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NASA Decides No Fix Needed for Endeavor's Tiles
bhmit1 writes "It looks like NASA is reporting that no repairs are needed for Endeavor. 'After meeting for five hours, mission managers opted Thursday night against any risky spacewalk repairs, after receiving the results of one final thermal test. The massive amount of data indicated Endeavor would suffer no serious structural damage during next week's re-entry. Their worry was not that Endeavor might be destroyed and its seven astronauts killed in a replay of the Columbia disaster — the gouge is too small to be catastrophic. They were concerned that the heat of re-entry could weaken the shuttle's aluminum frame at the damaged spot and result in lengthy post-flight repairs.'"
It's unfortunate, this could have been a good test case to see how the repair materials/procedures work under realistic conditions.
Having firm, experimental data about:
* The process of applying the patch
* How well the patch stands up to re-entry
* How well the patch protects underlying systems
and more. Better to get this data on a 'non-critical' bit of damage than waiting until something is REALLY busted before finding the inadequecy.
They've done extensive testing on the ground, I'm sure, but a real-world test scenario can trump ten lab extrapolations. That's why we do external betas of software, the real world always has something up it's sleeve.
Now that link is a bit of a read, but a very striking introduction on influencing decision-making with presentation techniques, even if this costs other people's lives.
molmod.com - computing tips from a molecular modeling
...or the shuttle's days will be numbered even if it is still a useful tool.
Endeavour is currently on the sixth shuttle mission since Columbia was lost. On Slashdot there's a chance that somebody could tell you what was achieved on any of those six missions. Ask an average member of the public though, and I guarantee you that less than 1% have any idea of a single piece of scientific research achieved on any of those six flights.
A large number of those members of the public will be able to tell you about the scares over foam and tiles on every single mission though - because that is the only part of shuttle missions that the media cares about.
This is only going to be fixed one way. NASA has to start giving out copious quantities of interesting video from shuttle flights to the media, and completely seal away from the media any talk of damage or problems. The damage has been of no real significance every time, but it is the only thing we're talking about.
Unless NASA can extricate itself from the media black hole, it will never again run a shuttle mission without the shuttle being called into question - and that will eventually lead to calls for funding for this "dangerous" vehicle to be withdrawn. After all, it doesn't actually do anything when it is up there, right?
As a former USAF avionics specialist and later crew chief, one thing was always true:
The decision about air-worthiness, mission-worthiness was the pilot's, the aircraft commander.
It didn't matter if I told him that sure, the plane will fly, if he didn't like it, the plane didn't fly.
So, NASA, provide all the information to the commander, pilot, and crew, and let THEM make the call. If you don't like what they decide, it can be taken up AFTER the mission.
Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it everywhere, diagnosing it incorrectly and applying the wrong fix.
All the strong layers of whatever you want to strap onto an astronaut in addition to all the crap s/he's already got to wear and maneuver through won't help all that much against a small particle moving at that speed.
Slashdot Burying Stories About Slashdot Media Owned
Isn't the whole justification for manned missions that people can react and do a lot more than robots, at least at this point in time? And yet we're afraid to let them out the door to actually do anything. Time and again when people are given the chance to perform they rise to the occasion and exceed expectations.
Remind me, how many astronauts have we lost on spacewalks?
Don't a large percentage of fatal auto accidents happen within a small distance of one's home? Relatively speaking, Columbia's accident happened right before they were to pull into the driveway, so to speak. Doesn't mean anything, just thought I make the comparison for whatever reason.
...landed just fine with tiles completely missing from the underbelly of the ship. For the earlier flights before the Columbia disaster, a typical shuttle mission had on average about 40 or so damaged tiles from foam and ice collisions during liftoff and climbout. One Columbia mission in 1997 even landed just fine with over 300 tiles damaged. In 1988, probably the most extensive tile damage was the Atlantis landing at Edwards with over 700 tiles damaged on the lower portions of the ship, with 298 of those having damage bigger than one inch. Extensive repairs were needed after that one.
Actually, their primary concern was the EVA its self. The suits are showing possible signs of aging (a 2 inch tear in the top two layers of a glove on the last EVA). They don't want an astronaut to be at risk of decompression while attempting a repair that is not life threatening.
-nB
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Actually, they are quite delicate. I know, because I've got a piece of the material. And no, I'm no one special... they sell it (or used to) in the KSC gift shop. A tap won't "snap" it but it will crush that spot... these things are like a silica sponge, mostly air. Great insulators, at the expense of being extremely fragile. It can't take much of a bump without damage.
I managed to easily put some marks into my sample before I smartened up and kept it in its case.
"(Good thing we didn't expect zero casualties in the era of test pilots, or aviation would not have gotten very far.)"
What bothers me isn't that there are people taking risks to advance our knowledge. What bothers me is that they are taking risks to prevent advancing our knowledge.
It took more than 100 flights and the loss of a ship with its crew to make NASA start looking at what happens to a shuttle during launch.
It's one thing when people die because you couldn't foresee a problem in a new wing design or a new engine technology. It's something entirely different when people die when you are unwilling to foot the bill of an EVA to inspect the spaceship while in orbit. It should have been done on the first flight of the Columbia (it wasn't possible at the time - no MMU, two crewmen). It should have been done when they decided to get rid of the white paint for the main tank. The belly inspection should have been conducted on the first time the shuttle docked with Mir. It was inexcusable not to do it as soon as the MMU became available and the shuttle started making regular trips to the ISS.
There is a lot wrong in this.
http://www.dieblinkenlights.com