Revamping Freenet
N3wsByt3 writes "Many will have heard about the anonymous P2P-system Freenet. What many probably don't know is, that a big change is at hand: the Freenet developers have decided to drop all support for the 0.5x version, to skip version 0.6 and to completely revamp the 0.7 build into some kind of poorly described, presumably scalable darknet. The main coder even threatened to quit if such a darknet would be rejected.
So, is it finally going the right way with the development of Freenet? Maybe not, since they seem reluctant to provide real data and rather rely on security through obfuscation, and then there is still the problem of their general inability in regard to pooling human resources, which, for any OSS project, is of the utmost importance." Obviously, the article submitter has his own feelings on Freenet, but notwithstanding that, what's the latest scuttlebutt from within the Freenet crowd?
A very interesting article about flaw in Freenet
http://www.aviransplace.com
Matthew has indeed indicated that he believes it is essential that we support "trusted links" in Freenet, and the other core Freenet developers, myself included, agree with him - so Newsbyte's attempt to stir that up into some kind of controversy is just another example of his trolling.
I have no idea where Newsbyte's accusation that we are relying on security through obscurity comes from, certainly the archived email he links do doesn't seem to support any such claim.
As for the blog entry he links to, it essentially boils down to whining about why we don't implement each and every one of his suggestions.
When considering the value of Newsbyte's opinions, I would urge you to look first at what he has actually contributed to the project, versus those that he seeks to criticise.
We ran these observations by Freenet founder Ian Clarke. He agreed that the caching behavior does reveal far too many clues. But the next major revision is expected to eliminate the problem. Sometime later this year, it is hoped, the Freeenet developers will release a version that employs premix routing.
The World Wide Web is dying. Soon, we shall have only the Internet.
I don't want my node to be used to harbor child porn, offensive content or terrorism. What can I do?
The true test of someone who claims to believe in Freedom of Speech is whether they tolerate speech which they disagree with, or even find disgusting. If this is not acceptable to you, you should not run a Freenet node.
Free MacMini
You can't tell what's stored on your node very easily.
However, it is relatively easy to see what is on freenet at large. There are several spiders that roam freenet and index freesites they come across. It's sort of like what Google does. So all one has to do is load up these indexes and see how many of the sites are child porn related. Another way to tell is load up Frost and see how many of the boards of child porn related.
There's a very large number of them.
The thing about Freenet is that you can't report or block offending IPs; that's the exact thing it's designed to prevent.
When you retrieve a file from Freenet (at least the current "stable" implementation), your request is bounced through several other random nodes on the network; and relaying a request for another node looks exactly the same, protocol-wise, as initiating one. They call it "plausible deniability;" if a person's node contains stuff considered "bad," or illegal, then there's absolutely no way of knowing (as long as the person frequently clears their browser history and cache) whether the user of that node initiated the requests for any of that content or if they were just unknowingly relaying it for someone else.
A while ago, I saw a Freesite linked on the Freedom Engine (one of Freenet's most popular portals, probably because its operator links to kiddy porn and murder pictures, considering them to be "free speech") which claimed to filter content matching a certain list of hashes out of your node, so that your node would neither store that content nor relay requests for it. It came preloaded with a filter-list (somehow obfuscated so the real file keys couldn't be extracted by people who like that kind of stuff) of miscellaneous generally-objectional content. I'm not sure what the reaction to that was, if there was much.
But there's no way of finding out who's actually storing and retrieving that content. The current Freenet implementation leaves absolutely nothing to "security through obscurity." The only way to censor it would be through legal means, perhaps by declaring that allowing one's Freenet node to be used for illegal things is a contributory crime. But due to the nature of Freenet it would still be very hard to enforce.
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