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Boeing 787 May Be Vulnerable to Hacker Attack
palegray.net writes "An article posted yesterday on Wired.com notes that 'Boeing's new 787 Dreamliner passenger jet may have a serious security vulnerability in its onboard computer networks that could allow passengers to access the plane's control systems, according to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.' They're already working on solutions to the problem - including placing more physical separation between aircraft networks and implementing more robust software-based firewalls."
No more playing MS Flight Sim.
Why aren't both networks physically completely seperated from each other?
... is one that's physically isolated. I can't think of one good reason why passengers should have any access whatsoever to command/control networks used by the airplane.
I'm not an avionics engineer - however, even in a small hotel I service, we keep the guest network and the hotel/admin network seperate. The only common hardware is the AC power and the modem that has a /28 assigned to it.
What kind of an idiot would put the flight control systems and the on-board entertainment/voip/net/pr0n on the same physical network? Were they trying to save weight/money by running only one cable through the plane?
I recall reading about MS stuffing their software into cars (that probably evolved into Ford's SYNC) and even there the MS crap and the engine management systems were completely separate.
There are a few million easier ways to bring down an aircraft (or kill thousands and cause panic if that's your thing). Yes this is idiocy in engineering, but considering all the other threats I don't think it's way up the list. Ultimately, we aren't dead yet because there just aren't that many intelligent people that want to kill us, cause it just isn't that hard to pull off.
I am not an avionics engineer, but I worked with electrical and electronic systems on nuclear power plants, and we had a pretty strict segregation between different types of systems--and with 0 connection between a critical system (power sensing, for example) and a non-critical system (Some water level management). That's not even COUNTING peripheral systems (computers on the local netowrk for email/ppt/xls).
My thought is that some asshole at boeing decided to save some money on cable runs and ginned up an explanation of how software segregation would serve as an adequate barrier between flight critical systems and passenger systems. They never learn.
If what TFA claims is really true, i.e. that the passenger network is physically connected to the control and navigation system, then someone should get fired for this.
The control and navigation system of an airplane is one of the most critical networks possible; the lives of hundreds of passengers (and potentially of thousands of people on the ground) depend on its correct functioning. There are not many more critical networks than that, except maybe control systems for weapons, nuclear plants and some factory control systems.
Even the worst sysadmin out there knows that you do not physically connect such a highly sensitive, highly critical network to something crappy like the in-flight passenger entertainment network.
Why should the two networks should be connected at all? To tell the passengers the current speed of the plane?
The XBox was hacked. The playstation was hacked. DVDs were hacked. HD-DVD was hacked. Pretty much anything out there was hacked if someone had an interest in it (and mostly the interest wasn't commercial, just "for fun"). Even if they do aren't "completely connected" as Boeing claims, the danger of it being hacked is very real. On one hand you are not allowed to use your mobile phone on a plane, and on the other you can play with a network which is attached to the navigation and control system? Come on.
- If the plane deviates from the flight plan, access to Google Maps may become handy to plan a new route
- While on autopilot, access to certain web sites may provide some entertainment to the captain, who usually is a lonely man
- Given the bad quality of many onboard speakers, announcements from the cockpit can be emailed or IM'ed to passengers
- Hacker intrusion may be a better excuse than malfunctioning engine as the reason for a plane crash
- No more planes grounded due to lack of pilot operating manual, as it could be easily downloaded from the Internet
I am sure there are many other good reasons to connect the navigation network to the Internet, so this list is not exhaustive.The flight control and avionics networks as well as the hardware are separate from the passenger network.
The concern is that a separate network of maintenance and some limited flight information data share the same up/down links as the passenger network. The FAA notice is to demonstrate to the FAA that there can be no interference between the maintenance and flight information data and the passenger network.
Even if the maintenance and flight information data were compromised, at worst this would mean that the operating history of the aircraft is not accurate. This is a big deal but not something that will lead to in flight failure.
An additional requirement of the FAA notice is to prohibit future passenger services without testing for interference and security.
With 2 of those in the cockpit, one for pilot, one for copilot, each running 2 Operating Systems Linux/Windows, and all networked together since each box has 6 network interfaces on it. The thing would be a field day for hackers. While they were designing it a bunch of the consultants helping with the coding were ranting about possible security, but were ignored.
I can't go into specifics because of my NDA, but considering it was 4 years ago I worked on it, I doubt that is still in force. Though I believe I can say I worked on it, and that information is all publicly available.
Did you READ the report? I did. It doesn't say anything is unsafe. What it says is there are unique architectures in the systems that put them at odds with CFR 14 regulations compliance whether they present an actual or potential danger or not. Furthermore there's a comment in the report which states that Airbus objects to the regulatory findings on the basis that the 'standard' is too high level to offer any concrete value for implementation or compliance.
Like any other IT security audit - compliance doesn't mean security it means compliance. And in the cases where there are deviations from the standard, the system has to be able to speak to that deviation and address it or contest it.
If that worries you, then I look into Airbus - at least Boeing beleives the pilot should always have the last say, not the computer
A thistle is a fat salad for an ass's mouth...
... It looks like you're trying to take over the flight controls ...
/dev/random > /dev/aileron
Or, for a more unix-y flavour...
# cat
Queue up 11,000 A/C posts about H4X0RZ Cr45h1n6 for REALZ Do0DEZ!.
This is not a "Windows vs Linux" thing. These are highly specialized data networks designed specifically for aircraft. The typical running life of a big jet is some 40 years or more - the idea of a consumer O/S such as Windows (or even Linux) being suitable for such a situation is simply stupid. Everything is coded in firmware, micro-processor based, with a likelyhood of actually crashing accidentally being somewhat less likely than getting struck by lightning on a sunny day while sitting in the cellar of your 4-story house.
Not bloody likely.
But, actual, malicious attack? Possible - and if there was *ANY* connection between the passenger data networks and the main control networks, that's an issue that must be addressed.
Most likely, the FAA found some part that was connected to both networks, that itself was not capable of actually transmitting data. But they're being car eful, as is their job, since lives are on the line.
Go FAA!
I have no problem with your religion until you decide it's reason to deprive others of the truth.