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Half a Million Database Servers 'Have no Firewall'
An anonymous reader writes "There are nearly half a million database servers exposed on the Internet, without firewall protection according to UK-based security researcher David Litchfield."
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And don't forget the "Good news, we just made your application/database/whatever accessible to the everybody!"
I've seen a number of things cobbled together just to get a department or company through something that suddenly become available to a lot more people than the original target audience. It's a good argument for never taking short cuts when you're programming, but I'm sure there are a lot of people that have gotten something out on a deadline only to turn around and look at it later and say "What came over me to do it that way?"
"It is a miracle that curiosity survives formal education." -Albert Einstein
Well this is quite simple and not really all that mysterious.
If you secure your server correctly in the first place.
Close up, secure and encrypt ports that consume passwords and serve data.
You don't have a problem! Within reason of course.
I that gets breached, a firewall won't protect you from an attack either.
Du...
I wonder how many people know that firewalls don't actually do anything.
Accept keep useless network fanboys employed.
1. Because everyone knows that a firewall is the end all and be all of security.
2. How do they know they don't have a firewall and not just an open port?
3. Open port != DB server Litchfield took a look at just over 1 million randomly generated Internet Protocol [IP] addresses, checking them to see if he could access them on the IP ports reserved for Microsoft SQL Server or Oracle's database. 4. Not all DBs are huge corporate DBs. Hell some versions of MS Office install SQL on your computer.
5. Maybe some of them actually need/want to have remote people access them (and they don't know about VPNs(lolz))
6. Yeah some people should get their shit together
Did Mr. Litchfield crash his BMW and wants a new one? This just smacks of "ZOMG!!! Ur ports are open, give me ur monies and I will fix u!" His company is even linked in the fourth paragraph. Next please.
Thank you. It's about time someone else realized this.
Firewalls are good for:
- Helping to limit access to services which don't have built in access limits (think tcp-wrappers++)
- Helping to protect a pile of machines over which you have little to no control (a bunch of desktops in the office, for example).
When talking about servers, if you sufficiently harden your machine, a firewall does very little, especially if the service being compromised is one which the firewall allows pretty much anyone access to...
Just because the listener is accessible on port 1521 from the outside, doesn't mean the database itself is directly available.Depending on what identification method is set up, you may have to identify yourself to the listener first using one of many ID schemes before the listener will connect you to the database itself which may be well protected behind a firewall..
I wish he had known what he was writing about before he actually wrote the damn article.
If you mod me down, I *will* introduce you to my sister!
I'm not an IT worker, but I think the idea that because some people don't know what "xyz" is, ignores a basic pretense in this circumstance. I'm not going to pretend this example explains all or some of the 1/2 non-FW DB servers.
I've worked and volunteered for several non-profit, NGOs and small businesses. And worked in B2B sales selling computer equipment to them. Generally the IT staff is an outside consultant who does a few things (whatever they're able to afford). Setting up of complex computer equipment and software is often left to someone who's able to understand the instruction manual but no IT training (so it could be the receptionist, the director or somewhere in-between). Setting up a firewall is expensive and doesn't fit into many budgets of small organizations. Someone with no IT training may also think a DB server or networked printer needs no firewall.
Let me put it this way: as a non-IT worker, I haven't put 100% of my resources behind studying I.T. (software, hardware) etc. I've programmed computers and used computers since I was born. Despite being somewhat knowledgeable in TCP/IP and reading firewall and comp. security books (mostly for self-interest), I'm not confident I can even configure an adequate firewall for my home computer. Things like FreeBSD's IPFW are supposed to be "easy" to setup. Not my experience. Its sheer confusion. MS, Apple and some OSS firewalls are supposed to make it even easier. Block this port, block that port and that's it??? don't think so. I'm not even 50% confident this solution provides adequate protection esp for a NGO, non-profit, SMB or home computer. So how is someone not as well-read supposed to setup a firewall on a limited budget? But a pre-built hardware solution? Still that needs to be setup and configured too. And even then, you still have to be knowledgeable enough to *test* whatever solution you're using to actually make sure it works and keeps your system well protected.
Not a trivial or inexpensive task. But people with no training or knowledge are often asked to do this.
The same argument could be made about ANY service/port, including http, ftp, etc. The premise of the article - that "port open == bad all by itself" - is junk.
And as we have repeatedly seen, accessing your db through a web server gives 2 different attack vectors - flaws in the web server, and flaws in the middleware.
Nothing except an unplugged box with the hard drive removed will ever be 100% secure.
Kevin Smith on Prince
Personally, I would rather have my webserver, which is designed to be publicly available, and quite easy to secure, available - vs. WormBait such as MSSQL. I can't think of one good reason to have your DB Server port open to the inet. Need to link it to a remote server? VPN... The argument about the only secure system being completly disconnected is true, but doesnt apply here. The point is there is something that the person managing the server want to make available, so there is inherent risk... the point is to take the "best" method to do that. The article is so much FUD, but doesnt excuse having the db port open to the inet.
Let's read the article and see what that headline really means.
He found open ports on just over 200 servers, which correspond to the ports used by two popular database servers. That's all. The article doesn't say that he actually connected to them, confirmed that there were real databases running there, or even identified the owners. He found two hundred open ports out of a million randomly chosen addresses on the Internet. But "0.02% of Internet Connected Computers May Or May Not Be Running Database Software" just isn't the kind of headline that grabs attention.
Unless there is a lot more detail, preferably from someone who isn't in the business of selling firewalls for databases, then you'll have to forgive me for not being terribly concerned about this revelation.
The scanning method he used is not conclusive that all of the "hits" were vulnerable db servers. Also he only scanned for MSSQL and Oracle, What of Sybase, MySQL, PostGres, DB2, and all manner of other systems? MySQL has had a remote vuln in the past - I'm sure somewhere on the inet there are vuln versions running. I cant speak of the others. The bottom line is that his "research" misses a significant portion of whats running out there. How do you not add MySQL, when LAMP is a pretty prominent application foundation. I also dont see anything conclusive in TFA to show that it was more than verifying the port was open - how does he even know its actually the database running there? He specifically states that corporate data is at risk, but he randomly chose IP ranges, would it not make more sense to randomly chose IP ranges from those known to be corporate networks? (info is available - ARIN, RIPE, APNIC, etc). Without a more rigorous study the article is most definitely FUD, as you cant definitively draw any conclusions from the results. What the article does do, is causes a good discussion about why people should be more security-aware.