A Little .Mac Security Flaw
deleuth writes "The de facto online connectivity software sold along with many Apple computers, .Mac, has a Web interface through which users can check their 'iDisk' while away from their own computer. However, there is no Log-Out button in this Web interface, so most users just close the browser and walk away... not realizing that their iDisk has been cached by the browser and that anyone who wants to can open up the browser, go back to the link in History, and get into their iDisk completely logged in. From here, files can be downloaded and/or deleted. This seems like a minor security flaw via bad interface design, and podcaster Klaatu (of thebadapples.info) posted this on the discussion.apple.com site, only to have his post removed by Apple. Furthermore, feedback at apple.com/feedback has gone unanswered. The problem remains: there is no way for the average computer user to log-out of their iDisk on public computers. A quick review of any public terminal's browser history could bring up all kinds of interesting things."
Am I the only one that notices that Apple's response to every problem is a swift "let's delete this topic and pretend the problem doesn't exist"? .. Seems like bad business practise to me.
Free means no restrictions, ironic the FSF's GPL forces restrictions, isn't it? What's your definition of free?
I love how this is a "little", "minor" security flaw, and even though Apple actively deleted the post exposing this information nobody's really up in arms as it's just due to "bad interface design". If this were a Microsoft property, people would be screaming bloody murder.
After accessing your iDisk in Firefox:
In Safari:
Or if you remember to do so before visiting .Mac's iDisk page:
Problem solved.
So yes, there are ways for the average user to log-out of their iDisk from a public terminal. They just simply have to use the existing facilities at their disposal.
Yaz.
Slashdot editor kdawson and Slashdot submitter deleuth mysteriously disappear...
I am an new Apple user. And reasonably happy.
However, there is one thing that I am very troubled by and it is simply this: Apple apparent arrogance and ignorance when it comes to security.
Apple has enjoyed a "blanket" of security because it is low profile and a niche. However, as its market share and mind share expands, this period of respite will soon fade.
You would think that, during this time, Apple would have used the opportunity to develop and internal culture, policies and procedures, as well as infrastructure for dealing effectively with security issues. However, the complete opposite appears to be the case.
Apple has failed miserably to publicly and actively address such issues. It also fails to respond in anything that could be called a rapid manner to reports of exploitable security holes. Taking actions such as deleting posts that point out security problems makes the situation worse, not better. Failing to publicly document the existence, status and nature of defects makes the situation worse, not better. Being secretive makes the situation worse, not better.
Apple makes decent hardware. Leopard is very nice to use, though far from perfect. The whole ecosystem and vertical integration is nice. However, the whole thing could come crashing down because of a serious security flaw. If people think Microsoft is susceptible to such a scenario, the Apple empire is even more so.
It's not a question of if, but when. Will Apple be prepared? So far, all signs point to "NO".
PS... the CAPTCHA word for this post was "condom".. how appropriate considering the whole point is to have a good profolactic. A good metaphore for Apple's current approach to security.
No SSH session for transmission of personal data, and reliable logout for protection? Insane security practice from a now UNIX-certified OS vendor, especially when it comes to something so private as the transfer of one's hard disk contents to an internet backup? Ah well, it was bound to happen, and it has probably happened in the past, and will likely happen again in the future. Anyone can slip up.
Still waiting on Serviscope_minor to wake up to fucking reality and realize that Jessica Price isn't going to fuck him.
Huh? You seem to have conflated their corporate policy, which is sometimes very stupid, with their security policy, which is generally good. The two have nothing to do with each other. Apple's overzealous moderation of their own forums is well known, and unfortunate. But it has nothing to do with how well they manage their OS security and how well they respond to exploits.
You are very mistaken, this incident does prove that Apple's security policies and responses are indeed lacking. Don't get fixated on the deletion of a post, consider that they did not respond by adding a logout option to a *web* interface.
Indeed; I'm somewhat amused that this is described as a "minor" security flaw in the summary and blamed on the user interface. If it was a Microsoft web site it would be described as a major flaw and the foaming at the mouth would begin. Nor is it a user interface problem; by using session cookies closing the browser would logout the user, with or without a logout button.
The site listed (but not linked) in the summary doesn't describe the issue as minor, or a UI problem, so one can only assume that description comes from the summary author.
Slashdot has a "public" option. If you click that when you log in, your login state is only stored for the session and freed when you close the browser.
Many other sites also implement a "public" mode like Slashdot has. Just as two other examples, Microsoft's Outlook Web Access (OWA) lets you choose "public" or "private" when you login, and Microsoft's Passport/Windows Live ID gives you the option to save email + password, just email, or nothing (the latter two are effectively session-only logins, as you still need the user's password in order to login subsequently). As well, every other site also has the ability to logout, which .Mac is missing.
A "decent timeout" is trivially simple -- mark your cookie only valid for the current session (aka, use a "session cookie"). This is at odds with persistent login designs, so you have to give users the option -- login with a session cookie ("public terminal") that will expire when you close the browser, or login with a persistent cookie ("private terminal") that will remain valid for some period of time. If you only choose the latter, like .Mac, you must also provide a "logout" option. Anything less is a security violation.
Anyone can slip up.
Ah, but this is Slashdot, where corporations are composed of primordial evil and capitalism is the beefy fart of the Devil. Every slip up is cause for running to the hills to prepare revolutionary strikes, and then run to the other hills and plan counter-revolutionary terror, and we all run around like decapitated chickens shouting comforting mantras like "Information wants to be free!" and "It am teh suk!"
The Reg is currently questioning Apple's approach even in addressing well-known security vulnerabilities that it has actually acknowledged:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/12/15/apple_security_fixes/