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Building a Better Voting Machine

edmicman writes "Wired News has an interesting article about what would make the perfect voting machine: 'With election season upon us, Wired News spoke with two of the top computer scientists in the field, UC Berkeley's David Wagner and Princeton's Ed Felten, and came up with a wish list of features we would include in a voting machine, if we were asked to create one. These recommendations can't guarantee clean results on their own. Voting machines, no matter how secure, are no remedy for poor election procedures and ill-conceived election laws. So our system would include thorough auditing and verification capabilities and require faithful adherence to good election practices, as wells as topnotch usability and security features.'"

2 of 245 comments (clear)

  1. Don't build anything by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Paper and pencil. Mark your choices, put it in a cardboard box. It's the perfect solution and scales wonderfully.

    Many countries already use this advanced technique.

  2. MY Perfect Voting Machine by AeroIllini · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The true perfect voting machine consists of the following four components:

    - Paper
    - Pencil
    - Locked box with slot
    - Election official who can count

    Anything else is a solution in search of a problem, and a way for partisan election officials to send some contract money to their buddies in the tech industry.

    Seriously, who the hell cares about digital records or fast counts? I don't care how fast the results come in, I want them to be RIGHT. A voting system needs to enforce two basic principles: private votes and public counts. The voters need to know that their votes are private and anonymous, and the counting process needs to be simple and transparent enough that it can be understood, audited, and repeated. Computers, for the majority of people, are magical black boxes. They don't trust them as far as they can throw them, and that means there will always be suspicion of fraud, no matter how open the source and how impenetrable the outer casing. When we go to paper ballots, we guarantee that the process is easily understood, auditible, difficult to rig, and that counting is repeatable. There is no electronic system that satisfies all those conditions, and therefore electronic systems should not be used.

    However, if we wanted to use touch screen systems to print out ballots instead of marking them, that's fine with me (it would make voting more accessible, with a well-designed UI). The voter can verify their votes before dropping them in the box. But the printed paper ballots need to be counted by hand.

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