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What to Expect from Linux 2.6.12
apt-get writes "Saw this Linuxworld report from the annual Australian Linux conference, Linux.conf.au, in Canberra last week. The article outlines some of the new features we can expect for the 2.6.12 kernel release, including: support for trusted computing, and security enhanced Linux. The kernel developers are also working on improving the 'feel' of the Linux desktop with inotify for file managers and events notification so hardware 'just works'. Unfortunately no release date other than 'sometime soon' is given."
Just for those not in the know..
/home recursively. I don't remember why or which. :)
Inotify is a replacement for dnotify. With both you can watch for a file for changes. You can even watch a directory for changes. However with dnotify you couldn't recursively watch a directory for changes. To do so required basically 'opening' each folder and quickly you use up the maximum number of files you can open.
With inotify it still doesn't directly support recursively watching a directory but example code for doing so is given and doesn't have the same problems. One distro uses this for watching
As for the notification thing - that's part of HAL, and means usb pens, cameras, etc should be 'auto detected' and the user can be notified and asked what to do automatically.
does this mean I can tust my computer now?
Not if you're using the spell checker at the moment, no.
What's your damage, Heather?
You got one thing right - you *are* going to rub a lot of feathers the wrong way saying that. I'm not saying I agree or disagree with the idea, but understand that having lots (and lots) of little tools that do one thing only, that can be chained together is the "Unix way".
For a lot of people, that's a lot of the appeal of Unix and Unix-like systems.
It's official. Most of you are morons.
It's a different thing. The 'trusted computing' in Windows is all about DRM, preventing you from getting access to data on your machine.
The 'trusted computing' in Linux 2.6.12 is about being able to run a process that is restricted in what it can do (read and write to a pipe, essentially), so that you can run an arbitary downloaded binary without worrying that it will do bad things. (think: distributed.net, SETI, etc).
GUN Linux
Eric, is that you?
Secure messaging: http://quickmsg.vreeken.net/
Ross Anderson's Critique
IBM's Rebuttal
Trusted Gentoo
IBM's rebuttal does a decent job of allaying some of the fears - for example, it states that it will not prevent you from running any OS & programs you wish to on your own computer (which, for the record, I believe - witness the Trusted Gentoo project and e.g. this this link). They state that their approach to Trusted Computing is not particularly well-suited to DRM, and on the face of it, I agree - there seems to be little attempt at restricting the user of a computer with the TPM from doing what they want. However, in my opinion, as a base for an utterly crippling DRM regime, distributors simply could not ask for a better setup, as I'll argue a little later.
So to re-cap, it seems that if you are running Trusted hardware, there are no restrictions on what you can do on your computer in isolation; you can install Linux, run any number of Open Source apps, etc. But the keyword here is in isolation, and it is here that the dangers of Trusted Computing are revealed. For you see, Trusted Computing enables the usage of remote attestation wherein a server may request a hash of all software currently running on your computer. This hash is, for all intents and purposes, unforgeable, and if you disable your TPM (as IBM stress that you can, and again for the record, I see no reason to disbelieve them), no hash will be sent. The server may then assess this hash of software (or note that no hash has been provided, in which case it may well treat your computer as Untrusted) and decide, based on what software you are running, to simply not serve you with whatever material you requested - for example, it may decide that it will not deliver MP3's to your computer unless it knows for a fact that the receiving application is one that is known to encrypt the content as soon as it is received (so that e.g. it simply cannot be viewed while not running in Trusted mode) and which will take every step to ensure that once received, the unencrypted content never leaves your machine (e.g. by being written to CD, e-mailed , etc.). As you can imagine, the above scenario is not at all far-fetched as the **AA/ other media distributors are positively *creaming* themselves at the thought of stamping out casual file-sharing or even making backups for your own use in some of your other devices.
So we are left with the situation where someone who does not use Trusted hardware (and is thus unable to respond to attestation requests) or those who do run Trusted hardware but whose software fingerprint is not deemed acceptable by the server will simply not be granted access to certain material, rendering such people at a big disadvantage. And it's no good buying hardware free from Trust chips from China or such places on the "black market"; this offers no advantage at all as Trusted hardware, as mentioned, does not stop you using your computer the way you want in isolation; the problem only occurs when you try to interact with other computers.
So far, this sounds unpleasant but not too bad (although I would urge you to read Anderson's linked essay for some more imaginative and serious abuses), but if we allow ourselves to follow the slippery-slope, we end up at the state where ISPs will not allow your computer to access the internet at all (for surfing, e-mailing, anything) unless you are running Trusted hardware and software. Obviously, the social, political and legal barriers to this occurence are non-trivial, but we've all seen ridiculous Acts qu