Patent Pools and Pledges - Panacea or Placebo?
I've been wary of those patent pledges and pools from the beginning. There's an awful lot of dishonesty in these all-too-obvious attempts to curry favor with the community and reassure customers. While the jury is still out on some of those projects, none of them has so far delivered a single compelling reason for me to believe that they're really going to be more than a placebo. Some make it sound like these pools are a bulletproof vest for open source, but it's more like you have a coin in your pocket and hope that a bullet will be deflected by it. Too bad the coin isn't even in a place where someone would usually shoot you.
While I do agree that open source should protect itself as best as possible within the legal framework that exists, cheap PR plays are not a substitute for a real solution. The pledges that I've seen so far had all sorts of shortcomings:
- Some pledged patents are of little or no value. Among IBM's 500 patents "contributed" in January, there were some that had nothing to do withsoftware, and many were up for renewal soon, with no guarantee that they'd actually be renewed.
- The pledges typically just relate to particular open source licenses (sometimes rarely-used ones) or projects, such as the Linux kernel (which is only a small part of a standard Linux configuration).
- Some pledges are revocable or haveloopholes such as vague conditions under which the patent holder can sue you anyhow.
- So far the quantities of patents involved have been negligible compared to the total number of issued software patents, and even to the number held by the "generous donors." Even in the long run, there'll be hundreds of thousands of software patents in the world that aren't subject to any pledge. In his speeches, Richard Stallman likens software patents to mines in a park: If there are 90,000 mines in the park instead of 100,000, it's still far from being a safe place to walk.
Even if you don't look the gift-horse in the mouth, there are fundamental problems that even the best pledges can't solve:
- You can't practically go about your programming job by always looking up a patent pledge database whether it contains just the algorithms you need. I don't think any programmer would seriously do that! And even if algorithms A and B are covered by patents in a pool, there may be a patent C that covers your particular combination of A and B, and that patent C may not be in the pool.
- Pledges which exclusively relate to open source aren't too valuable. Software under the BSD license is used in closed-source projects all the time. A project like PostgreSQL, which already felt forced to replace a caching algorithm due to an IBM patent, couldn't just base its development decisions on open source considerations alone. Then there are dual-licensing models for GPL software (MySQL is a well-known example) and companies that sell closed source software to finance their open source development efforts.
- These pledges are only made by organizations that don't intend to sue open source projects anyway. Patent holders who are potentially hostile, be it for strategic or purely financial motivations, won't pledge anything. It's nice to firm up the commitment of your allies not to act against you, but it doesn't reduce the number of enemies.
- If a company promises not to sue open source projects over a certain set of patents, it still doesn't mean that those patents can be used by open source projects for retaliatory purposes. However, the patent game is one of mutually assured destruction, like in the Cold War. If NATO hadn't had a single nuclear weapon, and the Soviet Union had promised not to use something like 5% of its nuclear arsenal, then we probably wouldn't live in freedom now.
- Companies usually can't even make their patents available for the purpose of building a counterthreat because those patents are already subject to existing cross-licensing agreements. If a new entity (such as the Open Invention Network) started acquiring unencumbered patents, then one day they might be able to grant a license to a company like Microsoft in exchange for a covenant not to sue Linux with its own patents. That could indeed make a major difference (even if only for Linux), yet it wouldn't help against trolls that have no products of their own. And a strategic aggressor could secretly arrange for such a troll to do the job.
No matter how you look at it, the only way to reliably solve the problem is at the political level: through legislation that excludes pure program logic from the scope of patentable subject matter. Sure, there's no shortage of people out there who say this can't be done, but they're all wrong. We've been toldmany times that the European software patent directive would come one way or the other -- until we got the European Parliament to reject it by a landslide of 648-32. The German Bundestag and Spanish Senado unanimously backed our central demands. The new German government has just vowed to counter, at the international level, "the trend to seal off markets, among other things by means of patent law." The time is ripe for legislative action.
Some members of the legal profession claim that software patents are an unalterable fate because theyhave a vested interest in sustaining the system. It's a tall order, but definitely possible, to change the legislative framework in our favor. In every parliamentary democracy.
Especially in the field of software, the patent regime no longer serves the public interest. In a perfect democracy, software patents would already be history. In the suboptimal democracies in which we live, there are special interests that oppose changes. Those have influence and deep pockets, but at the end of the day the most valuable currency in politics is voter popularity.
If all the companies who have pledged patents to open source, or who have contributed to those pools, decided to seriously campaign for legislation that abolishes software patents, then the problem could be solved for good. As long as they don't do that, they're not for real. Some may even have a hidden agenda of creating patent pools to gain effective control over the open source universe. We've got to watch out.
Florian founded the NoSoftwarePatents.com campaign. For his political efforts against software patents, he has been named as one of the "top 50 most influential people in intellectual property" according to Managing Intellectual Property magazine and is a candidate for the title of European of the Year.
Won't touch it - too much "P" in the headline
"However, the patent game is one of mutually assured destruction, like in the Cold War. If NATO hadn't had a single nuclear weapon, and the Soviet Union had promised not to use something like 5% of its nuclear arsenal, then we probably wouldn't live in freedom now."
The topic title taught us terminology.
Patent MAD seems like the only way to get to be a big company these days. With the dot com boom over, what else could possibly take a small company and make it competitive with a giant like ebay.com? Skype got bought out by who else? Ebay.com
A giant like eBay with their mountains of patented software stands to make a fortune every time someone else tries to write some of their own software to sell something on the Internet.
Saskboy's blog is good. 9 out of 10 dentists agree.
Not to say it's a PR "stunt" or "trick", but it makes certain vendors conspicuous by their absence from these groups. If you've got a town where there's a big organization pledging to protect the environment, but the biggest company in the town isn't signing on, it leaves an impression.
My turnips listen for the soft cry of your love
The problems with intellectual property of all sorts (copyrights, patents, trade marks, service marks) stem from a fundamental belief that competition is the most efficient mechanism for progress. This belief means that government's role is to protect players from excessive competition by granting intellectual property monopolies. Unfortunately, this has the side effect of strengthening the cultural forces against collaboration. Open source software development, which is fundamentally a collaborative model (collaborate to build code, collaborate to share code, etc.), is showing that such a model can be successful. However, given the competitive intellectual property culture, open source models are extremely vulnerable. My thought: over the course of the next few decades, the software world will become a proving ground to demonstrate that collaborative economic models are superior to competitive economic models. However, the vested interests in the competitive model will only very slowly come around to embracing the collaborative model.
Helping with organizational effectiveness is our job.
Seems to me that a patent pool that accepts patents under a license obligating the pool not to enforce the patent, and offering anyone a free, unrestricted license to use the patent, is harmless. It's also indistinguishable from "public domain" in operation, but has the valuable bonus of an interested party which can actively fight others who try to privatize the patented IP. The public domain is a great legal principle, but the economics fail to protect the public - "tragedy of the commons".
Funding the "public patent" pool is a challenge, but a sufficiently diversified and pushy pool with lots of profitable licenses can probably pressure "association members" for enough money to operate. Or sell "value added services", like IP legal advice and "IP market info", like licensing activity. Maybe just a virtual organization, cheap in normal operation, that pulls dues from licensees only when they vote to challenge a rival IP claim to their free patent. If legal, possibly after the fact, when someone licenses a patent that had meanwhile been conflicted by a new, private patent. The economics of that operation might see a "reverse claim jumping" industry, where people spot unlicensed public patents in conflict with newer private patents. They license the public patent, then fund the suit against the private rival, which seizes the private income for the pool, compensating the new public licensee.
The power of this way of thinking, a real libertarian method for fighting private IP hoarders, offers a lot of new operations in the public interest, entirely consistent with private capitalism, while excluding monopolism. Let the good times roll!
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make install -not war
What about adding a clause like this to both LGPL 3 and GPL 3:
By using this software you agree never to initiate a software patent lawsuit against any person or company. If you do initiate such a lawsuit, the license fee is $1M per year, retroactively, and you are defined as "aggressive". There is one exception to this rule: Anyone may initiate software patent lawsuits against others who are aggressive.
This has the effect of even making life difficult for litigation companies: As more and more software includes at least LGPL code, over time they would have to run their companies without the use of software of any type.
No, you can patent innovations that derive from other patents, including combinations.
2) In closed source, how can it be determined (legally) that someone is infringing on another's patented algorithm?
(Software) patents cover behaviors, not just implementations. If your patent covers a method of embedding data in documents, you can generally tell from the applications behavior if it infringes - at least enought to start a lawsuit and begin discovery.
That being said, I don't know a thing about patents, and they kinda scare me (I picture a patent-boogeyman when I think about it) or is that what they are supposed to do?
Pretty much, yeah.
My quick & dirty solution to our patent troubles: