Software Error Likely Killed MGS Spacecraft
Aglassis writes "NASA investigators have determined that a software update performed in June of 2006 may have doomed the 10-year-old spacecraft. Apparently the software error caused the solar arrays to drive against a mechanical stop which then forced the spacecraft into safe mode. Unfortunately, after that the spacecraft's radiator was pointed at the sun which overheated the battery and destroyed it. Contact was lost with the Mars Global Surveyor spacecraft in November 2006. NASA will form an internal review board to determine formally the cause of the loss of the spacecraft and what remedial actions are needed for future missions."
I don't believe it.
Its most likely the Martian automated defense system setup just before we sent a probe and destroyed their civilisation.
liqbase
One crash in ten years? Why don't the NASA guys write consumer operating systems?
Glad i'm not the programmer who came up with that bit of code! Their next performace review is going to be _lots_ of fun!
This Space Intentionally Left Blank
Funny definition of 'safe mode'. I'd get the main antenna pointing at the earth, the battery radiator pointing away from the sun, and the computer going 'what do I do know, smarty earthlings?' and waiting for a command.
Maybe NASA's 'safe mode' just put 'safe mode' in the corners of all the returned images and did them in 8-bit colour...
Aero and space are very unforgiving of human coding errors.
Some expert is always trumpeting the fact that "Johnny can't program," to which many of us roll our eyes and go back to coding. But could this be a sign that the quality of the help NASA is hiring is such that these kinds of mistakes are now rampant? I mean, this could have been avoided if the code had been tested out on a full-scale mock-up of the machine, to verify that it did what it was supposed to do, before ever sending the commands to the actual machine. If anything, it's a QA failure.
GetOuttaMySpace - The Anti-Social Network
No sandbox can avoid the fact that one test was missing.
We used to live in a vacuum tube. When the computer was running, and your bit was accessed, you almost had enough light to read by. Mother would disconnect the tube when she went to bed, causing floating point errors for almost eight clock-cycles...
Or at least, that's how I remember it...
It wasn't one engineer. It was a team effort. And it wasn't a very simple matter of "forgetting". Several factors combined, including re-use of code from the MGS mission (a conversion factor was in the old code, but not recognized when the code was adapted for the doomed MCO) and budget constraints that limited pre-flight testing (so bug was missed...and in fact might have still been missed even with more testing). The effects of the bug were also subtle enough that 3 minor main engine firings were conducted without enough error showing up to reveal the problem. It wasn't until the long orbital insertion firing that the error in the trajectory became noticeable, and by then it was too late. The team's first clue something was wrong was when the spacecraft didn't radio home after the engine burn.
The details are really convoluted, but the Wikipedia page on the mission has a decent write up explaining how the mistake was made, with additional resources cited. The PDF paper giving a perspective from the MCO team is particularly revealing, if you've got some time on your hands.