Randal Schwartz's Charges Expunged
After 13 years, Randal Schwartz has had his conviction expunged. In effect, legally it never happened.
If you haven't heard about this one before, my take is that as a contractor at Intel, Randal did some over-zealous white-hat cracking free-of-charge; this embarrassed some people in management (he pointed out that their passwords were terrible) and management then chose to embarrass themselves further by having him convicted of a felony under an 'anti-hacking' law. More info can be had from the Friends of Randal Schwartz.
Congratulations to Randal - it's nice to actually read a good news story with regards to the legal system.
BlackNova Traders
Congratulations Randall, its great news to hear that the legal system actually works once in a while.
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Cheers Gene
Except that it did.
And all the effects can never be erased.
For example any "lists" he's been added to over the last 13 years will not be updated to reflect his new 'never was a criminal' status. Be it terrorist watch lists, no fly lists, FBI persons of interest list, or whatever else, not to mention his prints will remain in the system, etc, etc.
The independent contractor shall...
The in-house employee shall...
May not seem a good use of time, unless you consider the value of staying out of the criminal legal system.
Luke, help me take this mask off
Most of the 'controversial' pardons are granted the last day of office, so there is not enough data to compare the current president and former. Report back in 2008 when there is more data.
- Lewis "Scooter" Libby
- Donald "Rummy" Rumsfeld
- Richard "Dick" Cheney
Note that like most mobsters, W's friends have nicknames. And yes, I know none of these people have been convicted for anything, but there's still time.In theory, practice and theory are the same. In practice, they're not.
The slashdot crowd has a short memory.. This is not a simple issue of "embarassing the management", as the summary states. In fact, in all the original writeups, I don't remember ever hearing executive passwords being an issue. The issues were egregious violations of corporate security policy, and basic logic:
- His position at Intel was not involved in security, intrusion detection, or other areas that might actually call for "white hat hacking" as part of the job function. He was a contractor, not an Intel employee, which I'm sure made Intel even more concerned about his security violations.
- He had installed backdoors on Intel machines, which allowed him to access the Intel network from outside the company.
- He took passwd files and ran cracking tools against them to break other users passwords.
- Not only was he cracking password files from Intel organizations, he was using Intel systems to crack password files from other companies, including O'Reilly and Associates.
See this writeup for information from the person involved in shutting him down.
Whether this was "white hat" hacking could be debated. In any case, it was fucking stupid. Bypassing network security for an inbound back door?!? Cracking password files from other companies on Intel computers?!? These are just stupid moves, which anyone should expect to get fired for doing.
and Randall still can't get a clearance without being upfront about it.
As someone who has gone through a security background check, worked at Intel and read the decision of the appeals court: I would be fairly surprised if Randal was able to get a security clearance even even if no conviction had occurred. The undisputed portions of the case suggest that Randal lacked an ethical barrier between him and either his curiosity about things for which he did not have access or his desire to gain respect by demonstrating his skill. This was 13 years ago maybe he has changed, I don't know.
Whether his intentions at the time were noble or not: he logged onto a system for which he knew his account should have been deleted; he ran a gate program on the system (after previously being told to stop running a gate on other systems); he cracked one of the passwords to someone with higher access on the system; he then logged on to the system using the cracked user's account; he transferred the password file to another machine; he ran crack on this other machine; he turned up 35 weak passwords; he said nothing; he left for a while to teach a class; he came back; he still said nothing; he re-ran crack on another faster machine (this is apparently what eventually got him caught).
Randal claims he did all this to re-gain respect at Intel's supercomputer division. I have no reason to doubt this is honest. The fact that he so freely gave so much information to the police suggests to me that he was trying to convey that he had no intention of harming Intel's business. However it is very, very bad judgment. Now if you were the agent assigned to his security background check, looking to see if his character demonstrates a likelihood of compromising sensitive information, even unintentionally, what would you think?
Education is a better safeguard of liberty than a standing army.
Edward Everett (1794 - 1865)
I was once working as an engineer at a secure facility, where one of my friends explained to me that he had never actually planned on working there. He figured he'd let them pay them while the background check was in progress, but never expected to actually be cleared (the interview with the Feds went something like Q: "So what about all these hits of acid they found in your refrigerator?", A: "Well, they were there.")
But they did indeed give him a clearence, I would infer because they concluded he wasn't vulnerable to blackmail on the point, and so on.
And I have to say that the opinion of "someone who has gone through a security check" isn't terribly authoritative, unless you were turned down for having a similar background to Randal's.
Want to improve your Karma? Instead of "Post Anonymously", try the "Post Humously" option.
At a sufficiently high level, a security check is not something you 'fail' or 'pass' - it's simply a risk assessment that clarifies to those that are planning to use your services which areas of risk they need to manage. It's not a tick box process that HR does over lunch - it takes months of investigative work. There is a simple way to get through that: do. not. lie.
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