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Tricking Vista's UAC To Hide Malware
Vista's User Account Control, love it or hate it, represents a barrier against unwanted software getting run on users' computers. A Symantec researcher has found a simple way to spoof UAC and says that it shouldn't be completely trusted. The trick is to disguise the UAC warning dialog in the color associated with alerts generated by Windows itself.
With every release of Windows, Microsoft seems to devise some new, overly-complicated scheme to try to protect Windows users. The scheme they came up with may sound great, but then it falls flat on its face because of some minor flaw or workaround.
So maybe what they need to do is to get back to the fundamentals. We only need to look as far as OpenBSD to see how keeping things simple and intelligent results in a very secure operating system. Instead of writing new (and probably buggy) code to try and prevent things like malware, they just repeatedly go over the code they already have, to try to ensure that it is exploit-free. And it works. OpenBSD is a damn secure system.
That pops up a UAC dialog, but because RunLegacyCPLElevated.exe is set to run those Control Panel plug-ins with full administrative privileges, the dialog is bordered by Vista's own greenish color to signify the file is part of the operating system.
So we make fun of Homeland Security for their meaningless color-coded threat levels, but take the colored borders of confirmation dialogs on Vista as gospel?
Sorry, this does not constitute a threat. Just one more indication that we need some form of licensure before letting people anywhere near a computer.
I'll gladly join in on the MS bashing - when appropriate. In this case, any blame rests solidly with users who have no idea what they should or shouldn't let run on their computers.
This isn't security, this is a legal CYA.
Never noticed these colors as well.
;)
I did try to cut the number of warnings given, but uac still is not yet at a level it is user friendly.
Let me point out:
-It sometimes tells the publisher is unknown, and sometimes it show the publisher, but say it is unverified. It is just a conspiracy with verisign to sell code signing certificates.
-Java vm had fine grained access controls a long time ago, and the NSA build these into windows NT 4.0 also. But all UAC allows is to give full access(=admin that can install drivers) or deny (no option most of the times) it. Yes, you can apply all kind of rights to the user, but not to a program... This is a lost opportunity.
-Once UAC is popping up you have no way to take back control. So guess what a user does when he is confronted with {while (true)askPersmissiontoinstalltrojan;}
-...???
-profit. Yes for Steve Ballmer that is...
While it may be true that different colored borders are supposed to mean varying levels of "trust", as in what component is running, I don't think any user would know that. The text in the dialogs doesn't appear to be different (that I can tell), so why would a border color make me go "Oh, I should let that action happen, I bet that's some Control Panel action", especially when I wasn't working with the control panel.
One of the problems is that you can set the "green" ones to be always accepted in corporate networks to allow users to run certain programs that are part of Vista. So yes, this has some potential to do damage.
I wouldn't be too sure about that. The article mentions that "the dialog is bordered by Vista's own greenish color to signify the file is part of the operating system". Since this dialog will likely pop up frequently with a low chance that the user triggered it unintentionally (i.e. the user knows what he/she is doing) it might actually lower the barrier of clicking "Allow".
Don't forget that even though a user might not consciously notice the color after a lot of usage and especially repetition the brain might subconsciously notice the difference between a red (not as often appearing -> think twice) and green (frequently appearing after normally trusted "system" action -> just click on the damn thing) border and act accordingly.
:/- spoon(_).
These guys are pointing this out, because they want to sell symantec products. Thats the only reason why this article came out. It's the only reason why Symantec released this statement. They want to put the message out there that "You're not secure without Norton"
This is a corporate propaganda directive, possibly directly from the CEO him/herself. "Find something, and lets use it to make us money"
The old anti virus company making viruses, just to fuel sales... has come true. They dont have to release the viruses though, but simply they figured something out, and to tell the world that something.
Profit at all costs.
The main problem I have seen with Vista since the first RCs is the monotonous regularity that these messages pop up with during regular system use. The old adage that practice makes perfect is incorrect; Practice makes permanent is the real outcome and microsoft is basically forcing their customers to practice hitting that continue button while still trying to concentrate on the tasks at hand.
I have found myself clicking continue at the same time my thought registers to *not* click because of something not looking quite right. Since I am no longer developing software for a living, the only OS on my system is Ubuntu! Thank God for Debian, Ubuntu, Red Hat, et al. for their tremendous efforts to give everyone a reasonable alternative; whether we choose to use it is certainly a choice, but we do have the choice.
Kindness is the language which the deaf can hear and the blind can see. - Mark Twain
People have also speculated that this is so M$ can blame the user later. So they went through all the trouble to try and create a system which lets users know more about whats happening to tell them that in the end its all your fault if you get a virus? Why not just say in the EULA "Dont click anything, it could be a virus/worm/trojan/spy ware/ad ware. We wont help you then"? Furthermore, why does windows have so much support then? why are there updates? Its not "Deal with it yourself", its most likely "We cant protect you from it all, but we will try" As for a non free OS comment, People use non free OSes these days because they honestly dont know how things work, and wont spend the time to. Its the same reason why anyone can build a car, but noone really does.
Well, one obvious answer is to provide fake UAC authorization prompt for dozens upon dozens of applications and hide the real UAC prompt in the middle of them. After six or seven the average user will just start hitting "Allow" for everything under the assumption that they need to to get their OS to work again, or they will turn of UAC entirely.
People use non free OSes these days because they honestly dont know how things work, and wont spend the time to. Its the same reason why anyone can build a car, but noone really does.
No.
People don't build their own cars for the same reason they don't write their own OS from scratch: it's too much work, and they don't need to.
People use free OSes for the same reason they don't buy cars with the hoods welded shut. The difference is that there's no auto manufacturer with sufficient monopoly that that they'd ever sell any cars with the hood welded shut.
-- Alastair
And if you are just blindly clicking "Allow" without ever reading or thinking about what you are doing, how is it anyone else's fault but your own?
"But this one goes to 11!"
That sort of depends upon how high the false positive rate is in general.
The UAC is not a magic bullet, but it is a far better solution than anything we have today. Do you have a better idea? Don't let these programs run at all?I'm not saying UAC is worthless, just that it is far from ideal, or even sufficient to provide the security needed by the average user. As for having a better idea, I sure as hell do. I think any reasonable security engineer who looked at Windows with the goal of solving the malware problem would conclude several things. First, Windows is attacked so much more often due to its dominance that the security mechanisms on more secure desktops, like Linux, are still insufficient to solve the problem. Second, if you look at the most secure OS's available today, they've all gone the same route, mandatory access controls. That is to say, locking down security on an application by application basis with restrictions for all resources, not just files or network ports.
Moreover, MS already started to implement a signing framework needed to bring MAC to a desktop user in a usable way and the NT kernel has built in support for the kind of ACLs needed. The answer is pretty obvious at that point. The assumption that users will know if they can trust a given application and are not going to run software that they don't expressly trust is an incorrect assumption.
MS engineers, however apparently look at things a little differently. Instead of innovating a solution to the problem or even copying the really secure systems on the market, they looked at their closest competitors and tried to come up with something that would be "close enough" to what Linux and OS X have implemented that people would not see them as way behind anymore. They seem to have been trying to solve the problem that people perceive them as insecure, rather than the problem that users cannot do what they need to do securely. UAC addresses the perception by being very visible, while not really getting there for actual security.
As for their application signing solution (a needed tool for both users and the OS to determine trust) MS's normal self seems to have undermined it by building a framework designed around lock-in, rather than one that fosters competition among certifiers of trust that would lead to really useful information. At this point, I basically have no faith that MS has the ability to engineer a truly secure solution and the only hope for MS's customers is that someone else will do it so MS can copy it.
I don't know what world YOU live in, but ignoring security recommendations, not researching anything, and just clicking "Allow" without a clue to what you are allowing is not Microsoft's fault.
Will it happen all the time? Absolutely. Are a significant number of computer operators basically shaved apes without a clue about security? Absolutely. Does that make it Microsoft's fault? Absolutuely not.
How do you suggest Microsoft cures the world of dumb computer users who won't do what they are told, and what go against what common sense would dictate? Say someone bought a car, drove it until it died and then brought it to a repair shop where it was discovered there was no oil or engine coolant in it. ("Well, I saw some lights go on, but there are so many lights on the dashboard I just ignored them and kept driving.") Would it be the fault of Chevrolet because the operator couldn't be bothered to RTFM or understand how to properly operate a car before doing so?
"But this one goes to 11!"
Either I don't know anything about computer segurity (odd as I get paid for that) or these guys don't know anything about security (odd as THEY get paid for that). In order for this "hack" to work the user has to download malicious code from the Internet, run it and accept a warning that indicates there's a dangerous elevated operation going on. How is this a hack in any way? Normally, if the user ran malicious code on Vista and it tried an elevated operation, it would trigger a warning. If the user accepts the warning, the code is run elevated and the computer becomes damaged. That's how it is designed to be, and that's even more than most platforms do in this respect. In this situation, exactly the same applies. The user has to download the code, run it, and accept a security warning. So where's the hack? A real hack would be to prevent a security warning from raising, not to raise a security warning when one is granted (or not).
Not really. It's more like breaking into a house to install a complicated machine that unlocks the door from the inside, so you can come back later and rob it. It may be a bad situation, but it's never really going to happen, is it? If you already broke into the house, you're just going to go ahead and rob it.
Everybody wants to believe that the people installing botnets are hackers, but they're not. They're criminals. The people running security companies are hackers. They think building these fantastic scenarios is fun, because it is, so they spend all day doing it. Meanwhile, the criminals on the street don't give a shit. Lockpicks? Shotguns? Fuck that, I got BOOTS. Boots can open a door REAL good.
Microsoft cheerleader, blue flag waving, you got a problem with that?