"DNS Forgery Pharming" Attack Against BIND 9
Monley writes "Help Net Security is running a story about a severe flaw in BIND's implementation that allows fraudsters to efficiently predict generated random numbers without the need to control the route between the user and the DNS server. (Here are HTML and PDF versions of the paper.) Using this vulnerability, fraudsters can remotely forge DNS responses and direct users to fraudulent websites, which can steal the user's sign-in credentials and do other mischief. The flaw was discovered by security researcher and Trusteer's CTO, Amit Klein." The ISC has released a patch to BIND 9.
Since when is a severe flaw in BIND's implementation news?
Proud member of the Weirdo-American community.
Maybe those bored college students should have gotten off their asses, put down the bongs and published some research that they would have been paid for.
We'll thank goodness the people who are claiming the exploit *also* happen to have a product to defeat said exploit...
;)
"Existing desktop security solutions cannot protect against this type of attacks since DNS forgery pharming does not involve the user's computer or the DNS server but rather the cached data on the DNS server. Mutual authentication solutions, such as Trusteer's Rapport, which strongly authenticates the destination website and prevents access to unauthenticated websites, can defeat the attack."
How convenient!
What version of BIND is going to have the fix? I've got 9.3.2 at the moment.
This is the NSA, we're gonna geet U h@x0r5! Also, what is a h@x0r5?
If you read the PDF, you will see that a good history of this kind of attack (and previous responses to it) are detailed. Apparently there has been is history of research into this kind of attack, with various counter measures. But the new attack (which seems like it would apply to almost all versions of BIND9 takes a different approach at "cracking" the PRNG which looks like it could be run against real-world servers.
I don't pretend to understand everything (or even most things) in the PDF, but it looks like solid research to me.
Prime numbers are exactly what Alan Greenspan says they are -S. Minsky
The TFA recommends using Trusteer's product to defeat this attack:
So, to recap. Vendor discovers a flaw and recommends their product.Film at 11:00.
It must have been something you assimilated. . . .
Bind was and is a mess. The patch is to use something else....
Most ACs are not even worth the keystrokes to insult them. Be generically insulted by this and ignored otherwise.
http://www.openbsd.org/advisories/res_random.txt http://cr.yp.to/djbdns/forgery-cost.txt
Frankly, yes. The basic concepts of a DNS server are fairly straightforward, but as demonstrated by this attack, the devil is in the details. This attack uses reasonably advanced cryptanalysis, and exploits the predictable behaviour of DNS clients. I suspect that this attack would also have been mitigated by the use of DNSSEC, but the roll-out of that has been held up for years - and DNSSEC itself introduces even more cryptographic complexity.
OpenBSD's patched and native Bind9 is immune to this attack and has been for many years.
I am TheRaven on Soylent News
Bind has been around since the dawn of Vint Cerf's IP, but it has been redesigned and rewritten several times. The RFC that says replies go via UDP make it a security risk, but also make the net work better.
In 2007, where 1000,s of "researchers" spend their lives trying to break the Internet.... This stuff happens. BIND, SendMail and classic solutions are attacked. Amazingly they hold up better than Windows!
Maybe those bored college students should have gotten off their asses, put down the bongs and and written some bots that they would have been paid for.
...
Oh wait, that isn't ethical
I've been using djbdns for years. It takes some getting used to if you're coming from BIND-land but it's worth making the effort.
no longer working for cnet
Moron,
It is related to MS DNS -- a SYSTEM you said did not have any vulnerabilities.
It's not hard to get a connection and a rooted machine in somebody's internal network. Also -- I can't think of anybody that would use MS DNS server outside on the Internet. If you do then that confirms my opinion of you.
Why the hell is bind trying to implement its own random number generator? It's a piece of junk compared to the random numbers modern BSD OS's generate via libc.
-Matt
A large number of programmers can make minor modifications to small software applications.
A medium number of programmers can make minor modifications to medium-sized software applications.
Very few programmers can make any sort of modification to very large software applications. Very, very few.
Bind is a very large, complex piece of software. A good portion of that complexity is due to poor documentation and badly designed algorithms (a problem I've had with bind from the first release on through today), but at this point the majority of the complexity is due to feature creep. I still use bind simply because I do not have the desire to write a replacement for it, and because the only other really good DNS package has a copyright and licence on it that makes it virtually unusable. Software gets stale as it gets older... if I can't keep software up to date after the original author has lost interest then I have no interest incorporating said software, no matter how good it is.
-Matt
I personally like my DNS servers to follow the relevent standards personally.
Of course I could go ahead and run the recommended DJB configuring using rsync + openssh to propogate zone files. Then I would avoid the 10 vulnerabilities filed against BIND9 over it's seven year life span, but open myself to the 40 or so against OpenSSH, 30 or so against OpenSSL, and 10 or so against rsync.
Eh? BIND9 has a relatively tame history in terms of vulnerabilities. Just using the updates to RHEL3 as a quick and dirty metric, there have been two security updates compared to 5 openssh, 6 openssl, 11 php, 12 apache, 20 kernels, etc.
Unfortunately a lot of people seem stuck in the past and still judge BIND from the 4.x and 8.x days.
Lets see, it has to be GPLed or BSDed, run on every platform, be insanely robust, free as in beer, tested so thoroughly that it ought to make the law of gravity look like shaky science. So, based on those criteria, what DNS software could hold up? Just wondering. Peace, V
Jon Postel, R.I.P. You are missed.
Shouldn't login into a web site be bi-directional? not only a user logs in a web site but the web site should log in a user by submitting to the user a password (let's name this password back-password).
The login sequence should be:
1) user submits his username.
2) site submits the back-password.
3) if back-password is correct, user submits his password.
By using bi-directional login, if the site is spoofed, the login process will fail, unless the spoofed site knows the back-password.
After login, communication should be encrypted so as that no 3rd party can eavesdrop on the communications.