Study Finds Bank of America SiteKey is Flawed

An anonymous reader writes "The NYT reports on a Harvard and MIT study, which finds that the SiteKey authentication system employed by Bank of America is ineffective at prevent phishing attacks. SiteKey requires users to preselect an image and to recognize this image before they login, but users don't comply. 'The idea is that if customers do not see their image, they could be at a fraudulent Web site, dummied up to look like their bank's, and should not enter their passwords. The Harvard and M.I.T. researchers tested that hypothesis. In October, they brought 67 Bank of America customers in the Boston area into a controlled environment and asked them to conduct routine online banking activities, like looking up account balances. But the researchers had secretly withdrawn the images. Of 60 participants who got that far into the study and whose results could be verified, 58 entered passwords anyway. Only two chose not to log on, citing security concerns.' The study, aptly entitled "The Emperor's New Security Indicators", is available online."

Comments

This could be solved...

[Gnissem]

If BofA periodically did not show the image and then warned the user they had made a mistake by entering their password, users would soon be trained to look for the image. Setting up a security system once and then not reinforcing it periodically so that users take it seriously is the probelm.

Newflash!

[SNR monkey]

Enhanced security measures thwarted by stupid users. More at 11!

It seems like most security systems based on users not being idiots are doomed to fail. Phishing attacks work because people don't follow normal security procedures, making the authentication process longer/more involved for the user seems to be an inherently flawed idea because it trusts the user to know what is best for him/her.

Re:Newflash!

[gsslay]

The point is that people turn off their brain once told what to do by someone or something that appears to be a source of authority. Here it was the people who led them into the room and stood about with clipboards. People are used to being told what to do by other officious looking people.

On a website all it needs is an official looking statement at the top of the phishing page that says "We are sorry, but our image security is broken just now, please log in as normal while we fix it, thank you." People are used to being told that computer systems are down and they should manage as best they can while they're repaired.

You simply can't regulate for people not willing to think for themselves.

meh - controlled environment?

[hashmap]

1. go to an unusual place,

2. sign an agreement form,

3. follow instructions that say: "Log into your account"

4. you're aware that people are watching you and will analyze what you did

whatever results they get do not prove anything other than:

People placed in a unfamiliar, controlled environment with Harvard scientists ogling at them will not check the security image.

h

SiteKey is not to protect customers

[sexyrexy]

It's to protect Bank of America from liability. If someone's account integrity is compromised due to phishing, the bank's ass is covered - they implemented a two-way authentication, the user just chose to ignore it (after indicating they read and understood the terms and function of the SiteKey)

People are not "Flawed"

[jmagar.com]

Those of you stating that the problem is with the users are somewhat mistaken. At some point we as an industry are going to have to get more professional and stop blaming the users for all of the system problems. Let's take a new approach: include this requirement in your designs: A user may not understand the whole system, much in the way that you don't understand all the inner working of your automobile. A user of the system is not required nor expected to understand how it works.

Now, go forth and design systems that work, instead of blaming your design failure on the user.

Re:Flawed system or flawed usage?

[UnknowingFool]

Nope, it's clear, but I fear users are oblivious. That's why Vista's annoying security notifications will not be as effective MS would like them to be.

Allow TakeControlComputer.exe to run?

"Yes, quit bothering me. How do I turn that off? Let me google it."

Re:Sensationalist headline...

[jalefkowit]

The SiteKey isn't flawed, the people are.

People are, by definition, flawed. Any security system that is predicated on this changing sometime soon is broken.

Re:Flawed system or flawed usage?

[Znork]

"If you don't read this..."

Actually, I'd suggest 'if you read this and believe this in any way makes you safe from phising you should take your banking offline'.

This scheme is worthless. Once the user enters his username the bank discloses the picture. There's nothing stopping a phishing site or trojan from immediately using the username to obtain the correct picture and displaying it to the user. IE, the explaining text should say 'if you recognize your SiteKey you still have no idea wether or not it's safe to enter your passcode'.

Whoever thought this up obviously missed a few computer security classes.

"It's the users, not the system!" syndrome

[Brown]

There're a number of comments saying things along the lines of:

..the system itself is not flawed, but the way the users choose to operate on it

Enhanced security measures thwarted by stupid users. More at 11!

The SiteKey isn't flawed, the people are. It's a common error to ascribe problems with usability to 'idiot users'. The real problem is software that's designed for the wrong target group (experts, where it should be everyman) or just badly designed, confusing or poorly explained interfaces. The fact is, this system *has* to be designed to cope with clueless users. If it's only safe for use by people with an IQ over 100, then half the population will be at risk!

Re:Flawed system or flawed usage?

[bjourne]

It was not to hard to guess that that would be the very first response to this article. It is very typical for techies to expect users to use the system as the system was designed. That is not what happens in the real world. The usage of the system is equivalent to the system itself. If the usage of it is flawed, then the system, too, is flawed.

Many systems require you to change your password once a month or more often. Of course, the password must not be based on an English word and must contain both uppercase and lowercase letters and digits. Is it then a user failure when every other user forgets their password? No! It is the system that is faulty.

Therefore Bank of Americas system is faulty, most password based systems are infact faulty. It is not an acceptable excuse to put the burden on the user. It is a cop out. We are techies, we should make stuff work. It is our job.

Biased sample?

[ArsenneLupin]

Indeed, but what is surprising is not that they didn't notice the missing image, but that they agreed to participate at all. You may be on to something here. Maybe most people who they did ask refused to participate... phearing that the entire experiment might be a setup trying to get at their banking passwords.

The few that did participate where either excessively trusting or clueless, making them more likely to not worry about the missing image either.

In a word, they used a biased sample.

Re:Flawed system or flawed usage?

[Tom]

Rule #1 of user interface design: The user is always right. If he does something wrong, thank him for pointing out a flaw in your interface.