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Spam Detection Using an Artificial Immune System
rangeva writes "As anti-spam solutions evolve to limit junk email, the senders quickly adapt to make sure their messages are seen. an interesting article describes the application of an artificial immune system model to effectively protect email users from unwanted messages. In particular, it tests a spam immune system against the publicly available SpamAssassin corpus of spam and non-spam. It does so by classifying email messages with the detectors produced by the immune system. The resulting system classifies the messages with accuracy similar to that of other spam filters, but it does so with fewer detectors."
I have to admit, I don't see the need for these recent whizbang's additions to the spam-fighting repertoire. Sure, they might be ingenious, but on a practical level they don't do anything more than a properly-configured SpamAssassin system. I used to get a lot of spam coming through a default installation of SpamAssassin, but after spending some time with O'Reilly's book (the free docs may already be up to this level of reader-friendliness, it's been a couple of years) and tweaking my installation, I get spam once in a blue moon. There's just no need for anything more.
So now we can look forward to a spam filtering solution that actively searches for spammers and kills them?
I Am My Own Worst Enemy
Ever heard of hay fever? Allergies? Think, people, think! charon
It looks fancy but when you get down to it, all it means is that there are a number of heuristics that are combined into filters (this happens by user training.) The filters are 'weighted' and filters that are not used often enough are 'culled' (killed off.) I don't think this will be significantly better than any other Bayesian-type spam systems.
You can't handle the truth.
Ultimately, very little. At core, they're probably identical techniques, and if I were reviewing this as a scientific paper I'd ding them for not answering exactly that question. There are such strong parallels between the two (train them on known data, add up probabilities, cut stuff on a threshold) that I strongly suspect that they're identical.
There are useful things to be gained from a change of metaphor. For example, one difference between this and most bayesian spam filter implementations is that this explicitly incorporates a decay function. That could be useful, if a word that used to be common in spam no longer is (e.g. if I actually decided to buy a Rolex, it's no longer a strong spam indicator, whereas right now any email mentionining "Rolex" is 99.9999% certain to be spam).
You could easily modify a Bayesian filter to have time-decaying weights, but if the change in metaphor leads somebody to come up with a good insight, then perhaps this is useful. Mathematically, though, the equations look very similar.
Spam and content filtering will always be a struggle for anybody who actually utilizes email. Simply adding more logic will not solve the problem. Reporting spammers to every rbl list you can think of, and alerting forums and newsgroups of abusive ip blocks on the other hand is already doing quite nicely.
I recently gave up on tweaking filters for myself and a few dozen people whose accounts I administer. I wrote a little script that asks for confirmation from the sender...if the sender confirms, they are added to a whitelist and will go straight through after that. I can also add addresses manually to the whitelist, and will soon be able to have wildcard (domain-wide) approved addresses. I've gotten exactly two spam in 6 weeks...both were confirmed by either a person or an autoresponder. Five years ago I never would have wanted such a blunt system...nowadays it's just the ticket.
Evil is the money of root.
The "immune system" solution is just another way to detect spam, but it is unlikely to be much more successful than existing methods. As someone else pointed out, SpamAssasin is pretty good already. So what if this new type of filter eventually improves the spam filtering accuracy from 98% to 99%? A more highly-polished rock is still a rock.
The real problem is the sending of spam itself, and that problem arrises from an inability to correctly attribute the spam to the spammers. If we can do that, we can block it, or at least better convict the spammers who violate the law. Things that solve this problem, like Yahoo!'s "DomainKeys", are the future of anti-spam, not more highly-polished rocks.
Your post advocates a
(x) technical ( ) legislative ( ) market-based ( ) vigilante
approach to fighting spam. Your idea will not work. Here is why it won't work. (One or more of the following may apply to your particular idea, and it may have other flaws which used to vary from state to state before a bad federal law was passed.)
( ) Spammers can easily use it to harvest email addresses
( ) Mailing lists and other legitimate email uses would be affected
( ) No one will be able to find the guy or collect the money
( ) It is defenseless against brute force attacks
( ) It will stop spam for two weeks and then we'll be stuck with it
(x) An enormous amount of spam will initially go undetected before your idea is effective
( ) Users of email will not put up with it
( ) Microsoft will not put up with it
( ) The police will not put up with it
(x) Your idea proposes a solution that only large corporations could deploy
( ) Requires too much cooperation from spammers
( ) Requires immediate total cooperation from everybody at once
( ) Many email users cannot afford to lose business or alienate potential employers
( ) Spammers don't care about invalid addresses in their lists
( ) Anyone could anonymously destroy anyone else's career or business
Specifically, your plan fails to account for
( ) Laws expressly prohibiting it
( ) Lack of centrally controlling authority for email
( ) Open relays in foreign countries
( ) Ease of searching tiny alphanumeric address space of all email addresses
( ) Asshats
( ) Jurisdictional problems
( ) Unpopularity of weird new taxes
( ) Public reluctance to accept weird new forms of money
( ) Huge existing software investment in SMTP
( ) Susceptibility of protocols other than SMTP to attack
( ) Willingness of users to install OS patches received by email
( ) Armies of worm riddled broadband-connected Windows boxes
( ) Eternal arms race involved in all filtering approaches
( ) Extreme profitability of spam
( ) Joe jobs and/or identity theft
( ) Technically illiterate politicians
( ) Extreme stupidity on the part of people who do business with spammers
( ) Dishonesty on the part of spammers themselves
( ) Bandwidth costs that are unaffected by client filtering
(x) The large amount of resources needed for implementation of your idea that small companies don't have
( ) Outlook
and the following philosophical objections may also apply:
( ) Ideas similar to yours are easy to come up with, yet none have ever been shown practical
( ) Any scheme based on opt-out is unacceptable
( ) SMTP headers should not be the subject of legislation
( ) Blacklists suck
( ) Whitelists suck
( ) We should be able to talk about Viagra without being censored
(x) Your solution is nothing more than a conceptual remanifestation of a solution that already exists
( ) Countermeasures should not involve wire fraud or credit card fraud
( ) Countermeasures should not involve sabotage of public networks
( ) Countermeasures must work if phased in gradually
( ) Sending email should be free
( ) Why should we have to trust you and your servers?
( ) Incompatiblity with open source or open source licenses
( ) Feel-good measures do nothing to solve the problem
( ) Temporary/one-time email addresses are cumbersome
( ) I don't want the government reading my email
( ) Killing them that way is not slow and painful enough
Furthermore, this is what I think about you:
(x) I think it is a creative concept, but there is no need to reinvent the wheel.
( ) Sorry dude, but I don't think it would work.
( ) This is a stupid idea, and you're a stupid person for suggesting it.
( ) Nice try, assh0le! I'm going to find out where you live and burn your house down!
Falun Dafa is good!
More specifically, it correctly classifies 84% of spam and 98% of non-spam.
The authors used the SpamAssassin corpus. Holden shows that, on the Spamassasin corpus, Bogofilter correctly classifies 90.3% of spam and 99.88% of non-spam. See http://sam.holden.id.au/writings/spam2/
This approach is nowhere near state of the art.
I'm seriously sick of people abusing biological methodolgies. People seem very attracted to ideas simply because they are grounded in "how nature works" and ignore the mathematical benefits or weaknesses. Now this idea pretty much just sounds like statistical rules based on a corpus - pretty much how every successful solution out there now works. This solution simply prunes rules that aren't being used, but there are better ways to get a smaller spam detection database. Have you seen the stuff the CRM114 people are doing? This is nothing new.
Read your Russell and Norvig, people. Airplane research didn't get off the ground (ugh) until we stopped trying to mimic birds and study physical principles of flight.
Did you ever notice that *nix doesn't even cover Linux?
Here is a better Idea: Blue Security was attacked and shut down because the Internet is septic. The germs (spammers) have taken over. The best way to win this is to take the profit out of spamming. This can be done in a similar manner in which the body's t cells alert the rest of an immune system on how to attack a pathogen. A cryptographically signed spammer complaint (attack) file should be distributed via a peer to peer network protocol. This file is sent amongst complaining programs that complain to a spammer's website each time a spam advertising said website is received.
Like an immune system, this network of spam attack programs will have a t-cell. The "t-cells" will be a small group of people who draw up the complaint instruction file. Whenever the pathogen (spammer) releases enough toxins (spam) into the body (Internet), the T-cells (people who write the complaint instruction file) alert the immune cells (spam complaint program) of the presence of the pathogen and how to attack (complain to website advertised) it. The pathogen is overwhelmed with a quick immuno responce (high bandwidth usage resulting from many, many complaints).
When the cost of running a website surpasses the revenue earned from said website, the website is shut down. When the costs of spamming or advertising via spam exceeds the income, spam stops. Blue Security was beginning to become successful. Too bad they bowed out.