The End of Signature-Based Antivirus Software?
nosig writes "PCMagazine is running a story around the latest AV-TEST response time and proactive detection test for the latest MS05-039 vulnerability related attacks. The test results were announced by the author to the focus-virus discussion list.
What's really impresive, besides the huge difference between response times among antivirus companies, is that two products succeeded to proactively detect all 6 attacks without any signature update.
"
From the referred posting: You can find the information how fast the AV companies have reacted with a solution against Bozari.A/B, Drudgebot.B, IRCBot!Var and Zotob.A/B in an Excel sheet (18 KB ZIP file) which is available at http://www.av-test.org./
At first glance this looks like a clever variation on "important document attached" e-mails we all get every day...
This week on /., "The Death of [fill in the blank]!" It's just one test, slow down and breath.
The product scores (only the trolls need more karma). Or you can try page 4.
BitDefender 6/6
Fortinet 6/6
Nod32 5/6
eSafe 3/6
F-Prot 3/6
Panda 3/6
QuickHeal 3/6
McAfee 2/6
Norman 2/6
AntiVir 1/6
ClamAV 1/6
Proventia-VPS 3/6
Panda TruPrevent 6/6
A thought, and perhaps a better mind can say why this would or would not work.
Build an AV system that creates a VM sandbox that would then allow the a program to run to see what it would do, and if determind to work normally, then to pass the IO requests directly to the system.
So a worm or virus would begin to make calls out to the various sub-systems to hide itself and open up ports, then the AV would nip it in the bud.
III.IIVIVIXIIVIVIIIVVIIIIXVIIIXIIIIIIIIVIIIIVVIII
...It's the users. Until the general population of computer users become smart enough to know not to open strange attachments or install malware from unscrupulous websites, hax0rs will always find a way around virus protection schemes.
People here always clamor about how poorly Windows is designed and how it leaves people so open to attack. The truth is, even if everyone in the world used Linux, the hackers would still write viruses to exploit the same vulnerabilities stemming from the ignorant masses.
That's a bit extreme. If anything the signature based AV software isn't going anywhere right now. It seems like behavior analysis, which is what I thought of when I read the headline, would be a nice extra preventative measure to integrate into exisiting resident scanners. It doesn't seem like that type of technique would be very reliable if used by itself. Maybe the headline should have been: "A program that watches other programs spots a potential problem in advance!"
I think, based on my personal experience, that Hotmail is already moving away from virus definitions to a more general measure of "traits." In the case of Hotmail, the primary trait used in determining whether a file contains a virus is whether or not it has a really long name and more than one "." (dot) in it.
.pdf file, and using a filename with two "dots." I send this document to a Hotmail user, who wrote me back that Hotmail had declared the file to contain an incurable virus. Reasonably sure that my Xandros linux box had no virii on it, I renamed the file something more Microsoft friendly. The file was received with no problems.
I base this on the fact that, after exporting a document from StarOffice 7 directly to a
So there you have it, any file with a suspicious name must contain a virus. Easy, reliable detection.
Trying to use sarcasm in text-based forums does not work.
It just means that they already had the signature.
No, it means that the AV program was using "proactive virus protection."
That simply means that the AV program monitors the behavior of programs and makes sure they don't violate security policy. If they do, the AV software assumes it is a virus.
This kind of thing can only work if it's on the machines that will be running the viruses. If you want to scan everything coming in, or at your mail gateway, signature is still the way to go. There's a place for both methods, as has been the case for a long time.
I am trolling
Sheesh...This should be obvious to anyone that MS05-039 totally outclasses MS05-038 in proactive detection test response time. NTIKWTFIATA
Disclaimer: I worked for a household-name antivirus sw firm in the past and now work for one that does filters network-based viruses as a network service.
"None are more hopelessly enslaved than those who falsely believe they are free." -- Goethe
Why is that? From personal experience, most people I know run some form of AV software, which is good. They do not however, keep it updated! Let's examine why this is.
Average Joe buys a Dell. It comes with AV software, such as Norton or McAfee preloaded.
The software has a finite length of time (usually 3 to 6 months) before the user must pay to continue getting updates.
Average Joe doesn't see why they should have to pay to keep their AV software updated. ("I paid $XXX for this machine, and they want more? Heck no.")
While that may be a valid objection, it doesn't help to stop the spread of viruses. So what is the solution?
In my personal opinion , the solution is to make basic AV software, and any required updates, free of charge for the user. Software that fits this desription Example: Grisoft AVG Free Edition is already available.
What I cannot understand is why PC manufacturers do not use something like the above instead of "pay for updates" products. It would reduce their support calls dramatically, would it not?
Wouldn't it be safer to switch from blacklists to whitelists? i.e. Only known safe applications are permitted to run. If some shiny-new-app isn't added to your current A/V whitelist for 48 hours, all that means is you can't run the program for a while. That's an inconvenience. If shiny-new-malware isn't added to an A/V blacklist for 48 hours, major damage can ensue. I'd prefer the former, personally.
/every/ piece of software; so the whitelist for the stuff that one particular person uses should be of a manageable size, shouldn't it?
Users don't add new apps to their computers that often, and corporations wouild welcome the chance to ensure only approved and paid-for programs can run on their systems.
When you uploaded free software to a reputable FTP site, getting a suitable signature so that people could download it and use it would become a routine part of the upload procedure, and certainly one that the sort of geeks who use those services can handle.
It's true that a comprehensive whitelist database would be a big file, but why does that matter? No-one runs
If you use whitelists, the only time code needs to be checked is when new exectuable code files arrive on a system; given a competent gatekeeper program, all pre-existing stuff will be known-approved and won't need to be checked. That would provide a significant speed-up too.
Is this feasible? Where's the downside?