Slashdot Mirror


Locking Up Linux, Creating a Cryptobook

Tom's Hardware has a nice overview about some of the latest ways to secure your data looking specifically at open source solutions that wont lock down your credit card. Since many people presented performance issues for why they don't implement encryption there was also special attention given to how well your system will perform after implementation of encryption. From the article: "At least where LUKS is concerned, performance is hardly an issue - one must expect to pay some penalty for additional encryption facilities that handle unencrypted data transparently. All of these solutions are simple to set up and use on a daily basis, but LUKS is portable across Windows and Linux platforms."

23 of 68 comments (clear)

  1. Hardware encryption by virtuald · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Software encryption is fine, but there needs to be better and more widespread hardware encryption (NOT DRM) facilties that can be taken advantage of in a cross-platform manner..

  2. Not available in UK by LiquidCoooled · · Score: 2, Informative

    Apparantly, from the UK tomshardware.com redirects to tomshardware.co.uk which doesn't have the article.

    Thats just annoying as hell.

    --
    liqbase :: faster than paper
    1. Re:Not available in UK by Per+Wigren · · Score: 2, Informative

      Has ANYONE here ever been able to succesfully view a coral cached page? Either times out for me or just takes so long that I guve up (I.E. 20 minutes later the html is still loading.)

      That sounds like outgoing connections to port 8080/8090 are blocked for you. Are you behind a restrictive corporate firewall?

      --
      My other account has a 3-digit UID.
  3. Multi-user laptops by Gopal.V · · Score: 4, Informative

    Now, this might not be a common thing in the US. But here in India, a lot of companies have team laptops which we pass around (on-call duty for server pages, for instances).

    And somebody from Delhi, did something up which works for exactly that. qryptix encrypts your home dir and mounts using your passphrase when you login, built as a pam.d module.

    Except for the fact that I wanted a truecrypt built into it, so that I can have a hidden volume even after I pass-phrase in to the first volume, this works well enough for most purposes.

  4. encryption vs security by Keruo · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Encryption won't protect you from hackers if you have the drives mounted 24/7.
    It's only good for protection against stolen data, eg. usb drives or cds/dvds.
    Or, if you keep your entire computer at unsecre location, and are afraid that someone will steal the entire machine(root crypto).

    But remember, encrypted filesystems are vulnerable to cryptanalysis since they contain specific information at specific blocks even if encrypted(ext3 header etc..)
    Encryption won't give you perfect cover, but if you really have something valuable to protect, it's decent way to go.
    Performance WILL be an issue, don't be blinded with those luks graphs, real world performance will be much closer to the cryptfs/encfs performance numbers, but it's fast enough. Just encrypt what you have to. No need to encrypt entire system if you can get away just by encrypting home dir.

    --
    There are no atheists when recovering from tape backup.
    1. Re:encryption vs security by CastrTroy · · Score: 2, Interesting

      Well, I'm running an encrypted swap partition, and frankly, I haven't noticed any slow down. Granted, I have 1 gig of RAM, so I don't go into swap too often, but I find that it doesn't actually slow down your computer too much. You might notice if you don't have enough RAM, or if you encrypt your home partition, and then try to use if for video editing and other hard storage usage applications. However, if your using it on your laptop for business, you probably won't notice much of a difference.

      --

      Anthropic principle: We see the universe the way it is because if it were different we would not be here to see it.
    2. Re:encryption vs security by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative
      But remember, encrypted filesystems are vulnerable to cryptanalysis since they contain specific information at specific blocks even if encrypted(ext3 header etc..)
      That's bullshit. If your implementation is vulnerable to this, then it's flawed.
    3. Re:encryption vs security by owlstead · · Score: 5, Informative

      Mod parent up - if I do, I loose my own addition to the discussion. Most block ciphers are quite immune to known plain text attacks. This is at least true for DES and AES. And well implemented stream ciphers are as well (I specifically say "well implemented" because of the the flawed WEP implementation for WiFi).

    4. Re:encryption vs security by Beryllium+Sphere(tm) · · Score: 2, Informative

      >encrypted filesystems are vulnerable to cryptanalysis since they contain specific information at specific blocks even if encrypted(ext3 header etc..)

      Part of the minimum design criteria for a crypto algorithm is to resist "known plaintext" attacks, such as knowing the location of magic numbers, headers, and so on.

  5. TrueCrypt? by SirClicksalot · · Score: 5, Interesting

    A pity they don't mention TrueCrypt.

    Besides encrypting your data, TrueCrypt can also create hidden volumes:
    "The principle is that a TrueCrypt volume is created within another TrueCrypt volume (within the free space on the volume). Even when the outer volume is mounted, it is impossible to prove whether there is a hidden volume within it or not, because free space on any TrueCrypt volume is always filled with random data when the volume is created* and no part of the (dismounted) hidden volume can be distinguished from random data. Note that TrueCrypt does not modify the file system (information about free space, etc.) within the outer volume in any way."

    So even if you reveal your password, the hidden volume stays safe. Not a bad feature, considering it is a crime in many countries to refuse to give your encryption key to the authorities...

    --
    It is not so much that I have confidence in scientists being right, but that I have so much in nonscientists being wrong
    1. Re:TrueCrypt? by rich_r · · Score: 2, Informative

      No, it's a crime to not give up your encryption key in the uk. Furthermore, it's the only crime for which the burden of proof is on the accused. Don't have a link to hand, but I believe it's the RIP act of '99. (commentary here)

    2. Re:TrueCrypt? by Rich0 · · Score: 2, Insightful

      So, then you put a hidden share in, and then put another hidden share inside that hidden share. Truecrypt hidden shares can be an arbitrary number of levels deep, and unless the authorities intend to just beat you until you die they're going to have to figure at some point that you might just be telling them the truth when you say there isn't another level...

      The design of truecrypt is that it isn't possible to tell whether there is a hidden volume or not - it just looks like unused space.

    3. Re:TrueCrypt? by Rich0 · · Score: 2, Informative

      Truecrypt volumes are filled with random data when they are initialized, and appear random when files are created/deleted. There is nothing you can do to tell whether a volume was ever written to without knowing the key.

      So, yes it does look like "used" space. But it also looks like "empty" space by the same virtue. If you just put your regular checkbook in a truecrypt volume and put something else in a hidden volume it would be plausible to say that the checkbook is the only thing in there.

  6. No, software. by Kadin2048 · · Score: 5, Insightful

    I'm not sure I agree with this.

    Software encryption is really superior to hardware in many ways. Basically the only way it's usually not superior is in terms of speed, and this is why you see hardware encryption implemented.

    However, as general-purpose computers have gotten faster and faster, so that there's more surplus capacity for things like encryption and decryption on the fly, I see the need for hardware encryption becoming less and less.

    There's just no reason to restrict yourself to a hardware-based system that's hard to upgrade and fix, when you can use a software system that can be kept in tune with the state of the art and is a lot easier to trust. Even if I'm a relatively interested and intelligent person, there's no way I can 'open up' a hardware encryption module and see what's going on inside. With software encryption, I can look at the source code (and provided I'm using a trusted compiler and toolchain) know what it's doing.

    Furthermore, software encryption leads to more diversity in implementations. When you use hardware systems, the only way they're affordable is if there is an economy of scale. You don't make just a handful (or even a few thousand) hardware modules, you want to make tens or hundreds of thousands of them. That means it's automatically going to be a big target. With software, everyone can use something that fits their needs more completely, and the exposure of the system as a result of a single exploit is reduced.

    Hardware encryption was fine when computers were too slow to encrypt data that was being written to disk on-the-fly. But now they are, and this means that you can use regular equipment, and use whatever cryptographic implementation you want, and upgrade it as often as is required, with minimal additional expense. In fact, if I was going to build a "hardware" encryption device today, I'd probably just design it around a general-purpose system-on-a-chip so that it would be easily reprogrammable. I can't imagine that for anything but the most specialized, very speed-intensive tasks, that a custom-made hardware solution is really advantageous.

    Not that I'm saying that all cryptographic hardware is bad; there is definitely room for specialized components without making entire hardware encryptors: dedicated hardware random number generators, for instance, seem like they'll definitely have a place for the foreseeable future.

    --
    "Ladies and gentlemen, my killbot features Lotus Notes and a machine gun. It is the finest available."
    1. Re:No, software. by portmapper · · Score: 2, Informative
      Furthermore, THG's article claims to have tested large file sizes but their graphs dont show it. In order for a filesystem to be correctly benchmarked, the test file size must be at least twice the size of RAM. If it isn't then the test is only testing RAM speed, algorithm speed, and Linux's page cache system. According to THG, LUKS can sustain > 100MB/sec on a 20GB laptop drive from 2002. Hmmm, I think not.

      The speeds reported are not believeable for a Pentium III M 1.2 GhZ even for just encryption. For comparisons, below is the output of "openssl speed" using a Opteron 170 (dual core, 2 GhZ):

      timing function used: getrusage
      The 'numbers' are in 1000s of bytes per second processed.
      type 16 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes
      md2 1319.99k 2852.42k 4012.43k 4463.32k 4616.59k
      mdc2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
      md4 12368.68k 43225.00k 123294.14k 239186.25k 326060.22k
      md5 10343.67k 34100.40k 89670.38k 154227.67k 192088.84k
      hmac(md5) 12247.16k 38659.27k 98929.88k 161080.15k 197054.32k
      sha1 10349.75k 32168.77k 77261.21k 118780.01k 141100.42k
      rmd160 5952.92k 15180.22k 28828.97k 36378.64k 40787.12k
      rc4 136573.04k 143986.99k 145413.62k 146386.75k 146586.59k
      des cbc 34461.90k 35701.70k 37036.93k 37175.49k 36608.52k
      des ede3 13751.49k 14061.98k 14140.86k 14095.64k 14166.87k
      idea cbc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
      rc2 cbc 21347.66k 21906.79k 21789.39k 22140.53k 21636.99k
      rc5-32/12 cbc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
      blowfish cbc 65679.12k 71584.56k 72852.48k 73303.87k 73445.24k
      cast cbc 53265.79k 56068.99k 56726.04k 57409.73k 57494.63k
      aes-128 cbc 86677.02k 90569.60k 92748.63k 92012.46k 93433.72k
      aes-192 cbc 75476.78k 80489.02k 81191.59k 82528.12k 82633.50k
      aes-256 cbc 67846.54k 71592.09k 73376.29k 73320.49k 73532.54k
    2. Re:No, software. by mophab · · Score: 2, Informative

      In my experience, hardware encryption doesn't keep up with speed either. If you are using software encryption, it gets faster along with everything else as you upgrade to faster machines. Hardware encryption just does not keep pace with the increasing speed of general purpose processors.

      The only remaining reason to keep hardware encryption around is to protect your private keys. Even in this way hardware can be problematic. If you have important private keys locked away in hardware, you need to have some backup plan if the hardware fails, or is not fast enough to meet future demand. So even in this case, you are probably better off with general purpose hardware that will protect/destroy its contents if physically attacked. Of course you can keep the hardware with the private keys on a secure subnet as well.

  7. Printable view of TFA by pair-a-noyd · · Score: 2, Informative

    If you have the 400 page ad loaded version as much as I do.

    http://www.tomshardware.com/2006/08/18/locking_up_ linux-creating_a_cryptobook/print.html

    1. Re:Printable view of TFA by pair-a-noyd · · Score: 2, Funny

      Shit, coffee malfunction, I meant to type "hate" not "have"....

  8. My experience by cvalente · · Score: 5, Informative

    I've been running my desktop on an encrypted root partition using LUKS (on Gentoo via dm-crypt) for over 6 months now.

    I was afraid that heavy IO access might cause high CPU usage or that some FS might not play all that well with the encryption.

    So far, I've had no problems. Even copying from one encrypted partition to another encrypted partition causes no noticeable lag due to encryption and normal usage of my disk, even with heavy uses such as DBs or backups seems to take place just like before.
    I've been using LUKS with xfs (and reiserfs to a lesser extent). I have a P4 3.2Ghz, don't remember the disk specs.

    Being able to have several passphrases is a good thing (you can even change them later on) and the assurance that a weak passphrase will not cause the key being easily guessed via crypto-analysis is another plus.

    The downside is that booting from an encrypted partition can be a little difficult to setup for a novice, but that has been improving and at least Gentoo now offers this on the current genkernel with little extra hassle.

    If you want the whole package, you can even encrypt the swap partition with a randomly generated key at boot time.

    What do you get from all this?

    Suppose your computer has an hardware malfunction and you have to send to be repaired (warranty for instance). You can be sure no one will find the financial data you saved there, or some less flaterring photo (or something more embarrassing you didn't even remember). Using an encrypted partition to save sensitive data might be enough, but many programs end up saving temporary data in unexpected places so all that care might be useless in the end. If everything is encrypted that risk is gone with just a little bit of extra work (once).

    Like someone wrote, this won't protect you from having you computer hacked while the partition is mounted and stealing data.

    --
    https://www.accountkiller.com/removal-requested
  9. eCryptfs by omnirealm · · Score: 3, Informative

    I am disappointed to see that Justin Korelc and Ed Tittel entirely missed eCryptfs, which is already in the -mm tree of the Linux kernel.

    --
    An unjust law is no law at all. - St. Augustine
  10. Re:Security First by kneeless · · Score: 3, Informative

    Debian Etch will have an option to use encryption by default and encrypt all partitions (except boot). This one article details how to encrypt all partitions except boot: http://www.debian-administration.org/articles/428

  11. Formats and upgrades by pe1chl · · Score: 2, Interesting

    A problem with Linux encrypted partitions is that there are several formats, and no migration path.
    As usual, when new and better solutions are developed, the Linux developer scene does not really care about backward compatability. The new method is sooo good that the old one should be left in the dust and its adopters must backup and restore.
    Developers who suggest backup and restore must be unaware of the current market situation w.r.t. backup solutions and their capacity vs that of IDE disks...

    Recently I decided to move two disks from my main system, encrypted under SuSE 9.2, to another box that I want to dedicate to background storage.
    I remembered that I had read about some issue in 9.3, but I believed that it had been long solved so I installed SUSE 10.0 on this new box.

    There was NO WAY I could get the disks mounted. I tried all the tricks found in several articles on Internet, but I kept getting errors.
    The SuSE knowledge base stated that everything would be fine when I just upgraded the OS, but I don't believe that because I tried the solutions equivalent to what would happen when upgrading. I don't want to risk it.

    Finally, the only solution was to install 9.2 on the new box, and the disks worked OK. Then, I have bought more disks (as was the plan) and copied the data from encrypted to unencrypted disks. Next step will be to install 10.0 again, but I am not so sure if I will encrypt the disks again as the 10.0 system is (I believe) not LUKS so probably at 11.0 I will again face the same problem because the "all new and better LUKS" is now the supported system.

    I will not even think about what would happen when I would want to change the distribution from SuSE to RedHat or Ubuntu or whatever.
    Chances must be about zero that I can still access the data.

    There is not even a tool that would in-place decrypt (or encrypt, for that matter) the data on a partition. Even when one wants to take the risk that it interrupts halfway and destroys everything. So you always need a source and destination device with enough space.

    Please keep this in mind before you encrypt your terabyte volumes...