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Host Integrity Monitoring Using Osiris and Samhain

nazarijo (Jose Nazario) writes "When you arrive to work one morning, you find that your coworker's workstation is acting funny. A quick forensic examination reveals it's been compromised and used to scan the network for more vulnerabilities. When did this happen, and where else is this going on in you domain? With a host integrity monitoring solution, you'll be a lot further along at answering those questions than piecing it all together after the fact. And you can accomplish this with two freeware tools, as described in Host Integrity Monitoring Using Osiris and Samhain, a new book from Syngress Publishing." Read on for the rest of Nazario's review. Host Integrity Monitoring Using Osiris and Samhain author Brian Wotring, with Bruce Potter and Rainer Wichmann pages 450 publisher Syngress rating 8 reviewer Jose Nazario ISBN 1597490180 summary Use freeware tools to ensure your site's security is intact

Host integrity monitoring is the process by which system and network administrators validate and enforce the security of their systems. This can be a complex suite of approaches, tools, and methodologies, and it can be as simple as looking at loggin output. In the past, tools like Tripwire were used to check the configurations on hosts. The freeware version of this tool was limited in its manageability, which was available mainly in the commercial version.

Tools like Osiris and Samhain came along to fill the gap and have since evolved into mature projects themselves. Like any existing software tool out there, any new book should be evaluated not only on its own but also in he context of the existing documentation. Both Osiris and Samhain have decent amounts of documentation available already (Samhain seems to have a larger user documentation repository online than the Osiris tool does), and the book contributes to these docs quite well.

Host Integrity Monitoring shows you how to set up these tools and put them into production on Windows, UNIX, and OS X. Wotring's writing is fairly good, and his examples are usually pretty clear. The pace of the material is good, and there's not a whole lot of domain-specific expertise beyond system administration skills required to make use of the book. At times some of the formatting of the text gets in the way, but that's trivial compared to the quality of writing (which is pretty good).

Overall the material in the book is decent. The book opens with an overview of what host integrity monitoring is, why you should use it, and some of the basic premises. Then it goes on to discuss Samhain and Osiris, starting with their basic installation and then on to their advanced usage. They differ enough that each project merits its own pieces of documentation, even though they're similar in spirit. You'll learn how to schedule scans, integrate with other tools like Swatch, and in general administer a site installation.

The author of the book, Brian Wotring, is more familiar with Osiris than he is with Samhain, and it shows. More material (100 pages) is devoted to using Osiris than is given to Samhain (60 pages), which is to be expected. The coverage of both is sufficient, though, and fills the major parts of the book.

There are three major strengths to this book over the existing docs. The first is seeing not just the tools themselves covered but also the threats they cover in place. The second is having the two tools covered side by side, allowing you to see how to accomplish the same task with each. And thirdly, there are two appendices that are true gems of this book. The first covers how to get your Linksys Linux based AP device monitored using the Osiris tool, which isn't a small feat. The second is how to write your own modules for Osiris and Samhain, for which this appears to be the only documentation for Osiris (Samhain's website has a How To on writing modules). Again, these add value to the book over the freely available documentation.

I would have liked to have seen the chapters devoted specifically to Osiris and Samhain, chapters 6 (Osiris) and 7 (Samhain) broken up into two or three chapters covering their installation and use. The length of these chapters can make finding some material difficult at times. I would have also have liked to see the use of the "bold is input, normal text is output" technical book convention. In many examples finding the user input text can be challenging.

Host Integrity Monitoring Using Osiris and Samhain is not only about these tools but about how to accomplish host integrity monitoring on the cheap (since the code is freely available). While you can find docs on each project, this book complements those docs nicely and provides a nicely wrapped package about how to get the most out of each tool. If you've been thinking about how to ensure that no one is tampering with your system, these tools, and this book, should definitely make your solutions list.

You can purchase Host Integrity Monitoring Using Osiris and Samhain from bn.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.

5 of 50 comments (clear)

  1. Book author appears to have written Osiris by georgewilliamherbert · · Score: 5, Interesting

    It should be noted that Brian Wotring, the book author, is the lead developer and release manager for Osiris. That probably explains why he knows it better than he knows Samhain...

  2. Tripwire? by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Interesting

    I've been using tripwire + custom scripts for centralized management for years.

    I'm wondering, why hasn't tripwire been improved or forked? It's GPL right?

  3. System Immutable flag & OS X by G4from128k · · Score: 4, Interesting

    On a FreeBSD system, you can set the "immutable flag" on a file. Given a high enough system securelevel, that file will be completely resistant to change (including unsetting that flag). This is extremely handy for locking down file signature databases, kernel files, and other likely targets for stealth modification. So long as that portion of the kernel stands intact, the system can never be completely clandestinely owned

    Very interesting. This FAQ suggest that OS X retains BSD's immutable flag. In theory, the only way to change this flag in OS X is to reboot in single-user mode. I wonder if a rootkit could force a reboot into single user mode, change these flags, and reboot back to remotely own an OS X machine? I would assume that unless the rootkit can insert something into the single-user mode start-up sequence, the system immutable flag should be fairly safe. The big downside would be that System Update would cease to work (and probably create a corrupt partial update) if the wrong file were locked in this way (security vs. ease-of-use again!).

    --
    Two wrongs don't make a right, but three lefts do.
    1. Re:System Immutable flag & OS X by Just+Some+Guy · · Score: 2, Interesting
      In theory, the only way to change this flag in OS X is to reboot in single-user mode.

      In FreeBSD, the securelevel is set by one of the rc.d scripts that get executed at boot. You could theoretically insert instructions to run before it gets set. Assuming, of course, that the rc.d scripts themselves haven't been made immutable.

      You nailed the main drawback: upgrading a running system becomes pretty much impossible without a reboot.

      The other one I usually encounter deals with running Aide. Basically, I generate a baseline filesystem checksum database and make that file immutable. When I run periodic verification passes, the list of differences grows over time, and since the baseline can't be altered in any way I can't ever reset it (without a reboot, that is). The workaround is to keep the output of each run in a new immutable file and compare each "diff" with the previous run. Note that with this setup, the size of Aide's database directly can only grow and never shrink. It's a small price to pay, but still one of those little unexpected hurdles.

      --
      Dewey, what part of this looks like authorities should be involved?
  4. Advantages to Samhain over Tripwire by Kernel+Kurtz · · Score: 2, Interesting
    I've been using Tripwire (and Tripwire Portable) for years. Recently I have started using Samhain in its place and have been quite happy with it.


    Some useful features that it has which Tripwire doesn't is the ability to monitor kernel system call tables for changes (a common attack vector), and to run as a daemon to alert on changes immediately.


    Its definitely worth a look.