · Score: 5, Informative

      1) No - it is open source and technically public domain. 2) That is what we are attempting now - the preview is to get it lined up with crypto experts to review. 3) If it gets past 2, then that is something to consider.

  7. Maybe there's something I'm not getting here, by sporktoast · · Score: 4, Insightful

    but what is "casual peer review" and why would it be desired (over perhaps more in depth peer review) for an encryption technology?

    --
    In a related story, the IRS has recently ruled that the cost of Windows upgrades can NOT be deducted as a gambling loss.
  8. Snake-oil... by rhythmx · · Score: 4, Insightful

    "We prove that our design is immune to differential and linear cryptanalysis"

    See Bruce Schneier's "Snake Oil", Warning Sign #8: Security proofs.

    "Secure Science will be offering a challenge at the end of April, introducing the cipher to the public."

    See: Warning Sign #9: "Cracking contests" and "The Fallacy of Cracking Contests"

    All of this may be well and good, but I don't any real engineers are going to be choosing this over AES anytime soon. AES was a competition backed by NIST to replace the current encryption standard (3DES). Most of the world's top cryptographers submitted thier algorithm. Only after a very long and very thourogh peer review process did the NIST declare Rijandel's submission to be the winner, and therefore the new AES standard.

    1. Re:Snake-oil... by cpeikert · · Score: 4, Insightful

      "We prove that our design is immune to differential and linear cryptanalysis"

      See Bruce Schneier's "Snake Oil", Warning Sign #8: Security proofs.


      Two things: number one, you can prove immunity to these two kinds of attacks, in a formal, rigorous way. That doesn't mean there are no attacks, but it's decent evidence of security.

      Number two, proofs of security are a very good thing. Just because snake-oil salesmen claim to have "proofs of unbreakability" does not mean that security proofs are bad. A rigorous proof of security against a well-specified, formal attack model should inspire lots of confidence. Without security proofs, cryptography would still just be mostly ad-hoc-ery.

    2. Re:Snake-oil... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Funny

      To: flaws@securescience.com
      From: bruce@schneier.com
      Subject: Peer Review

      Flaws,
      Peer review some algorithm you just made up? Wow. Definitely not Snake-oil. Gimme a break.

      Bruce

      >Bruce,
      >We just came up with a 1337 crypto algo. You wanna peer review it for us?
      >Peace,
      >flaws

  9. Re:Well....maybe by patchvonbraun · · Score: 5, Informative

    Immunity in this case meaning that the work factor for mounting the attack is greater or equal to the work factor for brute-forcing the key. If brute-forcing the key costs 2**128 operations, and differential costs 2**129, for example, then you'd be crazy to attempt differential cryptanalysis, when bruting the key is cheaper. I admit to not having RTFP, so I can't evaluate their claim of immunity to DC and LC, but modern ciphers are deliberately designed to be resistant to attack via DC and LC.

  10. I stand corrected! by John+Harrison · · Score: 4, Funny

    You are right. Nevermind what I said. Buy the snake oil, it has a better track record.

  11. Easy killer... by danielrm26 · · Score: 4, Insightful
    "This cipher is proposed as a hardware alternative to AES, being that it is more efficient in hardware, simpler to implement, and comparably secure to AES-128."
    Comparably secure? The Rijndael algorithm has been around for a pretty long time and has undergone a lot of scrutiny. Wait until this new kid has been around the block for a few years; then we talk about comparisons to Rijndael.

    "You keep using this word. I don't think it means what you think it means."
    --
    dmiessler.com -- grep understanding knowledge
  12. I don't get it... by cperciva · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Maybe I'm misreading the description, but it looks to me like this is an 8-round cipher with a round function considerably simpler than Rijndael's round function.

    Given that 8-round Rijndael is broken, it seems highly optimistic to think that this new cipher will not be broken.

  13. More hardware-efficient than Rijndael? by ca1v1n · · Score: 5, Insightful

    I've actually designed the encryption end of a synthesizable Rijndael chip. It was lab 5 of ECE 435 at U.Va. Granted, that's a 4 1/2 credit course, and there were only 5 labs, but still. Adding the decryption would have less than doubled the work, and considerably less than doubled the silicon. Implementing AES in hardware is NOT hard. In the name of laziness, I did it in a highly parallel fashion a lot of work that could be serialized to reduce the transistor count by about a factor of 8, before getting to even slightly fancy optimization techniques.

    You need some registers, some shifters, and some very minimal control logic. Doing the sbox algorithmically isn't terribly fast and requires a fair amount of logic, so generally you just use a 256 byte ROM for the sbox. With die space being as expensive as it was when DES was being designed, it's understandable that they did some weird things to make it fit on the chip. These days, nobody blinks at 10k transistors, even on embedded devices.

    Sure, their 4x4 sbox is going to take a lot less space on the chip, but does that really buy anything? Their design document shows that 32 of them are necessary to do a whole round in a single step, while only 4 are needed for Rijndael. That's 2048 bits of ROM on CS2 and 8192 bits of ROM for Rijndael, but CS2 takes 33 rounds while the 128-bit version of Rijndael takes only 10. The amount of hardware required for comparable throughput is about the same, though Rijndael's pipeline is an order of magnitude shorter, due to fewer rounds and the rounds not having to go through that barrel-shifter network.

  14. Re:Author? Rationale? Trustability? by Ckwop · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Why should we care? There are lots of crypto algorithms out there, some of which, like the AES candidates, have been thoroughly beaten up by the community. Is there some weakness (esp. with Rijndael) that this addresses?

    The only "weakness" in AES is that the transform is incomplete. Nobody has turned this into an attack and it's unlikely to become a source of attack.

    I couldn't really tell which block modes were useful - CBC, counter-mode, etc. Is there anything different here than AES?

    No, modes of operation are independent of the underlying block cipher.

    How well does it parallelize - if you're trying to pump out maximum speed on something other than a discrete 8-bit chip, such as an array of cells in an FPGA or ASIC, does that work ok? Or is the answer simply "go use whichever standard operations mode you like, just as you would with AES or 3DES?

    I've not read the details of the spec to be able to answer this question. Sorry :(

    Is 128 bits long enough for both the key and the block? There was some discussions about originally trying to design for 256-bit keys, but cutting back to 128 for efficiency reasons. If making it fit onto an 8051 is part of your design criteria, that may be necessary, but many algorithms have some encryption modes that aren't as useful because of birthday attacks because the keys are too short.

    This isn't really a concern. In order for birthday attacks to come about using CBC, or some other chaining mode, you'd have to encrypt around 2^64 blocks. The block is 128-bit long, which gives 2^4 * 2^64 = 2^68 bytes of encryption before the probabilities become an issue. If you're encrypting that much with a single key, you're insane.

    You might think counter mode would help you avoid that problem, but alas, it does not. In a random stream you'd expect each group of 128-bits to be equally probable. With CTR, however, we know that each 128-bit block of the keystream will only be repeated after 2^128 encryptions. This fact allows you to distinquish CTR from random after around, you guessed it, 2^64 encryptions.

    Oh btw, donate to Tom St Denis he writes a cool cryptolib.

    Simon.