First AACS Blu-Ray/HD-DVD Key Revoked
Thomas Charron writes "An update posted for Intervideo WinDVD 8 confirms that it's AACS key has been possibly revoked. WinDVD 8 is the software which had its device key compromised, allowing unfettered access to Blu-Ray and HD-DVD content, resulting in HD movies being made available via many torrent sites online. This is possibly the first known key revocation which has taken place, and little is known of the actual process used for key revocation. According to the release, 'Please be aware that failure to apply the update will result in AACS-protected HD DVD and BD playback being disabled,' which pretty much confirms that the key revocation has already taken place for all newly released Blu-Ray and HD-DVD discs."
I don't completely understand what's going on here. And that's exactly my point. I don't want to understand. Does this breach disable any user's player until they update their hardware? Will some disks play and others not? (I'm kind of making this up, but I'm role-playing what most consumers are experiencing based on my limited anecdotal observations).
I don't want to know the ins and outs of the security of the media. I want it to work like the old CD players. I insert a disk, I watch a movie. Simple. Easy. Done.
I think above and beyond the hurdle of introducing a new format, ahem, two new formats, for DVDs this kind of hiccup could be fatal to the rollout. People are annoyed enough with little things (cables plugged in wrong way, audio/video receivers improperly configured, etc.), when it comes to having to update firmware to be able to play stuff they've paid for, they're going to be mad. And maybe some, maybe many are going to rethink their upgrade plans and find regular DVD okay enough. And maybe people who have been considering HD DVD will stay away in droves. Fingers crossed.
this is what's more curious to me.. when/if a hardware player ever is compromised, what are you gonna do then? the content owner denies your access to their content.. you think the manufacturer will step up with an "oops, our bad; here's a new unit to play stuff.." har.
.. that might actually be one class-action suit i could hop on and enjoy, just to watch potential legal fallout. :)
i don't even know if this has happened with dvd or how possible it is.. but i have to think the potential is out there, and unless the unit has some sort of design foresight to resolve some issue (firmware updates to my bluRay player? and what kinda new 'security' hole is that?!?) i'd think you could be toast.
-r
-'fester
What are the implications for hardware players? Will they now need to be updated, or does this key revocation only apply for WinDVD in particular. If so, does this mean that it would be possible to hack apart a hardware HDDVD/Bluray player and take its key? This doesn't seem like a very secure system if that kind of attack is possible.
Soo, what if PS3s key gets revoked? Would all the owners have to return their machine?
Particles, stuff that matters.
And the clever cracking groups will grab a key and not tell anyone, just keep using it to make releases. It'll be amusing to watch and see what happens, though. Will they keep playing whack-a-mole when they can find which key has been extracted? Will they finally realize it's just not worth the effort? Or will they end up revoking all software player keys and forcing you to buy and use the hardware players? I'm betting on the latter.
LOAD "SIG",8,1
Unfortunately, you're assuming that the memory holding the key is in a separate chip from the processor which will use it. These days, it's common for chips to have internal non-volatile storage (Flash). I bet (note: speculation) one of the design goals for AACS was to ensure that the key was never in-flight on a PCB trace. You can't probe a signal if it's routed internally in the silicon, never leaving the chip.
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Actually, it is. Toshiba's first HD-DVD players are, in fact, Pentium 4 computers.
Not ALL, but the vast majority of DVD players can be flashed in the same manner.
Slashdot gets worse every day... Pipedot: News for nerds, without the corporate slant
I was wondering, what if you bought a commercial disk and made a copy without protection (via copy circumvention in a country where fair use isn't demolished by the dmca, like in sweden), and then destroyed the original, and resold it as a "drm-free" version? No one can argue the content has changed... so doesn't this then fall under the right of first sale, which was upheld by the supreme court some time ago?
Yep, just a few more lines. The original poster was correct. It's not a big deal like VHS->DVD was (random access, media doesn't degrade with repeated viewings, far better sound, menus and special features, no rewinding...). If you don't have a big screen TV, HD is absolutely worthless. My 27" TV is just fine with regular DVD and I don't need a theatre-sized screen in my living room.
So when the key of your Samsung BD-P1000 is revoked, your player will no longer play any new disks that you buy. You will have to go out and buy a new player.
This entire thread is complete bullshit. Keys are not revoked via a network jack. Keys are revoked by the simple act of releasing new discs that don't support them.
So this bit is pretty well established
1. Player gets compromised (keys extracted somehow)
2. All new content no longer has a key for the compromised player.
a. Your player cannot play these new disks
b. The new content cannot be decrypted by hackers either.
c. Anything currently released will still play fine.
Now the interesting bit is how to update the players. The key system on Blu-Ray is very clever, and allows enough keys that they will never run out, at least in practice. It was designed to allow revocation of multiple compromised players, hundreds of times over.
The real issue is that you don't want a legitimate player to stop working. A software player can easily be updated on the internet. But a hardware player cannot assume an internet connection. And consumers are going to get angry if their player stops working because someone somewhere managed to figure out its keys.
However, there is no reason why a firmware update for the hardware player cannot be included on all new titles released. There is plenty of space on a Blu-Ray disk to hold thousands of firmware patches, for every compromised hardware player. So the end users will get updated.
Which doesn't mean that a real hacker couldn't "upgrade" their program too, but its a world of difference between figuring out a single key and emulating the system through an upgrade.
However, the biggest reason for this system is that of forcing a delay.
If you stop keys being released for a few months you capture most of the sales market
Sure, you may lose the long tail of marketing, but if you can just keep the decryption keys out of circulation for a few months plenty enough people will buy the disks anyway.
And they can play this cat and mouse game for a long time to come....
My 2c worth,
Michael
There is no cryptographic solution to the problem where the intended receiver and the attacker are the same entity.
AACS contains traitor-tracing algorithms that allow you to locate the device key from a decrypted video, or released title key.