What's Missing From File / Disk Encryption?
lockDrive asks: "Every month, we read a news about personal information leak. Most of the time, either a laptop or a hard disk that contains sensitive information is stolen from a government or corporate office, and the data are not encrypted. Recently, Department of Veterans Affairs had lost a laptop which contained confidential information for 26.5 million veterans. The data were not encrypted. There are many products that provide a solution to such a problem. Microsoft Encrypting File System (EFS), which comes with Windows 2000 and later, encrypts data in a file system and seems to have a decent key recovery system in Windows 2003 Server CA. Products like SecureDoc and DriveCrypt encrypt an entire disk. I have tried some of them and they are not that difficult to use. What is holding people who handle sensitive information (government, health-care, insurance ...) back from encrypting their data? Are the products still too hard to use? Are they concerned about performance loss? Are they not convinced with the security gain? Are they just not adopting the technology quickly? Is there anything missing in the technology?"
Time is what is needed. :-D
I've been looking for an encrypted hard drive controller- something that looks to the OS like a normal disk but every single byte written to the disk is encrypted. The moment the power is pulled the key is lost and needs to re-entered when the system reboots. It would look like a disk error but when the "Non-system or disk error" message comes up you enter the key and the system boots normally.
I would prefer there not be any chance of the OS leaving around un-encrypted information on the swap partition or hacing a back door or any other stupidity. I've seen encrypted controllers but only with 40 bit keys. I'd love to see something with an AES 256 bit key. If nothing is out there I may just have to put together something using an FPGA.
-sirket
It's not a technological problem -- everyone in Windows & Linux land should be using Truecrypt or something similar and being smart about how they handle data. Rather it's a social problem.
Without written security policies, nobody knows what they should/can/must not do, and even if they do, they follow the rules inconsistently.
Take a look at Cisco's SAFE, for example. It explicitly says
If you don't know what you have, who gets to access it, and when, what good is a bunch of hardware and software? You might as well hand all your workers CDs of your databases and cross your fingers. Which, possibly, actually happens in some of these cases. Sadly, this sort of stuff is Day 1 material for CCNA and MCSE and other certifications these days, so it pretty much looks like whoever is running the show in these places can't follow or doesn't know standard industry practices. That's gross negligence, IMO, and nothing to do with any sort of technical failings.
I would love to a see a distro, like ubunto, that would ask me if I wanted to create a small boot parition, and a larger *encrypted* primary parition, which would then install to the encrypted partiton, and finally give me the chance to burn a CD from which to boot (or USB stick if my system supported that, etc.). Then, on boot (either from the HD small boot part, or a read-only CD), I'd enter my password to access the root partition. As it stands, getting this done requires some expertise, too much time for most of us, and lot manipulating of files, partitions, etc.. Make it easy!
I'd just like to be able to store 'personal' or 'private' information on a 1GB encrypted flash drive.
One of the major reasons that has stopped me from using encryption, however, is the lack of compadibility for diffrent operating systems.
If I encrypt the drive using AES-256 on linux, I'm unable to read it on Windows. If I encrypt it with one of the Windows tools, I'm unable to read it on linux.
So I'm stuck between only being able to read my information at home on my linux machine, or only on public/windows computers.
We had someone at work talk about this...
http://www.truecrypt.org/
Its not a HW controler, but a mount the file system encrypted. It seems like a well thought idea anyway. And available for Linux.
The really great thing about TrueCrypt, as I see it, is plausible deniability. This means that you can "nest" volumes and only have to account for the outer "envelope" when you are tortured by Homeland Security because you are using cryptography. The short of this: it is impossible to distinguish the "signal" of a nested hidden volume from the "noise" of random bits and such on the device.