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What to Expect from Linux 2.6.12

apt-get writes "Saw this Linuxworld report from the annual Australian Linux conference, Linux.conf.au, in Canberra last week. The article outlines some of the new features we can expect for the 2.6.12 kernel release, including: support for trusted computing, and security enhanced Linux. The kernel developers are also working on improving the 'feel' of the Linux desktop with inotify for file managers and events notification so hardware 'just works'. Unfortunately no release date other than 'sometime soon' is given."

40 of 505 comments (clear)

  1. Yay! by qwertphobia · · Score: 3, Funny

    does this mean I can tust my computer now?

    we've had a growing apart since it started cheating on me and got a virus :-(

    --
    Never ask for directions from a two-headed tourist! -Big Bird
    1. Re:Yay! by Brento · · Score: 5, Funny

      does this mean I can tust my computer now?

      Not if you're using the spell checker at the moment, no.

      --
      What's your damage, Heather?
  2. Trusted Computing by khujifig · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Is the inclusion of trusted computing a good thing here? Many people in the /. crowd didn't seem to like the idea of it's inclusion in Windows...

    Was its inclusion in the kernel by choice?

    1. Re:Trusted Computing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

      It's a different thing. The 'trusted computing' in Windows is all about DRM, preventing you from getting access to data on your machine.

      The 'trusted computing' in Linux 2.6.12 is about being able to run a process that is restricted in what it can do (read and write to a pipe, essentially), so that you can run an arbitary downloaded binary without worrying that it will do bad things. (think: distributed.net, SETI, etc).

    2. Re:Trusted Computing by madaxe42 · · Score: 4, Interesting

      do something good with it (make computers safer)

      Call me silly, but how is 'making computers safer' a good thing? I don't *need* protecting from the big bad wide world, there are enough intrusions into my life to make it 'safer' as it is - each and almost every one of them pisses me off.

    3. Re:Trusted Computing by paulpach · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Yes. Trusted computing is a very good thing. This is some of the things you can expect:

      When you compile or install a software, you can sign it. The computer will not execute anything that is not signed. This stops many viruses and trojan horses, so you can trust that you authorized everything the computer executes. It is just a security layer just like the no execution bit.

      The important thing here is that the user is in full control of the system. The user gets to sign the packages or he can choose to use a distro that signs them for him. He chooses what the computer runs and what not. There is no third party that limits what the user can/cannot execute.

      Besides signing software, TCPA (the chip that is going to be supported by the kernel) does encryption on hardware. So you can have hardware accelerated encryption/decryption, and your CPU will be free to do other things. This is not much different from hardware accelerated 2d & 3d graphics. Again, this is a very good thing.

      Many people opose trusted computer because they confuse this with DRM (Digital rights management). DRM is technology that limits the right to open media. Trusted computer does not limit your rights at all. The confusion arises from the fact that microsoft plans to use TCPA (Trusted computer) to implement DRM.

      TCPA support will totally be optional. You can enable/disable it when compiling the kernel. You normally want it enabled to take advantage of hw accelerated encryption, but if you are still paranoid (read misinformed) and think there is some evil corporation that is going to use TCPA to limit your rights, you can just turn it off.

      There is a nice article from ibm that clarifies the issue

    4. Re:Trusted Computing by Ford+Prefect · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Is the inclusion of trusted computing a good thing here? Many people in the /. crowd didn't seem to like the idea of it's inclusion in Windows...

      I think the complaints about locking machines down are more in who gets the keys...

      --
      Tedious Bloggy Stuff - hooray?
    5. Re:Trusted Computing by finkployd · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Trusted computing as a whole is a good thing, with one componant that is a very bad thing: Remote attestation. This will allow remote systems to know exactly what software you are using to connect to them (cryptographically, so no spoofing it unless you are really good at factoring large primes :)

      The nightmare scenerio is far beyond the typical DRM use case that most slashdotters fret about. Imagine if Microsoft wanted to ensure that only "trusted" client can connect to windows file sharing services, ie lock out Samba. Or make it so that only IE can connect to IIS webservers.

      Sure they may not, but they are building the technology to allow this to happen and if ever they fall upon hard times, they will be legally obligated to their shareholders to take any advantages they can to ensure profits.

    6. Re:Trusted Computing by Blapto · · Score: 4, Informative

      If you're a *nix user, think really cool chroot jail.

    7. Re:Trusted Computing by Minna+Kirai · · Score: 4, Insightful

      AC: It isn't usefull by itself, but if you combine it with ExecShield and SELinux it could be a useful security layer.

      Or, you could just combine ExecShield and SELinux by themselves and have a useful security layer, without needing Trusted Computing at all.

      Brushing aside the minor side-features, Trusted Computing is really about tamper-resistant hardware enforcing the signatures of software on the PC. The main use of that is preventing the legal and physical owner of that PC from hacking programs on his own computer, so that RIAA music publishers can continue to trust it.

    8. Re:Trusted Computing by Minna+Kirai · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Trusted computing as a whole is a good thing, with one componant that is a very bad thing: Remote attestation.

      Nuclear bombs are on a whole good things, with one componant that is a very bad thing: widespread death.

      You can't admit that the single motivating factor of a system is bad, but then say that the afterthoughts and bonus utilities somehow make up for it. And if you don't believe remote attestation was the driving factor to create Trusted Computing, just look at its history of sponsors.

    9. Re:Trusted Computing by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

      (posting anonymously, cuz I work at verisign, though not in any of the cert-related depts...)

      Free clue -- VeriSign's raison d'etre is not to convince end users that Business X is "trustworthy", only to verify whether or not someone representing themselves as Business X is in fact Business X. We verify the connection(s) between a real-world/meatspace identity and an electronic identity.

      If We Install Spyware, Inc. applies for a SSL cert for www.weinstallspyware.com, our job is to verify that the guy requesting the cert is actually works for We Install Spyware, and that the domain name is also legitimately connected with the company. Ditto for code signing certs.

      If, after we have verified that yes, indeed, the spyware you are about to install is really from We Install Spyware, Inc, you still want to install it, then hey, that's on you. We verify the company's identity, that's all.

    10. Re:Trusted Computing by Alsee · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Who modded this up? It is wrong on almost every point.

      When you compile or install a software, you can sign it. The computer will not execute anything that is not signed.

      Which has absolutely nothing to do with Trusted Computing.

      If you want to do that you can do it right now with a trivial change to the EXE loader code. Hell, you can do it on a Win98 machine without a patch - all you need to do is redirect EXE and similar filetype association to point you your own little stub code to do that check. You can obviously do it with a trivial patch to Linux or DOS or any system.

      Trusted Computing has nothing to do with signing files. In Trusted Computing any code's hash *is* it's "signature" and controlls what data it may decrypt. It is that hash which is reported over the internet. No need for any signature from anyone. You can certainly add signatures for various purposes on top of the Trust system, but it really has nothing to do with Trusted Computing itself.

      The important thing here is that the user is in full control of the system.

      Sure - in the sense that if he does not "voluntarily" turn over total control to the Trust system and to other people then it is impossible to install and run the new Trusted software and impossible to read or use any Trusted files and it will be impossible to view any Trusted website, and potentially in about 5-8 years he may be denied any internet access. The Trusted Computing Group has announced a project for routers that would deny an internet connection to any computer that is not locked down in Trusted Compliant mode. In fact at the Washington DC Global Tech Summit the president's Cyber Cecurity Advisor called on ISPs to plan on making exactly this sort of system a mandatory part of their Terms of Service to get internet access. I can dig up a link to this speech if you don't beleive me.

      So short term refusal to submit to Trusted Computing and give up control of your computer just means you can't use a few new peices of software and you won't be able to buy the RIAA and MPAA's new DRM download sales. However the problem gets worse over a couple of years. Refusal to submit means you get locked out of more and more software and more and more files and more and more websites. Eventually you may be be effectively banned from the internet unless you 'voluntarily' activate the Trust chip.

      But yes, you are always 'free' to leave the Trust system off. You are 'free' to crawl into a hole in the ground and use nothing new and connect to no one. You are 'free' to to choose to get locked in a prison cell instead of giving up control of your computer.

      So you can have hardware accelerated encryption/decryption

      Lie.

      To be fair I assume *you* are not lying, merely that you are honestly echoing a lie that has been told to you.

      Trust chips cheap low horsepower silicon. Running crypo on them is SLOWER than on even the lowest of ordinary low end CPUs. In fact a single basic crypto operations may take a full second or more to run on these very low capability Trust chips.

      If you want crypto accelleration, great, get a standard hardware crypto accellerator. They've been around forever and they have absolutely nothing to do with Trusted Comptuing.

      Many people opose trusted computer because they confuse this with DRM

      You could get EVERY claimed benefit to the owner of Trusted Computing with identical hardware where the owner is given a printed copy of his master key. The fundamental design requirement of Trusted Computing is that they owner is forbidden to know his master key and the specification requires that the chip must self-destruct and destroy your data if you attempt to get at your master key.

      The *ONLY* purpose of forbidding the owner to know his own key is to enable DRM enforcment and DRM-type functionality, to restrict the owner. Being forbidden to know your own key has the sole effect of restricting what you c

      --
      - - You can't take something off the Internet! That's like trying to take pee out of a swimming pool.
  3. Feature creep by Dancin_Santa · · Score: 4, Insightful

    I know I'm going to rub a few feathers the wrong way, but I think this kind of feature creep is actually good for the Linux kernel.

    The more features we can get into kernel mode, the less we need to rely on "chaining" and other Unix-way solutions and we can think more about applications and OS services as "whole units".

    And since the majority of installations of this latest version will be on desktops, the more hardware support, the better the hardware support, the more seamless the hardware support, the better.

    It would be nice to see some componentization of the kernel to allow for easy stripping of unnecessary features, but as the kernel will stand, the features are all necessary.

    1. Re:Feature creep by Tim+C · · Score: 5, Insightful

      You got one thing right - you *are* going to rub a lot of feathers the wrong way saying that. I'm not saying I agree or disagree with the idea, but understand that having lots (and lots) of little tools that do one thing only, that can be chained together is the "Unix way".

      For a lot of people, that's a lot of the appeal of Unix and Unix-like systems.

  4. What this means by JohnFluxx · · Score: 5, Informative

    Just for those not in the know..

    Inotify is a replacement for dnotify. With both you can watch for a file for changes. You can even watch a directory for changes. However with dnotify you couldn't recursively watch a directory for changes. To do so required basically 'opening' each folder and quickly you use up the maximum number of files you can open.

    With inotify it still doesn't directly support recursively watching a directory but example code for doing so is given and doesn't have the same problems. One distro uses this for watching /home recursively. I don't remember why or which. :)

    As for the notification thing - that's part of HAL, and means usb pens, cameras, etc should be 'auto detected' and the user can be notified and asked what to do automatically.

    1. Re:What this means by JohnFluxx · · Score: 3, Informative

      Oh just to reply to myself.. dnotify had this problem where if you watched a file say on a CD, it meant that file was 'opened' and hence the CD couldn't be ejected because it was being used..

      inotify fixes this.

      (waiting 2 mins between posts... sigh)

    2. Re:What this means by tialaramex · · Score: 3, Informative

      hotplug isn't enough

      The hotplug system is part of the OS, running as root, and is intended to do things like insert driver modules, pump firmware around, and set permissions. This is useful even on a server, although its more important for a laptop or desktop machine. It doesn't do anything to your desktop directly though...

      HAL uses DBUS to notify the user's desktop software about these exciting events so that it can do something appropriate. The desktop doesn't have dangerous privileges (so it's unlikely to accidentally format your main SCSI drive instead of the freshly inserted USB flash) and is able to interfact with the user through pop-ups and making icons appear in file managers etc.

      This system (Hotplug + HAL + DBUS) replaces earlier systems where desktop software polled for any interesting changes every few seconds. The new system is event driven, using resources only when they're needed, and should hopefully be more powerful too.

    3. Re:What this means by spitzak · · Score: 3, Interesting

      The fact that you *have* to "unmount" is the bug, you know.

      I know, they may have trashed their data because they did not unmount. However it is silly to "punish" them by making it impossible to stick the disk back in to see if it is trashed.

      Here is what I consider the ideal solution, far better than Windows or OS/X. Lets see if somebody can actually do this right:

      When the drive is pulled, the system checks to see if all I/O had been flushed to it. If so it unmouts. The desktop environment responds instantly by removing any display of that drive or it's contents in file browsers.

      If I/O has not been flushed the disk indicator remains in the desktop display, with a big red mark indicating that it had been pulled. Usually sticking it back in and pulling it after a second will flush the rest of the data and unmount it correctly. The user can also ignore it and stick new USB drives in (getting new icons) or do something on the menu to make it forget about the drive.

      Attempting to shut down or log off with any red marked disks will ask the user to stick them back in so the data can be flushed. The user can hit cancel if they don't want to.

      This flushing of a reinserted device must check carefully that it is the same device and it has not been written to by another machine while it was pulled.

  5. What about a better solution for device drivers by UnderAttack · · Score: 4, Interesting

    I think these changes are nice. But what Linux needs is a rethinking of the way device drivers are integrated. Bundling them all with the kernel will just no longer work (did you ever try to configure a kernel these days?). What I am looking for is a way to be able to use the same driver (aka 'module') in different kernels without having to recompile all over again, and the ability to compile a driver without having the complete kernel source installed.

    --
    ---- join dshield.org Distributed Intrusion Detec
    1. Re:What about a better solution for device drivers by JohnFluxx · · Score: 3, Insightful

      'did you ever try to configure a kernel these days?' - no, my distro does it for me.

      I don't see what the problem is. My distro has all the drivers compiled for me. What use case do you have other than compiling your own kernel for the sake of it?

      On a practical level, Linus has said many times that he won't do this because it would require freezing the internal kernel api. While this might sound good for an outsider, you only have to consider how much say the USB structure has been reorganised to realise how bad an idea it would have been if this was all frozen.

    2. Re:What about a better solution for device drivers by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Interesting


      I've been a avid user of Linux for a long time.

      The days of compiling a custom kernel is over, except for people who like playing with the latest features or gentoo users.

      Not because it's impractical, just because there is no point.

      If you have a high-quality distro (Suse, Mandrake, Debian, Ubuntu, Fedora etc) then the distro people are quicker to apply kernel patches to fix security issues, test them for bugs, and release updated kernels then what you can normally get thru kernel.org.

      The performance advantage of running a custom kernel to cut down on excess drivers is pretty much null and void if you have more then 16 megs of RAM.

      Stability with distro versions of kernels are generally very good because they are tested in your operating enviroment before they are given to you.

      So unless you run into oddball issues (such as the very latest hardware) or requirements recompiling a kernel is a non-issue, even with very experianced and demanding linux users.

    3. Re:What about a better solution for device drivers by pkphilip · · Score: 3, Interesting

      I think it will be useful to have a system whereby drivers can be loaded without requiring the entire kernel to be compiled.

      Granted most distributions do ship with as many of the drivers as possible, but I have found myself in a spot a few times when the Linux kernel did not have the drivers for something fairly critical which was needed during installation - for instance, I am trying to install linux onto my AMD64 machine but none of the linux kernels (including 2.6.11) support the southbridge chipset on my motherboard.. and so Linux cannot detect the harddisk on my computer...which means I cannot install Linux on the machine now.

      I installed XP on the same machine without a problem - just popped in the device driver CD and the harddisk was immediately recognized.

      It will be great to have that facility on Linux as well - changed your graphics card? just pop in the driver CD and install the driver and you are ready to go..

    4. Re:What about a better solution for device drivers by Robert+The+Coward · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Microsoft hasn't provided a stable API. Many Drivers from NT4.0, 2000, XP and 2003 don't work accress all NT based platforms. There answer has been to support all NT based platforms with diff. drivers for Each OS. What happens when longhorn comes out. Either the manf. has keep up with the changes of Longhorn and released updated driver for that version or doesn't support it and you can't use that device on Longhorn. I have been bitten with hardware no longer supported in new Microsoft OS more times than I care to admit. Under Linux I have a Raid Controller by a manf. that went out of bussines 10 Years ago that still works under linux today. In linux it seems once supported allwas supported.

  6. Boring missing features... by mi · · Score: 4, Interesting
    Can Linux, please, implement the kqueue (PDF) interface, please?

    Also, how about growing files with mmap? Currently one can not mmap() beyond the end of the file on Linux...

    --
    In Soviet Washington the swamp drains you.
  7. "Unfortunately no release date" by Salk · · Score: 3, Insightful

    This seems like a good thing to me. One of the advantages of Linux not been driven by a need to produce revenue.

  8. Re:Those are pretty big changes by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

    1. There is no 2.7 tree, so no backporting.
    2. Why do you assume, that the interest is sudden? Maybe the technology is simply deemed ready (as in tested and reliable enough) now to go into the main kernel?

  9. We need a "break the kernel" team by cluge · · Score: 4, Insightful

    The current linux kernel is pretty amazing if you think about it. It's running on everything from OS 390's right down to cell phones with features for everything inbetween. This flexability generally means that the kernel has a lot of untested combinations. Thats a potential problem.

    The kernel needs a team of people that specifically tries to break the kernel. Right now kernel testing is haphazard at best. By devoting a team of people (just like the developers) whose sole purpose in life is to break the kernel we (the community) will improve the security, and quality of future linux kernels. It will also improve the quality of code going into the kernel.

    The new code sounds very good - but the linux development community needs some hackers to break stuff.

    Cluge

    --
    "Science is about ego as much as it is about discovery and truth " - I said it, so sue me.
  10. Re:Linux x by pe1rxq · · Score: 5, Funny

    GUN Linux

    Eric, is that you?

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    Secure messaging: http://quickmsg.vreeken.net/
  11. Essential links.... by ssj_195 · · Score: 5, Interesting
    ... for people wishing to know more about the possible ramifications of Trusted ("Treacherous"...?) Computing:

    Ross Anderson's Critique

    IBM's Rebuttal

    Trusted Gentoo

    IBM's rebuttal does a decent job of allaying some of the fears - for example, it states that it will not prevent you from running any OS & programs you wish to on your own computer (which, for the record, I believe - witness the Trusted Gentoo project and e.g. this this link). They state that their approach to Trusted Computing is not particularly well-suited to DRM, and on the face of it, I agree - there seems to be little attempt at restricting the user of a computer with the TPM from doing what they want. However, in my opinion, as a base for an utterly crippling DRM regime, distributors simply could not ask for a better setup, as I'll argue a little later.

    So to re-cap, it seems that if you are running Trusted hardware, there are no restrictions on what you can do on your computer in isolation; you can install Linux, run any number of Open Source apps, etc. But the keyword here is in isolation, and it is here that the dangers of Trusted Computing are revealed. For you see, Trusted Computing enables the usage of remote attestation wherein a server may request a hash of all software currently running on your computer. This hash is, for all intents and purposes, unforgeable, and if you disable your TPM (as IBM stress that you can, and again for the record, I see no reason to disbelieve them), no hash will be sent. The server may then assess this hash of software (or note that no hash has been provided, in which case it may well treat your computer as Untrusted) and decide, based on what software you are running, to simply not serve you with whatever material you requested - for example, it may decide that it will not deliver MP3's to your computer unless it knows for a fact that the receiving application is one that is known to encrypt the content as soon as it is received (so that e.g. it simply cannot be viewed while not running in Trusted mode) and which will take every step to ensure that once received, the unencrypted content never leaves your machine (e.g. by being written to CD, e-mailed , etc.). As you can imagine, the above scenario is not at all far-fetched as the **AA/ other media distributors are positively *creaming* themselves at the thought of stamping out casual file-sharing or even making backups for your own use in some of your other devices.

    So we are left with the situation where someone who does not use Trusted hardware (and is thus unable to respond to attestation requests) or those who do run Trusted hardware but whose software fingerprint is not deemed acceptable by the server will simply not be granted access to certain material, rendering such people at a big disadvantage. And it's no good buying hardware free from Trust chips from China or such places on the "black market"; this offers no advantage at all as Trusted hardware, as mentioned, does not stop you using your computer the way you want in isolation; the problem only occurs when you try to interact with other computers.

    So far, this sounds unpleasant but not too bad (although I would urge you to read Anderson's linked essay for some more imaginative and serious abuses), but if we allow ourselves to follow the slippery-slope, we end up at the state where ISPs will not allow your computer to access the internet at all (for surfing, e-mailing, anything) unless you are running Trusted hardware and software. Obviously, the social, political and legal barriers to this occurence are non-trivial, but we've all seen ridiculous Acts qu

    1. Re:Essential links.... by OeLeWaPpErKe · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Did you read what you just said ?

      Next time you find out by email your boss is about to fire you because you're e.g. colored, you will not be able to forward that mail to the authorities, and your boss will be able to destroy ALL traces of that email from his home.

      Next time the police really needs data on a person's computer it will not be possible to extract it, because "TPM" will prevent it.

      And ... next time microsoft needs all the internal documents from your company, they will just open their explorer, that just happens to be implicitly trusted by your company's software, and it can do 2 things : they can both read the documents, and they can make the documents AND any backup copies you may have inaccessible.

      Adobe will be able to do this for pdfs, your bank for your bank statements, ...

      THAT is what TPM is about.

  12. Latency and preempt by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Apparently, accourding to some posts on the Linux Audio User list the latency in native 2.6.12 is as good as the patched 2.4 for audio use.
    This is great news for all of us using Linux for audio. It's also a pretty mean feat, as the 2.4 low latency patches were a little bit brute force compared to the 'correct' method in 2.6 of fixing all the problem spin lock areas in the kernel, a much harder task.
    Now all we need is to get the RT LSM module into the main kernel. (It allows non root uses real time scheduling without messing about, it's not vital for perfomance but nice for usability.)

    I have not tried 2.6.12 myself yet, but have got great results with unpatched 2.6.11 kernels.

  13. What a waste of effort... by hanssprudel · · Score: 3, Insightful

    I realize that it is probably paid for by IBM as part of their campaign to try to dupe people into thinking that the DRM vehicle they call "trusted computing" (remember: that is "trusted" as in "other people can trust your computer to control you") is something benign. However, implementing "TC" in Linux feels like a gigantic waste of time: does anybody here REALLY think that the proprietary DRM applications that are the ONLY REASON WHY WE WOULD NEED "TC" are ever going to be ported to Linux?

    Do you see the DRMed "music stores" (it is more like a barter: "give us your money and control over your computer, and we'll let some Britney and Fiddy come from your speakers!") falling over themselves to run on Linux? Do you think that is because Linux doesn't support "TC" or because those companies couldn't possibly care less about Linux as a platform? I'll give you three guesses. And the ENTIRE POINT with "TC" is to make it impossible for us to reverse engineer and write our own replacements for those applications - so be definition we can forget about that alternative.

    All I can say is, I hope they had fun implementing it, and that they feel happy about the all the people who believe the astroturfing that "TC" isn't the Torjan Horse of DRM.

    "TC" is DRM is the tool of closed networks, closed source, a closed society, and a closed future. People who believe it will coexist with Linux are so naive that it would be quaint if it wasn't so fucking scary...

    1. Re:What a waste of effort... by Professor_UNIX · · Score: 3, Interesting

      What is interesting is that "Trusted" used to be a label applied to systems like Trusted Solaris that implemented mandatory access controls (similar to what SELinux does for Linux). Which version of Trusted computing are they talking about? Mandatory access controls or the DRM nonsense?

    2. Re:What a waste of effort... by Slashcrap · · Score: 3, Informative

      Your post is as incoherent and paranoid as it is long.

      The problem with what you understand as Trusted Computing is that someone else gets the keys. They can decide what your computer can run and what it can't. Obviously this is bad and justifies the acute paranoia from which you seem to be suffering.

      With the Linux implementation, you get the keys. So you can sign all of the executables you normally use and tell the kernel to only run them. Anything unsigned (e.g trojans, rootkits etc..) won't run.

      It's a useful security feature. It's not about the RIAA preventing you from running that Britney Spears mp3 that you downloaded from Kazaa.

  14. I Wish firewire would just work by t35t0r · · Score: 3, Informative

    Every day I see a new bug on the ieee1394 mailing list. There are some serious issues with firewire on linux. It is nowhere as mature as it is on winxp or macosx. DMESG spits out lots of errors, sometimes my drives unmount themselves when I transfer 50gb+ (ext3/reiser were massacres, xfs was slightly better). Even with the latest kernel these problems persist.

  15. Go to the source by Corbet · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Should you be curious, I've posted the slides to my talk on LWN.net.

    --
    Jonathan Corbet, LWN.net
  16. Gamers: Configurable USB Mouse Polling Rate! by Jagasian · · Score: 4, Interesting

    One feature that isn't talked about much, but is very popular amongst gamers is the configurable USB mouse polling rate. For years it has been available as a kernel patch, but now it has finally been included in the kernel. This means no more recompiling your kernel just to increase your mouse polling rate from 125hz to 500hz. It can now be set from your boot loader or from the command prompt.

    Why is this so great? Well, the typical polling rate of 125hz for USB mice is noticably less smooth than a polling rate of 500hz, whether you are using your mouse in games or a desktop app. For this reason many people preferred to use PS2 mice, as they could be polled at up to 200hz. Now with this new feature, PS2 can be retired. Get yourself a high resolution USB optical mouse and set the polling rate to 500hz.

    You can feel the difference.

  17. Re:Gamers: Configurable USB Mouse Polling Rate! by alyandon · · Score: 3, Informative

    In most FPS games you typically respond with very small, quick mouse movements. The faster you poll the mouse the more accurate the mouse motion can be tracked which means less undershooting/overshooting your target intended target.

    Is it a night and day difference? No.

  18. Re:Gamers: Configurable USB Mouse Polling Rate! by Jagasian · · Score: 4, Insightful

    First off, a CRT's refresh rate can be above 100hz, but even so, the CRT's refresh rate is not synchronized with the mouse polling rate. So the cursor drawn to the screen is done so using the last mouse polling data. With 125hz, this means the data could be 8 miliseconds old, while with 500hz, the data is a maximum of 2 miliseconds old. Hence there is less lag in physical mouse movement and its logical and visual effect.

    It is actually more complicated than that, but those lag values are for lag due to mouse rate alone. Of course the CRT refresh rate introduces its own lag. But in short, keeping monitor refresh rate constant, because the monitor is not synchronized with the mouse, increasing the polling rate of the mouse makes for an improvement. Conversly the same can be said for increasing the refresh rate of the monitor.

    You don't have to take my word for it. If you are already using a good USB mouse at 125hz, try it at 500hz. You will notice the difference. Once you use 500hz for several days, try switching back to 125hz. You will hate it. The difference is even more noticable with higher resolution mice, such as 800 dpi and 1600 dpi optical mice because the movement delta can be quite large and a delay of 8 miliseconds of a large delta "feels" awkward.

    Of course, if you use a very crappy low resolution USB mouse, the difference is harder to notice.