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Computer Security, The Next 50 Years
bariswheel writes "Alan Cox, fellow at Red Hat Linux, gives a short-and-sweet talk at the European OSCON on the The Next 50 Years of Computer Security. Implementations of modularity, Trusted Computing hardware, 'separation of secrets,' and overcoming the challenge of users not reading dialog boxes, will be crucial milestones as we head on to the future. He states: "As security improves, we need to keep building things which are usable, which are turned on by default, which means understanding users is the target for the next 50 years. You don't buy a car with optional bumpers. You can have a steering wheel fitted if you like, but it comes with a spike by default." All of this has to be shipped in a way that doesn't stop the user from doing things."
What the article is basically saying is that we have to teach people how to use their computers. >85% of all the computer problems I encounter are PEBKAC (Problem Exists Between Keyboard And Chair). It's like the old saying goes, make something idiot proof and the world will make a better idiot. If people just learn how to use their computers (you shouldn't download exe's from people you don't know, a firewall is a good thing to have, ActiveX controls aren't safe and your default response shouldn't be to install them no matter what IE says) a huge number of problems would be eliminated. Like it or not, users are the biggest computer problem today. The problem shouldn't be usability, it should be user-ability.
I've always pictured the color of OS zealotry as a sort of bright flamingo pinkish hue
and overcoming the challenge of users not reading dialog boxes,
/etc once, do you wanna do it again?"
That's true. So true. Tons of times I just clicked yes without reading or reading fully and then later on down the road...oops.
I updated outlook express for my mom the one time and it autmatically blocked attachments, confusing her. And me, until I found where to uncheck that.
The computer can be taught to enforce security policies that the users themselves are unlikely to uphold, given their propensity to ignore advisories and software dialog boxes. Software engineers must build in security that is active by default, and they must understand the user so that security tools are actually used.
But also keep in mind who the user will be. Some advanced users would probaly not need/want the security by default. New users or non-advanced ones would need it. We would need to find security to be adaptable.
In a comical way maybe the system can say "well you hosed
That which does not kill me only postpones the inevitable.
I'm with you here. My sibling post (correct term?) and you make nice points about lazy programmers, so I'm going to go and bash some bad designers, too.
I've found that Windows and its applications are really, really stupid with the way they handle dialog boxes. Kind of off-topic, I know, but since most security issues are luser error, I can guess that most of those are caused by blind click-click-clicking Yes to dialog boxes.
I get a dialog box when I try to delete a file. I get several dialog boxes whenever a program crashes - something about an error report. At my school, they've managed to set up Word so you get three dialog boxes when you open it: one asking you to disable macros (to which the average user goes What?), another telling you that macros have been disabled (yes, that's why I clicked that button) and another telling you that there's a window open.
With so many dialog boxes around, most of them unnecessary, I don't blame the average user for ignoring the important ones. If you press Yes, the nasty evil dialog box will go away. Sooner or later the times comes when you install some spyware trying to get rid of the dialog box.
And what has Vista done? Put even more of them in. Quoth even Paul Thurrott: The problem with UAP is that it throws up an unbelievable number of warning dialogs for even the simplest of tasks. That these dialogs pop up repeatedly for the same action would be comical if it weren't so amazingly frustrating. It would be hilarious if it weren't going to affect hundreds of millions of people in a few short months. It is, in fact, almost criminal in its insidiousness. Gah, showering the user with more dialog boxes is useless, as they ignore them all anyway!
I'm on a roll here. What else?
When I want to Save a document, I go to the button marked Save. At least, I do on Gnome and OS X: Windows likes to have buttons called "Yes", "No" and "Cancel" instead. So instead of doing what I want (Saving), I have to read the dialog to find out which button Saves my document. And most people wouldn't even try to read it; they'd just click Yes and hope it was the right one. Oh, and the dialog text is often in a small font with no discernable main point about what it does.
Windows dialog boxes are obtrusive enough that people would rather make them go away (think: click Yes) than working out what they do. Here's an example of a Mac one - I can tell what each button does before reading, and even if I have to read, there's some nice bold text so I don't have to read it all. Here's the worst example of a Windows one I could find. Note none of the above things that the Mac does right. This isn't the best example, I know, but it points out where Windows fails best.
I reckon you could've eliminated a fair few spyware installs if the "Yes" button was labelled "Install Software", or the "Next" button was lebelled "Accept this Licence", or whatever it is. No more "Let's click Yes to make the nasty evil dialog box go away", but some people will think "Do I really want to install this software?" or "Do I really want to run this program?". It makes people think, and thinking is good when you're trying to make decisions.
Oh, and:
"How dare you try to type at another window when I am here, infidel scum!"
"And Vista dyes the rest of the screen black, just in case you didn't notice me the first time. See?"
Where was I? Oh yes, computer security. I don't think it's fair to blame any and all spyware installations on user error. Windows places you on a path above a crevasse with a bicycle, and expects you to pedal to the other side. Sure, you might get blown off by wind (read: security holes in the OS). Many people
Guy asked me for a quarter for a cup of coffee. So I bit him.
Only thing? No. Interfaces also make common mistakes easier to recover from
However, some mistakes cannot be recovered from - for example, if you click the "yes" button on the "would you like to install this malware" dialogue. In this case you might be able to use journalling features of the filesystem to undo the damage, but if you've done other things since then you probably couldn't selectively roll back the filesystem changes associated with the malware without rolling back everything else too.
In this case the UI has to be designed to make unrecoverable mistakes difficult or impossible to do in the first place so the "how do I recover?" problem (almost) never comes up. This is a very hard thing to do unless you want to turn computers into appliances (most people wouldn't like appliance computers since they wouldn't be able to install their favorite software) and becomes even harder when the people who want you to make mistakes (malware writers) are actively trying to trick you into making them.
One possibility that has been suggested is kind of a halfway-house between computers as we know them now and appliance computers - the OS would require all executable code to be signed by a "trusted party". However, this brings up some serious problems:
1. Who can be a "trusted party"? Lets say it's the OS vendor, why should I trust Microsoft to guarantee that the signed software is malware-free (especially since they are probably getting paid by the software vendor)? There will certainly need to be stiff penalties for signing software which turns out to be malware.
2. The inability to run unsigned software could be used to lock out the competition - for example, Microsoft could refuse to sign OpenOffice.
3. How much would this "signing service" cost - you can bet that thoroughly inspecting the software to ensure it really isn't malware is going to be very expensive so you just locked out all the small vendors who can't afford it.
4. How are you going to run code you compiled yourself since it won't be signed by the trusted party? This could either be FOSS code that you choose to compile yourself, or your own personal code.
These are certainly not easy problems. I do, however, feel that the ISPs need to take more action against people running malware infected machines. It seems all too common these days for ISPs to ignore abuse reports, let alone run monitoring software to proactively drop the connection to infected machines.
The ISPs should monitor people's connections for malware signatures and upon finding an infected host they should drop the entire internet connection until it's fixed (probably redirecting all web requests at a server containing patches and instructions to fix the problem).
Part of the problem is definately that most of the malware doesn't actually cause a problem for the owner of the infected machine - they don't know or care that their machine is actively being a spambot. Cause hassle for the owners of infected machines and they might actually pay attention to the security of their own systems (viruses were considered a much bigger deal back in the days when their payload often trashed your data).
http://blog.nexusuk.org