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Scientists Make Quantum Encryption Breakthrough

Madas writes "Scientists working in Cambridge have managed to make quantum encryption completely secure (registration required) by putting decoy pulses in the key transmission stream. According to the story this paves the way for safe, encrypted high-speed data links. Could this allow completely private transmission of data away from snooping eyes and ears? Or will it mean film studios can stop movies from being copied when traveling on the internet?"

38 of 156 comments (clear)

  1. Decoy Pulses are Nothing New... by Quaoar · · Score: 4, Funny

    My girlfriend makes them all the time.

    --
    I'll form my OWN solar system! With blackjack! And hookers!
    1. Re:Decoy Pulses are Nothing New... by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Funny

      Who is rating this 'Informative'?

      His girlfriend's other boyfriends?
  2. it is an intrusion detection breakthorough by harkabeeparolyn · · Score: 2, Informative

    ... not encryption. Quantum encryption or even computing is as pie in the sky as ever.

    1. Re:it is an intrusion detection breakthorough by geeber · · Score: 2, Interesting

      If by "Quantum encryption" you mean "Quantum key distribution" then you are incorrect. It is available commercially now.

  3. Stop piracy? by Jordan+Catalano · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Or will it mean film studios can stop movies from being copied when traveling on the internet?

    No. Not at all.

    Quantum "encryption" foils interception of a data stream. That has nothing to do with copying a file and resending it once it reaches its destination.

    1. Re:Stop piracy? by eklitzke · · Score: 2, Informative

      With quantum encryption you cannot conduct a meaningful MITM attack. This is called the observer effect, and is a very well known and studied phenomenon of quantum mechanics.

      --
      #include ".signature"
    2. Re:Stop piracy? by Xenographic · · Score: 5, Insightful

      You'd think that people here would know better than to ask such silly things by now, wouldn't you? Does it really take that much thinking to realize that you can't give someone access to data and not give them access at the same time?

      Even if you had some special quantum device to allow people to watch something once, only to have its quantum state collapse (or whatever), you could still record the output. With a camcorder, if it came to that.

      "Trying to make bits uncopyable is like trying to make water not wet." - Bruce Schneier, cryptography expert

    3. Re:Stop piracy? by Arancaytar · · Score: 3, Informative

      From what I've read, quantum encryption only really becomes necessary if common prime-number algorithms are rendered ineffective by unforeseen advances in computing power (say, quantum computing or other stuff now considered science fiction). It's basically a one-time-pad - it is proven to be completely secure if used correctly, but in most cases, other theoretically breakable technologies are enough.

      And the only thing you need to transfer the signal is apparently an uninterrupted fibre-optic line.

      But this is basically Google and Wikipedia speaking, so I'm waiting for a real expert to correct me on this.

    4. Re:Stop piracy? by gkhan1 · · Score: 2, Informative

      No this is basically true (there is a quantum computing algorithm called Shor's algorithm which could crack prime numbers in O((log N)^3) time, a vast improvement over current algorithms) that would make prime-number algorithms obsolete. In that case, quantum cryptography could be something worth looking into (although by that time something else might have come along, quantum computing is at least 100 years from being practically able to do what is needed). I was just making fun of the idea that you would use quantum cryptography to achieve authentication. There are so many easier ways :)

    5. Re:Stop piracy? by Prune · · Score: 2, Informative

      There are a number of things wrong with your post. First of all, no one has in blind testing been able to distinguish 256 kb/s mp3 from the original CD version, even with very high end equipment. For most people 192 is also indistinguishable. So the answer is simple, just don't use lower than 192 bitrate. Second, playback and re-recording, besides the distortion of the analog stages, results in increased distortion from jitter effects in the A/D and D/A conversions (jitter in the digital stream going into the converter results in amplitude errors in the analog signal, and humans can hear less than 5 picoseconds of signal-correlated jitter).

      --
      "Politicians and diapers must be changed often, and for the same reason."
  4. Dude! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 4, Funny

    You don't really have a girlfriend. But top marks for thinking anybody would ever believe you!

  5. Full Text by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Informative

    Researchers have managed to close a loophole in quantum cryptography that could allow a hacker to determine a secret key transmitted using the technology.

    Working at Toshiba Research Europe in Cambridge, scientists found that laser diodes used to transmit keys used to encrypt data, known as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), sometimes transmitted more than one photon at a time. Quantum encryption works by transmitting key data as a stream of single photons.

    Should an eavesdropper try to intercept the transmission, monitoring a single photon would change the state of that photon, and this would make both ends of the transmission aware that the data had been eavesdropped. However, the laser diodes can sometimes transmit more than one photon and so a hacker could monitor the second photon, leaving the first photon unchanged and this would not alert anyone that the key transmission had been compromised.

    But scientists have now added decoy photons to the key data. When an eavesdropper now tries to monitor extra photons, they will also monitor the decoy photons. Scientists said these decoy photons or "decoy pulses" are weaker on average and so very rarely contain two or more photons.

    If an eavesdropper attempts a pulse-splitting attack, they will transmit a lower fraction of these decoy pulses than signal pulses. By monitoring the transmission of the decoy and signal pulses separately this type of intervention can be detected, according to scientists.

    By introducing decoy pulses, the researcher found that stronger laser pulses could be used securely, increasing the rate at which keys may be sent. By using this method keys could be transmitted securely over a 25km fibre to an average bit rate of 5.5kbits/sec, a hundred-fold increase on previous efforts.

    "Using these new methods for QKD we can distribute many more secret keys per second, while at the same time guaranteeing the unconditional security of each," said Dr Andrew Shields, Quantum Information group leader at Toshiba Research Europe. "This enables QKD to be used for a number of important applications such as encryption of high bandwidth data links."

    The researchers also discovered a second method to push bit-rates even higher for QKD. The scientists have created the first semiconductor diode that can be controlled with electrical signal input to emit only single photons at a wavelength compatible with optical fibres. This 'single photon source' method eliminates the problem of multi-photon pulses altogether, claimed the research.

    The single photon diode has a structure similar to an ordinary semiconductor light emitting diode (LED), but measures just 45 nm in diameter and 10 nm in height. The dot can hold only a few electrons and so can only ever emit one photon at a time at the selected wavelength. The source operates with only electrical signals, which is essential for practical applications such as QKD. Initial trials with the new device, reported recently in the scientific journal Applied Physics Letters, showed the multi-photon rate from the device to be fives times lower than that of a laser diode of the same intensity.

  6. Editor, editor... by tgv · · Score: 5, Insightful

    What is the last sentence doing there: "Or will it mean film studios can stop ..."? It's clear from the preceding text that that (i.e., copy while travelling, not copy afterwards) is one of the potential uses. So it's completely redundant. At the same time, the implicature of this particular phrase suggests Something Bad: Big Companies are trying to stop You from your Right To Download, or something akin, implying that these "researchers" have hidden agendas and are enemies of open source, Linux, Ruby, Apache and probably of world peace. That's of course complete and utter nonsense, so the last sentence should have been cut out by the editor. Why didn't that happen? And what's the link to www.absolutegadget.com doing there? Who gains by putting this link on the /. front page?

    1. Re:Editor, editor... by pherthyl · · Score: 2

      Who gains by putting this link on the /. front page?

      Several people actually. If you submit an article that gets accepted, you get a link to your page. So you gain by having that link there because it drives some traffic to your site. Slashdot gains because there is now an incentive for people to submit good stories that will get accepted, and I gain amusement by watching people like you freak about nothing.

  7. Mod parent up - it's easy to steal from servers... by xxxJonBoyxxx · · Score: 2, Informative

    If you're only protecting the transport from spying eyes (with quantum encryption or whatever), that's only a part of what you need to protect your data.

    This is the same reason why many, if not most, "SSL-protected" or "SSH-protected" servers are really sitting ducks: interesting data is still sitting in the clear on the endpoint servers' hard drives. (And don't get me started about "AUTH TLS" email forwarding...)

  8. What the hell? by fabs64 · · Score: 2, Insightful

    I've seen summaries with better understanding of technical topics in my local, small town, tabloid newspaper.
    Really what nerd approves a summary like that?

  9. ahem by GlitchyBits · · Score: 3, Informative

    Quantum encryption is quite a misleading expression since the quantum mechanics is only used to securely transmit a cryptographic key ... not encrypting the message.

    1. Re:ahem by dido · · Score: 4, Informative

      Public key encryption is, in practice, used pretty much the same way as well. Public key algorithms are generally used as part of a secure key exchange protocol rather than encrypting a message as directly.

      --
      Qu'on me donne six lignes écrites de la main du plus honnête homme, j'y trouverai de quoi le faire pendre.
    2. Re:ahem by GlitchyBits · · Score: 3, Informative

      The problem with popular public key algorithms is that they are based on the assumption that the opponent doesn't have enough computationnal power in order to break it in a reasonnable amount of time, or he doesn't know a polynomial determinist algorithm to do so.

      The big advantage of using quantum key distribution is that it will (ideally) ensure that the cryptographic key you get has not been sniffed, and that you can securely exchange a key which is long enough in order to use a one time pad (which is an unconditionnaly secure way of encrypting a message).

    3. Re:ahem by swillden · · Score: 2, Informative

      "Unconditionally secure" assumes you have a perfectly random generator for your one-time pad. If I can find a way to predict the next number your RNG gave you, I may be able to defeat your one-time pad.

      Good random numbers are easy to obtain. There are any number of physical phenomena whose randomness is quantum in origin and therefore unpredictable. Just use one of them in a heavily-shielded room to ensure that none of your data leaks and you're golden.

      The hard part of using OTPs isn't generating the pads, it's transmitting and storing them securely. QC addresses secure transmission (though you still have to take care to avoid MITM attacks).

      --
      Note to ACs: I usually delete AC replies without reading them. If you want to talk to me, log in.
    4. Re:ahem by ysachlandil · · Score: 3, Interesting

      Not to mention the problems with "Man in the Middle" attacks. Since quantum encryption doesn't validate the endpoints, you could just cut the fiber and attach two new transceivers and nobody will know. And no, the technique in the article doesn't protect against this. There are only a few ways to get around this problem:

      -Monitor the fiber for cuts by keeping it lit at all times. Backhoe accidents will still happen, and then you need to guard the cut and use trusted technicians.
      -Have huge fiber ducts and patrol them with guards.
      -Use certificates to validate the endpoints. But then you need to trust public key crypto and then quantum doesn't add anything.

      So quantum crypto is still useless.

      --Blerik

    5. Re:ahem by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 2, Informative

      No, they would know. That's the whole point of quantum key exchange. Each photon sent has both linear and circular polarisation. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle states that measuring one of these states destroys all information about the other. This is the basis for QKE.

      Alice sends a stream of photons to Bob with random linear and circular polarisation. Call the string of bits represented by the linear polarisation 'a' - up is 1 and down is 0. The string represented by the circular polarisation we'll call 'b' - clockwise is 1 and anticlockwise is 0.

      Once Bob has received all the photons he tells Alice and she publicly announces all the bits of b. Bob discards the bits for 'a' which were transmitted in a photon for which his value for 'b' differs from what Alice announced. For example if Alice says b(i) = 1 but Bob has received b(i) = 0 he discards a(i). Bob also notifies Alice of which bits he has discarded.

      The line will have noise so a number of b(i) are expected not to match. However if a large number do not match it can be assumed that an attacker is listening in. If an attacker had been listening they would have only been able to measure a(i) or b(i) but not both. They would have to retransmit the photon and guess the value of whichever of a(i) or b(i) they did not measure. Due to the randomness of a and b they would have only a 0.5 probability of being sucessful for each photon. This becomes exponentially small as the number of photons is increased. When they are unsuccessful at reconstructing the photon Bob notices and discards that bit.

      If Alice and Bob agree on enough bits of b then it can be safely assumed there is no attacker and the remaining bits of 'a' are a key known only to them. This is a rather simplified description of what actually happens, but it should be enough to demonstrate that naive man-in-the-middle attackers like cutting the wire won't work.

    6. Re:ahem by Wildclaw · · Score: 3, Interesting

      I think you missed the parents point. What you just described is a method that prevents eavesdropping.

      What the parent suggests is the man-in-the-middle Dave intercepts both all and any communication between Alice and Bob. Alice sends a stream of photons over the quantum line, and Dave intercepts. Afterwards Alice does the public announce to check that bits havn't been intercepted, but Dave intercepts this message also, and this time acts as Bob to verify the photons recieved. Alica and Dave agrees that there isn't an eavesdropper on their line and starts communicating.

      So know Alice is communicating with Dave instead of Bob. Dave repeats the same with Bob, but now as the sender. Bob believes that Dave is Alice and they get a link established. Now Dave has one line open to Alice and one line open to Bob and can retransmit what he wants. Nothing of this violates Quantum Theory, because instead of eavesdropping, Dave has created two communication channels.

      The only problem Dave has to implement this is that he has to be able to intercept both the quantum channel and the public channel.

    7. Re:ahem by fenderized · · Score: 2, Informative
      Your link states:

      Quantum cryptography is still vulnerable to a type of MITM where the interceptor (Eve) establishes herself as "Alice" to Bob, and as "Bob" to Alice. Then, Eve simply has to perform QC negotiations on both sides simultaneously, obtaining two different keys. Alice-side key is used to decrypt the incoming message, which is reencrypted using the Bob-side key. This attack fails if both sides can verify each other's identity.
      which is pretty much what was stated.
  10. Point to point by nickovs · · Score: 4, Informative

    The biggest drawback of this technology is not that it is in fact a key distribution method rather than an encryption scheme. It is that, as with pretty much all QKD systems, this only works if you have a continuous fibre-optic cable from one end to the other. That might be fine for linking two embassies or two military facilities but it makes it a bit useless for the Internet.

    --
    If intelligent life is too complex to evolve on its own, who designed God?
    1. Re:Point to point by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Insightful

      Not only that but the quantum channel has no way of verifying who the remote end really is. IE it can detect easedropping but not wholesale replacement of the intended target of communication.

      I dare anyone to cite a single practical benefit over existing zero knowledge key agreement systems.

  11. finaly! by Patrik_AKA_RedX · · Score: 3, Funny

    Now I can make posts on slashdot without anyone being able to read them. Privacy at last!

  12. I can see the headlines now... by Roger+W+Moore · · Score: 4, Funny

    'DVD' Jon breaks quantum encryption, APS sues claiming its against the laws of physics.

  13. The drawbacks others haven't mentioned by Beryllium+Sphere(tm) · · Score: 5, Informative

    Elsewhere in the comments people have correctly pointed out that it isn't encryption at all and that it is fundamentally incompatible with any router, switch, bridge or even repeater.

    There's also the limit of 5.5 kbps, though that might be improved.

    The issue that should have killed this idea ten years ago when Shamir pointed it out is that an attacker who has spliced the fiber can read the polarizer without ever looking at a single one of the transmitted photons.

    Send the $#$@! key material by bonded courier in a tamper-evident package if it's that important. If for some reason that's not enough then split (e.g. Blakely-Shamir) the key material into shares, send each separately, and recombine when needed.

    1. Re:The drawbacks others haven't mentioned by jd · · Score: 4, Interesting
      Don't know if they still do, but in the 50's, the British used synchronized tapes with one-time pads. As best as I understand it, both sides of the link started their tapes at the same time and from the same offset (synchronized over secure phone) but had no control over when the machines at each end would actually sync up. (The exact sync mechanism is something I'm also a little unclear over - nothing from the tape was ever transmitted.) The practical upshot was that anyone who had a copy of the tape AND a copy of the transmission would still face a daunting computational challenge to break the encryption.

      If you combine this with the split key concept, so that the difficulty of obtaining a full pad is considerably greater, and perhaps even run each fragment through a public key encryption algorithm to make getting that fragment a near-impossible task, you get damn close to the theoretical level of security offered by an OTP.

      A correctly-implemented OTP, in which the pad cannot be derived algorithmically from known quantities, where the pad is not cyclic, and where the pad is used exactly once, cannot be broken at all without physically obtaining the specific part of the pad that is actually used and some computationally-viable method of eliminating any excess. If the pad is rendered unreadable, or the specific information required to make the pad usable simply doesn't exist except at the moment of transmission and then only on the machines involved, then OTP is essentially unbreakable.

      The premise of encryption is that nothing can ever be made 100% tamper-proof or uninterceptable, merely very tamper-resistant and very hard to intercept, and so you're far better off making what is obtained unusable. Having something that is supposedly not interceptable is so much snake oil. For a long time, nobody was sure you could undetectably tap optic fiber. What are the vulnerabilities of the endpoints? Is the connection between the "secure" endpoint and the computers at either end exploitable? Are any of the computers involved open to being monitored by TEMPEST or other remote techniques? If the machines are on partially or fully exposed networks, are the machines susceptible to having the transmission intercepted either prior to being secured or after being restored? (Partially exposed can include computers that share USB memory sticks or floppies with unsecure machines. All you need is a carrier for a virus.)

      --
      It's a small world and it smells funny; I'd buy another if it wasn't for the money; Take back what I paid (SoM)
  14. What about.... by edwardpickman · · Score: 2, Interesting

    The process obviously won't stop copying material but my question is could the same or a similar technology be used to create a dedicated display screen? Let's say with quantum entangled particles as an example you directly drove a screen from a linked source. For every screen manufactured a dedicated chip was loaded into the system linked to your display device. No lines would be needs to transmit the data but like a traditional TV reciever there would be no signal to tap it simply drives the screen. You order your content on demand and there's nothing to record so no piracy but if it was a one time purchase situation you wouldn't have to worry about lost, damaged or degraded media. It would solve most of the complaints except for those wanting free material. It would eliminate a lot of the distribution issues and end the dependence on satelites. No more screwed up signals when there's a lot of solar activity. Granted we're talking decades away but there is a potential for secured storage and distribution of media.

  15. They're different things by Moraelin · · Score: 4, Interesting

    Actually, quantum encryption and computing are different things.

    Quantum encryption is, well, basically nothing about using quantum mechanics to _encrypt_, but to send the key (and maybe the data too). The idea is that you send single photons. So basically if someone tapped into the line, you can't split the photon and get only a bit of the signal. Either you get it or the endpoint gets it, but not both. It makes man-in-the-middle attacks a bit harder. In fact, it claims to make it outright impossible.

    Since the whole idea here is to elliminate the possibility for a man in the middle, intrusion detection is something valuable. Mind you, if the sending single photons was as un-interceptable as originally claimed, intrusion should be simply not possible, so I'm a bit stumped as to why would they want to detect something impossible. Maybe they know something we don't about how impossible it really is? (E.g., come to think of it, a laser kind of device inserted on the line could multiply that original photon thousands of times, all the clones having the exact same phase, polarisation, whatever.)

    It may be pie-in-the-sky, I don't know, but at least it's one of those sane ideas that aren't too impossible to understand even for the layman. The only "quantum" thing about it is that you send individual quanta of light, i.e., photons. Since it's only one and it's indivisible, only one endpoint can get it. All simple and sane, IMHO.

    Quantum computing, on the other hand, I don't know... there must be some sane researchers out there who know what they're doing, no doubt. But the media and marketting hype has drowned it all in so much bullshit it could fertilize a few acres, so from the layman (even with a decent grasp of physics and computing) point of view, it's hard to even tell what it would _really_ do, how it would work at all, and how would it be useful at all.

    I've even seen such bullshit claims like that it basically holds all possible states at the same time, so it can calculate anything instantly, since the solution state is already one it simultaneously holds. Which is blatantly bull. If it simply holds all possible states at the same time, that's as good as saying that it has no state at all, or you can't measure it. To get an answer out of the computer, you need to get out of it a particular state which represents the result of the calculation. By that logic I could give you a CD with all possible 4 million DWORD (4 byte, 32 bit) values, from -2 million to 2 million, one of which is the result to your problem. There you go, any problem that has a DWORD result already has the result on that CD, so it was "calculated" instantly. Isn't it an impressive feat? I don't even know your problem, but that CD already has the result to it. It's also completely freakin' useless, if you don't know which one of them. That CD as such holds no more actual usable information that that it's a 32 bit number, which you knew in the first place.

    Not saying that that's what the actual researchers study, but that's the kind of bogus info that you see from the outside. It's damn hard to tell if it's actually something that might work, or just snake oil to get a clueless VC's money. On par with extracting free energy out of water, the Infinium console, and other such fine con schemes that some people actually dumped millions into.

    The only sorta working quantum implementations so far, are basically not even as much quantum computers as hyped, as glorified analog computers. The thing about quantum mechanics is that 99% of it are probabilities.

    As some trivial examples, you can't tell for example exactly where an electron is in a potential well (e.g., in a CMOS transistor), or in some cases even if it is still in the potential well or it's out of it already, but you can calculate a probability cloud of, basically, what are the chances of it being in this particular point. Or if you do interference with electrons (think the school physics experiment with shining a light through two thin slots, o

    --
    A polar bear is a cartesian bear after a coordinate transform.
    1. Re:They're different things by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 3, Informative

      QC is not bullshit from a mathematical perspective; there are well know algorithms(such as the Shor factoring algorithm)..and IBM tested it back in 2001.

      The problem w/ QC is having enough entangled qubits to get up to useful capacity..and its an insanely difficult engineering challenge.
      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_computing is a good intro to QC.

      While I agree that VC's will hype anything, your post is FUD crossed witha bit of 'get off my lawn, young whippersnappers'; its also clear that you didn't spend 5 minutes researching QC before you held forth on it. Yes, it will be specialized and won't replace normal digital computers.

      Don't take this personally, but the fact that I can find complete nonsense at 5 insightful is one of the reasons that I don't read slashdot comments much; there is rarely a more misleading source of information available.

    2. Re:They're different things by qcomp · · Score: 2, Informative

      Since the whole idea here is to elliminate the possibility for a man in the middle, intrusion detection is something valuable. Mind you, if the sending single photons was as un-interceptable as originally claimed, intrusion should be simply not possible, so I'm a bit stumped as to why would they want to detect something impossible. Maybe they know something we don't about how impossible it really is? (E.g., come to think of it, a laser kind of device inserted on the line could multiply that original photon thousands of times, all the clones having the exact same phase, polarisation, whatever.)

      The point is not that intrusion is impossible - but that it is always possible to detect intrusion (and hence abort the key distribution process if it is not secure).
      The point of the decoys is, AFAIK, essentially bandwidth: it makes it easier to detect intrusion nd less of the "key" has to be sacrificed for that purpose.

      The basic point of quantum key distribution (QKD) is that any eavesdropping attempt will unavoidably (by, at your preference, the uncertainty principle, the no-cloning principle, or monogamy of entanglement) introduce noise into the data shared by the two communication partners -- and that the amount of noise in the transmitted data (which is in practice also unavoidable, even if there is no eavesdropping at all) allows one to put a strict upper bound on any information a possible eavesdropper might have obtained. If the bound is sufficiently low, further classical "privacy amplification" can then make the shared key as secret as desired, otherwise the protocol must be aborted.

      In the first protocols, a random sequence of only four quantum states was sent from A to B and used both for intrusion detection and key generation. It may not be surprising that sending other states as well (and monitoring what becomes of them) may tell A and B more about the eavesdroppers actions.

      BTW: the process behind the "kind of laser device" is "stimulated emission", which has indeed be shown to work in some cases as an "optimal cloning device". But even optimal cloning does not break QKD, since it can only clone half of the states faithfully and introduces noise in the other half.

  16. Re:Mod parent up - it's easy to steal from servers by TheRaven64 · · Score: 3, Interesting

    Assuming the receiving mail server has a correctly signed certificate, it is practically impossible to intercept the mail in transit from one server to another. The catch it, the encrypted path is not guaranteed from end-to-end. If I send you an email, I will send it over a TLS connection to my mail server. It will then send it to your mail server (identified by MX), which may then forward it for several hops before it actually reaches you. I have no way of guaranteeing that the connection is secure beyond the first hop (my laptop to my mail server). Anything else might be no better than plain text because it might be plain text. If you want secure email, you need to use some kind of end-to-end encryption such as PGP and make sure you exchange keys over a secure out-of-band channel. Or, you can just accept that email isn't secure.

    --
    I am TheRaven on Soylent News
  17. Re:Tag suggestion... by LordSnooty · · Score: 5, Insightful

    Yeah, cos that's a great use of the tag system. Can't wait for the moment a few months hence where I need to find all articles where the headline wasn't proof-read. Just like I want to look up all the stories where someone made a mistake (search 'doh'), find all the Steve Balmer articles (search 'chairthrowing') or all the stories about problems for trad Slashdot villains (search: 'haha')

    The tag system is broken, but there's nothing wrong with the implementation. People can't tag correctly. Look below, all real tags.

  18. Re:DOS by fabs64 · · Score: 2, Insightful

    The point being that you can use the eavesdropper-aware channel to exchange a key-pair that you KNOW hasn't been intercepted. After that you can use any medium as your safe channel.

  19. Re:Tag suggestion... by arevos · · Score: 4, Insightful

    It seems to me that the search system can already find articles via keywords. Tags are most useful when they add meta-information that cannot be inferred by a keyword search. Whilst it's unlikely "proofyourfuckingheadlines" is going to be useful for many people, tags like "haha" and "doh" might be conceivably useful, as they give information beyond a search for words in the article summary could provide.