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Building a Better Voting Machine

edmicman writes "Wired News has an interesting article about what would make the perfect voting machine: 'With election season upon us, Wired News spoke with two of the top computer scientists in the field, UC Berkeley's David Wagner and Princeton's Ed Felten, and came up with a wish list of features we would include in a voting machine, if we were asked to create one. These recommendations can't guarantee clean results on their own. Voting machines, no matter how secure, are no remedy for poor election procedures and ill-conceived election laws. So our system would include thorough auditing and verification capabilities and require faithful adherence to good election practices, as wells as topnotch usability and security features.'"

36 of 245 comments (clear)

  1. Make it complicated please by argoff · · Score: 3, Insightful

    I'm serious. The more stupid and computer illiterate people you scare off, the better off we all will be.

  2. The Better Mousetrap by ackthpt · · Score: 2, Funny

    Build a better mousetrap and the world will beat a path to your door*

    * Subject to verification of safety by Underscribblers Laboratories; application, denial, re-application, re-denial, vetting by 12,256 paper shufflers, 52,469 rubber stampers, 245,193 red tape processors; re-re-application and final acceptance by the USPTO. Further said design must be the subject of scrutiny, in that it does not deprive any current american mousetrap assembly personnel or their employment in most favoured states, diminish compensation of executives, tip political balances one way or the other by being to simple or complex for the average lemming to operate, or threaten the United States Strategic Mousetrap Reserve. Further said design must be accepted by the US Mousetrap Think Tank and Allied Trade Council, 5870 G Street, Washington DC. Said mousetrap must be put forward in the US House of Representatives and Senate before proffering for acceptance by the head rat himself. Should said design be deemed without backdoor, defect or flaw**, please include next of kin to notify upon your mysterious disapperance.

    ** Particularly in Ohio where victory is already predicted by a mousetrap supplier who is a solid supporter of the head rat's party and has pledged to deliver as many votes for the head rat and his pals as possible. We can't have him looking bad now, can we?
    --

    A feeling of having made the same mistake before: Deja Foobar
  3. Random spot checks by Harmonious+Botch · · Score: 4, Insightful

    From TFA: "Random spot checks...This involves taking a random number of machines out of commission just before polls open on election morning to run a sample election on them to make sure the machines are recording and counting votes accurately.

    Before the polls open? How about during the election? At random times during the day?
    The poll workers should be required to have an extra one on hand just in case one breaks. It would be used to stand in for the one that was being checked. ( It could also be chosen for a random check. )

    1. Re:Random spot checks by Sparr0 · · Score: 3, Insightful

      $5000 per machine? Why? A $100 PC in a $50 arcade cabinet with a $20 printer could do everything that a perfect voting machine needs to do, and thats thrown together from consumer parts. If someone isn't building this 'perfect' voting machine for under $200 then something is wrong.

    2. Re:Random spot checks by xenocide2 · · Score: 2, Informative

      The $5000 gets you several things. It gets you a gigantic touchscreen about the size of my dell 20 inch monitor for the visually impaired (recall that a significant number of voters are elderly), along with a headset for those who really can't read well at all. It gets you a computer and stand that you can collapse and carry. it gets you a limited subset. And it gets you a machine primarily assembled in the states. It includes the cost of certifying the product design with one of three approved labs that test and vet these things. It includes a removable and theoretically secure pcCard slot for transporting the ballots. And the software needed to run all the various features, from translations to screen readers to the operating system. Like all government contracting work, the price is overbearing, mostly because so very few vendors are in the market. Even if you go with a cheap hard drive, cheap processor, and skimp in general on parts, I don't think you're going to get the screen alone for under 200. And remember, there's no room for error (theoretically) here. No failing power supplies, no broke hard drives, no blue screens, or those votes might simply be gone.

      There are interesting arguments in favor of a computerized ballot system. The implementations I've seen universally suck, sadly. Whether its a function of cost cutting or a simple consequence of an incredibly complex system I can't say with certainty.

      --
      I Browse at +4 Flamebait

      Open Source Sysadmin

  4. Open source & peer review by guyjr · · Score: 4, Insightful

    I think Wired is barking up the exact same, wrong, tree, that Diebold and every other manufacturer of voting machines is barking up - namely that they have all the answers.

    The solution is very simple: require all electronic voting machines to be open source, and invite all software developers around the world to peer review the code. When that majoriy agrees that a system is secure, then it's ready for use.

    1. Re:Open source & peer review by cp.tar · · Score: 3, Interesting
      require all electronic voting machines to be open source, and invite all software developers around the world to peer review the code. When that majoriy agrees that a system is secure, then it's ready for use.

      ... and when it's pronounced secure etc. - burn it to a ROM and disable any access to it which doesn't require at least a crowbar.

      After the vote, have the machine print out the total.

      --
      Ignore this signature. By order.
    2. Re:Open source & peer review by tonyr1988 · · Score: 2, Funny
      When that majoriy agrees that a system is secure, then it's ready for use.
      Exactly! That's where Diebold's machines come in. You can use them to determine when you've hit that majority!
    3. Re:Open source & peer review by Mab_Mass · · Score: 2, Insightful

      If you actually read the article, you'll see that they propose something just as good - requiring the full source code to be made public, which allows /. type geeks to do a complete audit.

      Essentially, though, the key requirements are simple to state: secure, transparent, auditable.

      Anything that fails any one of these is unacceptable.

    4. Re:Open source & peer review by Random+Utinni · · Score: 4, Insightful
      I think Wired is barking up the exact same, wrong, tree, that Diebold and every other manufacturer of voting machines is barking up - namely that they have all the answers.

      The solution is very simple...


      Erm? Pot... meet kettle.

      There is no simple solution to voter fraud. There always has been fraud, and there always will be. It's the nature of ingenuity. Hence the "build an idiot-proof machine, and the universe will build a better idiot". If someone wants to hack an electronic voting system, they will, open-sourced and peer-reviewed or not.

      In my view, the goal is simply to minimize the impact of such efforts, and to make it as difficult as possible to do so, as cheaply as possible. Open source *might* be a good way to go... certainly better than the closed electronic systems Diebold and their ilk are currently pushing. However, it's still an electronic system, and electronic systems are prone to making small errors very quickly (or being hacked to introduce small biases, very quickly). I'd personally prefer to return to a simple paper and pen ballot... simply check the box of the person/proposition you're voting for. Put paper in box. Let people count ballots (with observers, if desired). It scales fairly well, is difficult to introduce large errors into, and can't be hacked remotely. If it takes a little longer to get election results, so be it... there's almost two months between election day and inauguration day.
    5. Re:Open source & peer review by Qzukk · · Score: 4, Interesting

      Every time this comes up, I propose the same idea, but each time it gets a little more fleshed out.
      0. The voter completes whatever identification/registration/whatever steps required before being allowed into the actual voting room where...

      1. The voter receives a numbered (in an OCR friendly font, see below) blank ballot and is directed to the voting booth. The number indicates both the voting location and the sequence that the cards are issued. If ballots run out, voters are asked to wait while more are printed and delivered.
      2. The voter inserts the ballot into the electronic voting machine until a green light comes on. Diagrams illustrate the right way to do this, a notch in one corner prevents the voter from continuing until he/she figures this step out. Red light if they fail to do it wrong (labelled "WRONG" for the colorblind, buzzer for the blind though they will probably have someone load the ballot for them) to prevent them from trying to jam it in harder.
      3. The machine displays the ballot in the selected font size or reads the ballot to the blind user.
      3a. Each race is displayed separately with the candidates below it in a column. (or "For" and "Against" for appropriate referendums, etc.)
      3b. The user selects a candidate using up and down buttons, then presses the "Vote" button to select that.
      3c. Their choice is now highlighted on the screen (and read to them).
      3d. The user presses the "Next" button to move to the next race. Or presses the "Finished Voting" to indicate that they will will not vote in the remaining races. Loop to 3a until there are no more races or the user presses Finished Voting.
      4. A list of races and the selected candidates appears, the user can move up or down and see each race (have it read to them) and if they wish to change their mind, they can press the "Vote" button to return to that race and change their vote (See 3). User presses "Finished Voting" again to indicate that they are done (5 second delay required to prevent accidentially bouncing the button).

      Easy enough right? Now...
      5. The ballot card is fed through the machine's printer and printed in rows, with each row containing one race. Columns are the name of the race, the selection for that race, and a pattern designed for optical recognition. Each option has a unique code consisting of the code for that race plus a code for the candidate (to prevent misaligned scans) as well as codes for "no vote" and "write-in".
      6. Voter fills in any write-in positions.
      7. Voter reads the ballot card, and if there is a mistake, the voter presents the ballot to the site overseers who
      7a. Record the ballot number as destroyed and then
      7b. Destroy the ballot and issue a new one. Go back to 2.
      8. Voter places ballot in ballot box and goes home, proud to have done his civic duty.

      Lather, rinse, repeat for thousands of voters. The numbered ballots tell us two things: 1) Are there any missing ballot boxes and 2) are there any extra ballot boxes.

      8a. At the end of the day, the election observers record the lowest numbered unused ballot and destroy the remainder.
      9. Ballot boxes are delivered to a counting station.
      10. Ballots are dumped out, stacked up with the notches aligned, and each stack is counted in total
      11. The counted stack is then fed through an optical sorter set to sort the possible options for the first race into bins, one bin per candidate, one bin for all write-ins, one bin for no-votes.
      11a. Run each candidate's bin individually through the counting machine.
      11ai. Election observers spot check stacks by flipping like a flipbook and watching to see if the optical pattern being counted changes.
      11b. Count write-ins by hand
      11c. Run the no-vote stack through the counting machine....
      11d. and make sure the votes add up.
      12. Report the total to the next higher up official.

      Lather, rinse, repeat for all of the stacks.

      Why is this superior? First off, let's look at the actual counting: The counting machine doesn't k

      --
      If I have been able to see further than others, it is because I bought a pair of binoculars.
    6. Re:Open source & peer review by izzo+nizzo · · Score: 2, Interesting

      VoteHere is open source. I believe that it is a secure system even though I haven't analyzed the code personally. Further, its design and implementation adhere very well to the 'trust no one' concept that is one advantage of open source (the crucial one in this context).

      With this software, which I think will run on most or all of the machines that have already been purchased by all states, each vote is encoded, encrypted, and published (online) with each step of the process mirrored in an auditable backup channel. Voters don't need to trust local authorities' honesty and capability because they can check for themselves whether their vote was counted via their encrypted receipt. But no one can determine the content of specific votes unless they gather all the decryption keys to themselves. VoteHere

    7. Re:Open source & peer review by lgw · · Score: 2, Interesting
      burn it to a ROM and disable any access to it which doesn't require at least a crowbar.

      Have you seen the skills of the people who tamper with slot machines? They can pop the mahcine open, swap a ROM, and close it up in just a few dozen milliseconds, without triggering the many alarms.

      Of course, nothing's perfect, but it's a sad commentary that voting machines aren't at least as tamper-resistant as slot machines.
      --
      Socialism: a lie told by totalitarians and believed by fools.
    8. Re:Open source & peer review by Dark_MadMax666 · · Score: 2, Informative

      erm.. You will be using all open source tools, freely open for community and peer review .That will include ROM burning utility.
          Heck you know there is some platform out there which is build from ground up on open source, including OS, file system , drivers etc..mmm what the heck it was called...

  5. Don't build anything by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Paper and pencil. Mark your choices, put it in a cardboard box. It's the perfect solution and scales wonderfully.

    Many countries already use this advanced technique.

    1. Re:Don't build anything by From+A+Far+Away+Land · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Other famous democratic countries do use pencil and paper. Canada, one of Americas greatest neighbours to the north uses the birchbark and pinecone voting system... just pulling your leg. They, like Australians, use pencil and paper. We have about 70% voter turnout in Canada, with a voting population in the range of at least 10 million people. It takes us less than 2 hours after a poll closes to give nearly complete and meaningful results to the public.

      Telephoning the result to a central station is the extent of electrified voting in Canada. Everything else is on paper, for easy double checking if there's a court challenge. To have a system without paper that the voter marked, is an invitation for fraud.

    2. Re:Don't build anything by LiquidCoooled · · Score: 2, Insightful

      paper ballots can still be spoilt.

      Reading this from the bbc:

      Londoners had to register four votes altogether, a first and second choice for mayor, a vote for a London Assembly candidate and one for an Assembly party. While 2.9% of papers for the mayoral ballot were rejected, the London Assembly paper proved even more difficult.

      Over a hundred thousand people, 6.7% of the electorate, failed to correctly fill out the section choosing a constituency member, while 2.53% did not correctly register a London-wide party choice.


      Now that was only 2 years ago, but I think all interfaces suffer when dealing with multiple answers or pieces of information.
      A simple A B or C ballot works on paper really well, but you have to think VERY carefully about how you layout a complex set of questions.

      --
      liqbase :: faster than paper
    3. Re:Don't build anything by From+A+Far+Away+Land · · Score: 2, Insightful

      That's an interesting point. The obvious answer seems to be you choose between convenience of electronic voting - and get shafted out of your democracy that you're supposed to be getting. Or you simplify elections so that dog catchers aren't on the same paper as president - increasing the cost, but simplifying the voting. Since voting is pointless unless the voters know who they are voting for, and can easily make their mark, it's obvious that putting too much onto the ballot is actually less democracy than being able to pick every position in one shot.

  6. just like encryption by non · · Score: 2, Informative

    the best algorithm in the world is worthless in a poor implementation. enacting legislation that governed the process of counting the votes and verifying them is just as important as the machines themselves.

    --
    ...vividly encapsulates that post-Watergate/pre-punk/coked-up moment when you could trust no one, least of all yourself.
  7. Lines of Code = Tax Code by AeroIllini · · Score: 2, Funny
    "If you've got 50,000 lines of code, that's approaching the complexity of the U.S. tax code," Wagner says.

    Could you please express that number in Libraries of Congress? If you laid out all those lines of code without newlines, how many times would it wrap around the Earth?
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  8. Ive been saying it all along by The+Cisco+Kid · · Score: 3, Insightful

    Have one machine with fancy GUI's that are easy for people to use, which PRINTS a clear paper ballot on which the marks are both human and computer-readable (think of the little ovals you used to fill in with #2 pencil, only bigger ovals) and then a *seperate machine* which does nothing but scan and count the ovals.

    The marking machines could be of any complexity, wouldnt require auditing (the names on the ballots would be pre-printed, the machine would only mark in the ovals). Voters could choose to use the machine, or to mark the paper ballots themselves, and in all cases would be able to *look* at the paper ballot and verify their selections before submitting it to be counted. The specs for filling in the ballots could be released (and in fact the ballot specs would be part of the specs for the counting machine), and anyone under the sun could make marking machines, of any design that they wanted. The key is that these machines would record votes only on the paper ballot.

    The scanning/counting machine would have to be absolutely auditable, as simple and as transparent as possible. Every aspect of its operation would be required to be public domain, and available to any citizen upon request.

    1. Re:Ive been saying it all along by karl.auerbach · · Score: 2, Interesting

      What you suggest is similar to the proposal via the Open Voting Consortium.

      The differences are in that in the OVC approach only the results of a voter's selection are printed onto the generated paper. (We don't use pre-printed papers except that we use marked papers so that it is possible to distinguish between fake ballots that are printed elsewhere and valid ballots printed in response to a real voter's choices.)

      The reason why the non-selected choices are not printed is mechanical - to keep the voter's selections on one sheet of paper.

      Yes, multiple pages could be printed, each bearing the election idenfication information. This increases the issue of paper handling. One of the biggest problems with these machines are printers (not adequately reliable, need supplies, tend to draw a lot of power, take so long that the voter might walk away, print on papers that are not mechanically strong enough to withstand fast scanning by the vote counting equipment, etc) Remember this stuff has to work in conditions that range from 0% to 100% humidity and with power that is downright awful delivered through building wiring that may date from days of Edison and Tesla.

      But overall, I agree with you that the right approach is to consider the voting machines to be ballot marking machines, with variaions to fit the needs of physically disabled voters - and that the paper that is generated is "the" ballot and becomes valid only when physically inserted into a ballot box.

  9. MY Perfect Voting Machine by AeroIllini · · Score: 5, Insightful

    The true perfect voting machine consists of the following four components:

    - Paper
    - Pencil
    - Locked box with slot
    - Election official who can count

    Anything else is a solution in search of a problem, and a way for partisan election officials to send some contract money to their buddies in the tech industry.

    Seriously, who the hell cares about digital records or fast counts? I don't care how fast the results come in, I want them to be RIGHT. A voting system needs to enforce two basic principles: private votes and public counts. The voters need to know that their votes are private and anonymous, and the counting process needs to be simple and transparent enough that it can be understood, audited, and repeated. Computers, for the majority of people, are magical black boxes. They don't trust them as far as they can throw them, and that means there will always be suspicion of fraud, no matter how open the source and how impenetrable the outer casing. When we go to paper ballots, we guarantee that the process is easily understood, auditible, difficult to rig, and that counting is repeatable. There is no electronic system that satisfies all those conditions, and therefore electronic systems should not be used.

    However, if we wanted to use touch screen systems to print out ballots instead of marking them, that's fine with me (it would make voting more accessible, with a well-designed UI). The voter can verify their votes before dropping them in the box. But the printed paper ballots need to be counted by hand.

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  10. Re:Don't get too upset over this, it isn't importa by geekoid · · Score: 3, Insightful

    "And I'll even give a pass on FL in 2000 even though the recount conducted by the press gave the state to the Republicans."

    There WAS NO COMPLETE RECOUNT!
    Shit I am tired of this fucking false rumor. There were thousands og votes not even counted, as well as hundreds of prople being turned away.
    People involved with and running varias republican campahains were filmed interruptting the election process.

    Plus there was an ever BIGGER problem in Ohio.

    Personaly, I don't give a damn about election before I was born, I am concerned about elections that happen while I am a voter.
    2000 was a shame, as was 2004, and you should be pissed about it no mattter what party did it.

    Yes, if democrates had done that I would be just as pissed.
    OTOH we wouldn't have gotten rid of habias corpas.

    "But like I said, there is enough transparency that in any national election fraud can't swing the totals more than a point or two and the Electoral College minimizes the damage in Presidential elections.

    laughable, giving people more weight then others is an imbalanced system and it needs to be changed.

    --
    The Kruger Dunning explains most post on /. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning%E2%80%93Kruger_effect
  11. Open Voting Consortium by AaronW · · Score: 4, Interesting

    For those who are interested in seeing a proper voting system put together, check out the Open Voting Consortium. They have a free, open-source voting platform that addresses all of the concerns. It has a verifiable paper trail as well as support for blind users and multiple languages.

    I personally have donated money to this organization and believe they are doing the right thing in addressing the current mess we have now.

    Their paper trail has a really nice feature in that it also prints a bar code for a quick machine recount of the ballots as well as a human readable output.

    -Aaron

    --
    This post is encrypted twice with ROT-13. Documenting or attempting to crack this encryption is illegal.
    1. Re:Open Voting Consortium by WaxParadigm · · Score: 2, Interesting

      "Their paper trail has a really nice feature in that it also prints a bar code for a quick machine recount of the ballots as well as a human readable output."

      If it's as you describe and the votes are recorded for the machine in a separate bar code from the human-readable portion, well, that's just stupid as the human can only verify the human-readable portion (can't verify that the bar code is also correct). The human-readable portion should be what the machine reads, not some bar code...as stated in the Wired article, "the machine prints the votes onto a full-size paper ballot."

      Problem with all this is that the machine used to fill out the ballot is overkill for a vast majority of the population. The exact same paper trail (bubbles filled in on full-size ballot) can be achieved by using a pen to fill in the bubbles. So, the perfect voting center would have a small number of these machines (enough to handle those with special needs) and a ton of those fold-up writing stations with cardboard privacy walls and a pen for the masses of people for whom that works fine...then feed all of the ballots (filled out by computer or human) through a reader that tallies the votes and is audited for accuracy. It's simple, accurate, and has a lot of bandwidth/throughput (number of people who can vote at center in a given time) per dollar so folks don't have to wait around or have their tax dollars wasted on an unnecessary number of machines.

  12. David Chaum's Method by John.P.Jones · · Score: 3, Interesting

    At the end of the article they mention David Chaum's method of voter verifiable elections. I first saw this several years ago in graduate school (I believe I was reviewing an earlier version of the paper for a conference). It is a gloriously beautiful protocol, far beyond what I ever hope to see implemented in my lifetime. :( I suggest you take a look, I will look at the version referenced in the article again tonight as the exposition is considerably clearer than the version of the work I read (dumbed down a bit for a mass audience).

  13. Re:Don't get too upset over this, it isn't importa by drinkypoo · · Score: 2, Informative
    And yes I said DEMOCRATS steal elections. Think about it, who runs the elections in every major city? Who runs the elections in most smaller cities? How many precincts are entirely run by Democrats vs how many can you find without a single Democrat in the audit loop? Ok. So we have now established who has opportunity. Motive is easy; Democrats, like most politicians desire power. Democrats also tend to believe the ends justify the means.

    No one said Democrats don't steal votes. Well, no one with a clue. However, while we don't have any proof that Dems have stolen any presidential elections, we have piles of proof that the reps have stolen the last two of them.

    Consider that every important documented case of election fraud in the 20th Century was Democrats cheating.

    Nixon was a Republican until he ran his 1972 campaign independently. Really, he was still a Republican, but I think he was just trying to insulate his party.

    I live in Louisiana and can still remember Sen Landrieu winning her first election from a strong turnout among the dead in New Orleans.

    How convenient that Bush repeated the "votes from beyond the grave" gambit (which is older than democracy - oh wait, no one has ever actually tried a true democracy, they've all been representative or restricted, even unto Athens) in 2000... and succeeded.

    Of course, you seem to be forgetting the scam with which thousands of non-felons were added to a list of felons who were not eligible to vote down in Florida. The company was explicitly told that they would get paid if they did not check their list for validity.

    And I'll even give a pass on FL in 2000 even though the recount conducted by the press gave the state to the Republicans. After all the Democrats were trying something totally new in that case, lose and have the courts award the race after the polls closed. That is nothing any change in voting machines or elections laws can fix.

    You are either an idiot or a troll. I put my money on the second. The recount was not completed, it was illegally stopped by the unilateral action of a single supreme court justice. The recount did NOT give the election to Bush; it would have Definitely given it to Gore.

    A lot of this is because in the florida precincts where they used the scan-tron type forms, they had a form scanner with a switch on it. This switch determines whether mismarked ballots are kicked back out to the person inserting them, or silently accepted. In at least one primarily black precinct this switch was set to silently accept; in the majority of precincts it was set to reject. I guess in florida you only get to have your ballot checked at submission time if you're white.

    But like I said, there is enough transparency that in any national election fraud can't swing the totals more than a point or two and the Electoral College minimizes the damage in Presidential elections.

    The electoral college is the thing that makes our claims of Democracy a farce. Even given all of their cheating bullshit, the republicans still lost the popular vote in the last election. This is only like the fifth time that the electoral college has overridden the popular vote, proof that it is utterly unnecessary, but also proof that it sometimes goes against the will of the people and should be disbanded.

    The electoral college was instituted because it was supposedly believed to be a necessary item to prevent mob rule. In reality, it is a power structure created to keep the powerful in power eternally.

    --
    "You're right," Fisheye says. "I should have set it on 'whip' or 'chop.'"
  14. Trollish but valid point by joggle · · Score: 4, Insightful

    I would just like to point out that while the parent post is trollish in nature, it is a sentiment similar to what nearly all (if not all) of the founding fathers believed. That being certain qualifications are needed in order to cast a ballot. Their fear was some rogue could convince less educated people to vote for him so that he could, in turn, pillage the government and/or be a tyrant. I'll grant it's a thorny issue, but the problem of attempting to intentionally limit people who vote is that inevitably some racial groups will be disenfranchised (as well as other categories of population, such as the elderly in this case). Also, some local officials will try to exacerbate the situation to their favor (as happened-- and is still happening--in the South).

    1. Re:Trollish but valid point by sunderland56 · · Score: 2, Interesting

      So, you are saying:

      1. There should be a certain intelligence standard to be eligible to vote.

      Yes, that is a thorny issue; but the idea does have some merit. But, you are also saying:

      2. Intelligence follows racial and/or age groups.

      I heartily disagree, as will many eligible voters.

      Oh, and those Southern officials were NOT trying to enforce any form of intelligence standard - they were banning smart blacks, but allowing idiot whites to vote.

  15. Bullet-Proof Elections - the Geek Way by Spinlock_1977 · · Score: 2, Interesting

    Ok, voting machines cannot be guaranteed to be bullet-proof. Anyone who knows a decent amount about computer software & hardware gets that.

    But why is it so hard to envision a simple audit trail to absolutely guarantee the authenticity of any election?

    1) Make sure every voting machine spits out a paper receipt with a unique transaction number and the vote(s) recorded.

    2) Make public a web site that displays *every* receipt number and its vote(s). Ok, it might be 300 million database records, but a simple menu across the top will let anyone drill down to their receipt number and confirm their vote was recorded correctly. We'll file this exercise as each Citizen's Responsibility. (It's important to note that having a citizen enter a receipt number to see those particular ballot results will not be secure since it would take a different path through the web site software, and also reduce anonimity).

    3) Democracity loving geeks everywhere will write code to scan that (huge) web site and confirm the final totals.

    It seems so simple. What am I missing?

    --
    - The Kessel run is for nerf herders. I can circumnavigate the entire Central Finite Curve in a lot less than 12 parse
    1. Re:Bullet-Proof Elections - the Geek Way by phantomlord · · Score: 2, Informative

      If you take away a verifiable record (be it an ID you can look up or an actual copy) of your vote, you open yourself to the following type scenarios:

      1) Boss: You know, I really need to see your vote receipt so we can make sure you're protecting our interests. If you refuse or you don't vote the way we wanted, see you later.
      2) Abusive spouse: Honey, lemme make sure you voted the way I wanted or I will beat the crap out of you.
      3) Church: You heathen, you voted for people out to destroy our morality. I, requesting that you be excommunicated.

      etc, etc...

      --
      Don't leave your mind so open that your brain falls out. Don't close it so much that you cut off the blood.
  16. Re:Don't get too upset over this, it isn't importa by Duhavid · · Score: 2, Interesting
    Either we trust the people running our elections or we don't.


    There should inherently be distrust of our election officials, always every time, forever.
    If they cant stand an audit, they should not be there.

    Ever sell a house? Escrow companies exist because there is something of value
    and in the transfer you cannnot trust always the other side. Which is exactly
    as it should be. Sell a car? Notice of transfer of liability. Why? Because
    you cant always trust the other party involved. Which is the way it should be.
    If you buy something you are issued a receipt. Why? Lack of trust. Which is
    the way it should be. Your bank sends you statements each month. Repeat as
    above. I wont go on, because I have made my point, I hope.

    And yes I said DEMOCRATS steal elections.


    for each $party in America.PoliticalParties
            Not OK when $party steals or commits fraud in an election.
    next
    --
    emt 377 emt 4
  17. Re:Don't get too upset over this, it isn't importa by brit74 · · Score: 2, Informative

    Personally I have seen enough examples to believe Democrats routinely steal enough votes to gain a 1 or 2 point advantage in any national election and substantially more in certain local races. But we Republicans simply spot em the handicap and go on to win elections.

    You need to read more. There are plenty of cases of Republicans doing shifty things.

    LAS VEGAS -- Elections officials have rebuffed an attempt by a former GOP operative to purge about 17,000 Democrats from the voter rolls in the battleground state of Nevada, where the two presidential candidates are in a dead heat. Dan Burdish, former head of the state Republican Party, filed a challenge last week claiming the Democrats should be removed from the rolls because they were inactive voters. When asked why he did it Burdish told the press, "I am looking to take Democrats off the voter rolls." http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,135334,00.html

    2004: The State of Florida compiled a list of 47,000+ felons to be barred from voting. Jeb Bush struggled to keep this list secret. After a lawsuit to make the list public, it was discovered that African American felons (who tend to vote Democrat) made-up 50% of the list, including a number of African-Americans who had regained the right to vote, while hispanics (who tend to vote Republican) made up only 61 of the 47,000 felons on the list. http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/07/01/florida. elections/ http://www.leanleft.com/archives/2004/07/27/3244/

    Clint Curtis testifies under oath that Florida Representative Tom Feeney asked him to create a voting machine that could secretly switch the vote to whomever is pre-chosen to win an election. http://www.boingboing.net/2006/10/09/video_testimo ny_of_v.html

    2002: In New Hampshire, Democrats setup a phone line where disabled or elderly voters can call to get a ride to the polls. On election day, they are mysteriously jammed with calls from people hanging up. Legitimate voters can't get through. After some investigation, they trace the calls back to "GOP Marketplace" in Virginia. Republicans are convicted and admit that they did it to stop Democrats from getting to the polls. James Tobin, New England regional director of the Republican National Committee is convicted. http://bigbrassballs.wordpress.com/tag/gop-scandal s/phone-jamming/ http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/05/17/wednesd ay/index.html?eref=sitesearch

  18. Re:Don't get too upset over this, it isn't importa by Spasmodeus · · Score: 2, Insightful
    There WAS NO COMPLETE RECOUNT!
    No, but the recount for which Gore asked, and the Florida Supreme Court ordered, was finished by the press, and it showed Bush as the winner.

    Gore never asked for a statewide recount because he was afraid a statewide recount wouldn't have given him the net votes he needed. He only asked for counts of the undervotes in Democratic-leaning counties because he thought he could get just enough votes to be elected. His rhetoric about "count every vote" was total hooey.

    So if the U.S. Supreme Court hadn't put a stop to the recount, Gore would have still lost, only he would have been hoisted by his own petard instead of having the convenient "judicial coup" excuse.

    There's an interesting article on the whole despicable affair HERE.

  19. Voting machines must meet slot machine standards by Animats · · Score: 2, Informative

    Voting machines should be at least as secure as slot machines. The state of Nevada has standards for those, as I wrote in a previous Slashdot article. Nevada is concerned with collecting taxes and not cheating customers when the machines are owned by very shady people. So they have technical standards with teeth. Stuff like this:

    • ... must resist forced illegal entry and must retain evidence of any entry until properly cleared or until a new play is initiated. A gaming device must have a protective cover over the circuit boards that contain programs and circuitry used in the random selection process and control of the gaming device, including any electrically alterable program storage media. The cover must be designed to permit installation of a security locking mechanism by the manufacturer or end user of the gaming device.
    • ... must exhibit total immunity to human body electrostatic discharges on all player-exposed areas. ... must exhibit a capacity to recover and complete an interrupted play without loss or corruption of any stored or displayed information and without component failure. ... Gaming device power supply filtering must be sufficient to prevent disruption of the device by repeated switching on and off of the AC power. ... must be impervious to influences from outside the device, including, but not limited to, electro-magnetic interference, electro-static interference, and radio frequency interference.
    • All gaming devices which have control programs residing in one or more Conventional ROM Devices must employ a mechanism approved by the chairman to verify control programs and data. ... All gaming devices having control programs or data stored on memory devices other than Conventional ROM Devices must:
      (a) Employ a mechanism approved by the chairman which verifies that all control program components, including data and graphic information, are authentic copies of the approved components. The chairman may require tests to verify that components used by Nevada licensees are approved components. The verification mechanism must have an error rate of less than 1 in 10 to the 38th power and must prevent the execution of any control program component if any component is determined to be invalid. Any program component of the verification or initialization mechanism must be stored on a Conventional ROM Device that must be capable of being authenticated using a method approved by the chairman.
      (b) Employ a mechanism approved by the chairman which tests unused or unallocated areas of any alterable media for unintended programs or data and tests the structure of the storage media for integrity. The mechanism must prevent further play of the gaming device if unexpected data or structural inconsistencies are found.
      (c) Provide a mechanism for keeping a record, in a form approved by the chairman, anytime a control program component is added, removed, or altered on any alterable media. The record must contain a minimum of the last 10 modifications to the media and each record must contain the date and time of the action, identification of the component affected, the reason for the modification and any pertinent validation information.
      (d) Provide, as a minimum, a two-stage mechanism for validating all program components on demand via a communication port and protocol approved by the chairman. The first stage of this mechanism must verify all control components. The second stage must be capable of completely authenticating all program components, including graphics and data components in a maximum of 20 minutes. The mechanism for extracting the authentication information must be stored on a Conventional ROM Device that must be capable of being authenticated by a method approved by the chairman.

    That's part of what's needed. Those standards cover the possibility of an "alternate program" in a slot machine, and provide a way to check for it, with logs and an external program check capability.