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Digital Credentials Offer Enhanced Privacy

Posted by kdawson on from the cypherpunks-write-code dept.

John Q Random writes "Stefan Brands's company credentica.com announced their U-Prove library and SDK implementing ID tokens — also known as digital credentials or private credentials. (Private Credentials are a cool PKI replacement and anonymous e-cash tech that allows you to prove certified attributes like age, credit rating, group membership, etc. without revealing who you are; to allow you to have a digital life without the digital dossier effect inherent in a central databases.) Following this announcement, Adam Back announced credlib, an open source implementation of Brands credentials (and the older more basic Chaum certificates). These developments relate to recent news from IBM's Zurich labs on their identity-mixer project (previously discussed on Slashdot) that is based on the less efficient Jan Camenisch and Anna Lysyanskaya credentials."

10 of 49 comments (clear)

  1. Identity Theft by biocute · · Score: 3, Insightful

    This is under the presumption that the holder/applicant is who he claims he is.

    I guess it'll just get added to the to-do list of phishers and ID thieves.

    And the fact that (real) sensitive data has to be included to prevent 'leading/sharing' just begs for hacking.

    --
    Virtual Betting on Facebook for non-geeks.
    1. Re:Identity Theft by Zeinfeld · · Score: 2, Interesting
      The fact that Adam Back is involved lends serious credibility to this effort. There may well be weaknesses, as with any scheme. But at least it's been looked at and implemented in part by one of the best in the biz.

      Stefan is not exactly in need of credibility. We all know he can do the business on the technology side.

      The main concerns here are first Stephan has a tendency to prioritize certain political attachments over practical issues. So the question is not whether the system will be as private as claimed but whether it will be realistic enough to be viable. The second concern is navigating the thicket of patent claims various parties control.

      Tony Nadalin and myself have been proposing what appear to be similar schemes independently that do not offer the same degree of academic perfection (there is a possibility of registry default) but the IP is held (as far as we know) by companies that have a bigger interest in something happening than in milking their IP portfolios.

      I don't yet have a white paper on the subject but I did present the scheme at RSA. Details should be comming out soon.

      --
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  2. Well blow me down! by Itninja · · Score: 2, Funny

    At first I thought is said "Digital Credentials Offer Enhanced Piracy"

    "Me SmartCard an' Biometrics allow en' more booty to be plundered, yarhhh!"

    --
    I judt got a nre Kinesis keybiartf so please excusr ant egregiou typos.
  3. Technolgy can't fix legal/economic problems by Wesley+Felter · · Score: 2, Insightful

    Where is the threat to individual privacy? As I see it, the threat is companies misusing legitimately-obtained personal information. Now let's tie in privacy with today's earlier discussion about credit card fraud. To buy anything over the Net from a reputable vendor, you usually must provide your legal name, home address, and phone number in order for the credit card transaction to be approved. (Buying from less reputable vendors may actually provide more privacy because AFAIK Paypal doesn't expose all these personal details when you make a payment.) What is the chance that VISA/MC/AMEX will re-engineer their systems to be privacy-preserving?

    1. Re:Technolgy can't fix legal/economic problems by John.P.Jones · · Score: 2, Insightful

      > What is the chance that VISA/MC/AMEX will re-engineer their systems to be privacy-preserving?

      Much better when there is a well understood solution to the problem. The technology is a necessary not a sufficient condition for fixing these problems. No it won't magically solve our problems but that doesn't negate the use of developing the technology.

  4. RTFA by Wesley+Felter · · Score: 3, Interesting

    When I read "digital credentials" I immediately thought "(SSL/SMIME) certs and (SSH/PGP) keys". Those are two standard and widely implemented forms of "strong" digital authentication.

    The problem with regular certs is that they are all-or-nothing, so if you disclose your cert to a party, they now have all the information in the cert. For example, consider using a "digital drivers license" to prove your age or using a "digital student ID" to get a student discount; it's totall overkill.

    The summary explains why Brands credentials are an improvement:

    Private Credentials are a cool PKI replacement and anonymous e-cash tech that allows you to prove certified attributes like age, credit rating, group membership, etc. without revealing who you are (emphasis added)

  5. I don't think you understand the tech... by xxxJonBoyxxx · · Score: 2, Insightful

    The problem with regular certs is that they are all-or-nothing, so if you disclose your cert to a party, they now have all the information in the cert. For example, consider using a "digital drivers license" to prove your age or using a "digital student ID" to get a student discount; it's totall overkill.


    You don't put things like "age" or "student ID" on a cert, and you certainly wouldn't put them on a key. Instead, you could use the verified IDs from certs/keys to look up information from a master DB, much like Brands and dozens of other interchangable knuckleheads are proposing.

    Remember, whether you show up to a "verification service" with a magic cookie/ID/BrandsThing or a cert, you're still trusting a third party to only give out a piece of your total profile at a time. All the while, they're probably really selling the whole DB to random spammers, just like your average credit bureau.
    1. Re:I don't think you understand the tech... by Beryllium+Sphere(tm) · · Score: 2, Informative

      >Instead, you could use the verified IDs from certs/keys to look up information from a master DB, much like Brands and dozens of other interchangable knuckleheads are proposing.

      That is the exact opposite of what Dr. Brands is proposing, and the existence of a central database full of sensitive information is precisely the problem he's trying to prevent. How anyone could read his PhD thesis without understanding that is beyond my imagination.

      >you're still trusting a third party to only give out a piece of your total profile at a time.

      Not if they don't *have* your complete profile and see only a signed assertion of your age, or your blood type, or whatnot. Even cooler, you can disclose the result of a Boolean without disclosing the terms inside it: with a Brands credential you could assert "either over 18 or an emancipated minor", for example.

  6. How? by pesc · · Score: 2, Interesting

    I don't need this certificate myself. Can someone explain why I can't obtain one proving my age (42) and sell it to a youngster? All other attributes are masked.

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    )9TSS
  7. anti-lending feature (Re:How?) by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Informative

    They have an anti-lending option. Here's how it works: the credential can have multiple private keys, one of which has to be random and the others of which can be secrets you would not be happy to sell to a youngster. (Say like your credit card number, or any other info that could be risky to lend to someone). Without all of the private keys you cant use the credential, so the would be lender, or reseller cant transfer the credential without revealing secrets chosen to be risky to share.

    The CA or credential issuer, he sees secrets when the credential is issued, however you trust him not to abuse those secrets (and maybe you paid him with the same credit card number eg). However due to the crypto magic the CA cant observe nor trace your uses of the credential back to you even with full collusion with relying parties.

    In fact the privacy is unconditionally secure and the user has full control and doesnt have to trust anyone (not CA, not relying parties, etc) only that the software of his credential wallet software is correctly implemented. This software would typically be open source and peer reviewed.