Building Secure Computers?
maotx asks: "Growing into the job of a system administrator, I've been tasked with something I'm not quite prepared for: purchase or build a computer that meets DoD compliance for classified 'Secret' information. Several vendors, including Dell our primary supplier, offers computers that will work, but being new to the criteria I want to make sure the right computer is purchased. The computer will be used to create secure CAD drawings (Solidworks, OrCAD, etc) and must have, from what I can tell, a removable hard drive and security stickers to prevent tampering. What is you're experience in setting up a secure computer and is it better to have a vendor do it, or yourself?"
Ask the Dept of Defense. Asking Slashdot about DoD guidelines is like asking an elementary school for details about the space shuttle. No offense to /. community.
Though I have never worked for DoD, here is a guess on how this works:
If you are building this system for DoD at a request from DoD, then you have what is called a "need to know", which qualifies you for getting a security clearance sufficient for you to receive the exact requirements for such a system after that it is simple just meet the requirements. Of course, once (if!) you get the clearance (and this is an expensive, tedious and long long process involving the polygraph in some cases) and are given those documents, you will be forbidden from sharing this information with anyone else without breaking the law and risking a severe penalty.
If youre not building it for DoD, (or for them but not at their request - e.g. in hopes they'll buy your product), then you have no "need to know" and cannot apply for clearance and be revealed the requirements.
Im guessing its the latter (or you wouldnt be posting to /.), so
the answer is you simply cannot build such a system because you cannot
know the requirements.
Wow...where to begin...
First of all, soliciting advice on the construction of a computer that meets DoD compliance on Slashdot , of all places, is probably not the brightest of ideas...you might want to keep this from your employers if you are interested in keeping your job.
Second, security stickers on their own simply aren't adequate to the task at hand. Remember, you're looking for tamper-proof, not merely tamper-evident...
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~ |rip/\/\aster /\/\onkey
Yes...Removable hdd's. this is so that when the operator leaves the room to go take a leak or whatever, he/she can take the sensitive data with them. And at the end of the day the data can be placed in a secure safe. This is a requirement of all DoD computers that contain sensitive materials. It was very entertaining watching the Munitions guy walk around with a hdd at night when he needed to go take a leak. Very amusing.
There are 3 basic levels of security in the DOD:
- Sensetive: lists of SSNs, peoples phone numbers, etc. shred the paper, password protection, light building security
- Secret: Reporting information, non-combat comunication centers, etc. shred paper, lock down computers and network but have external connection, no unauthorized location access.
- Top-Secret: Detailed reporting, strategic info, etc. Don't print if you don't need to, locked down PCs, locked down network, likely no external access/email/etc.
For secret info, I never saw anything to hard core. We had some great network techs in Quantico (just prior to the NMCI 4066/4067 consultant replacment), they had a well locked down network, but still allowed internet access and email. But they could, and did, track all of your online activities, read your emails, mirror your hard drive, and shut you down from across the globe. Any specific secret locations like com-vaults had key code or rfid doors.(Anecdotal network security story from the military, optional reading:)
I had a network support budy in Okinowa who used an external (geocities) site to hold links to internal files for updates and software. Worked good for his updating work at off site locations. One day his user account was locked, 3 gents from the MITNOC showed up with a copy of his hard drive and a log of his internet/email activity over the last 3 months. Turned out some script kiddies found his site and started hammering the firewalls trying to get the software. -Rick
"Most people in the U.S. wouldn't know they live in a tyrannical state if it walked up and grabbed their junk." - MyFirs
PC case locks are, by and large, pretty shitty.
Game Overdrive - Gaming News
For as expensive as any of the security implementations are going to be for anything that ANYONE has replied to for this question... If your boss trusts you enough to design, buy, and implement the system, why not just ask for a substantial raise (say twice your current salary to whatever the most expensive of these recommendations would run, whatever suits you) to cover the cost of you personally babysitting the machine while people use it? OK, your company would have to spend a small sum to make sure that the room the machine's in is inaccessible when you're not there. But otherwise, when you're on the clock, you're watching the thing like a hawk. Somebody tries something fishy, you ask them what the hell they're doing right then and there, and there's no risk. Think about it.
Isn't it interesting how you come to recognize posters based solely on their sigs???
The post was in relation to the timeline. Thanks for the slippery slope argument however. The poster has just popped out of no where. He stated on a another post "I've spent a number of years now building/accrediting/auditing intelligence processing systems (READ: secure computers) and you silly little Slashdot geeks have NO idea what you're talking about when it comes to DoD red-tape."
So he's spent a number of years building these systems at the age of 19? Not only that but he would of got his first TS clearance in his mid-teens. Ridiculous. I personally think he's either:
1. A troll or;
2. An actual serving member who's getting a bit too big for his britches.
3. Some guy social engineering people.
That's my opinion, so feel free to believe whatever you like.
Answering as a professional paranoid lacking security clearance: to remind the user not to install such devices. Of course, it shouldn't be the microphone that's plugged with epoxy, but rather the speaker output line. As I understand it, incoming data is fine; but anything outgoing becomes classified.
More anecdotal data: a neighboring department has one such user. (And we're all relieved we only have one such PITA system around to deal with.) She's using a Dell laptop with internal hard drive removed, modular bay bootable hard drive (ergo, no floppy or RW-optical), no built-in wireless or modem, ethernet and USB disabled in BIOS, and separate boot and admin BIOS passwords. When not in use, the hard drive is kept in a safe — top drawer of a WWII-era fireproof combination lock four-drawer file cabinet, actually, that we had left over from a portion of the Manhattan project that was based here.
All output is dead-tree, via a parallel port printer; they ordered an odd-colored paper with a "CLASSIFIED" letterhead on it, which fills up the bottom drawer of the cabinet. I don't know if that was required, or just to make it easy to scan the office to make sure it was all locked up at the end. One of the middle cabinet drawers stores what's been printed; the last drawer stores the remains of any printout she's had to shred, for formal DOD disposal.
Bear in mind: all of what I'm reporting is what I remember of my opposite number in that department grumbling about at a general security meeting. My recall may be wrong, and he may have been deliberately lying.