Slashdot Mirror
Geekonomics
Ben Rothke writes "First the good news — in a fascinating and timely new book Geekonomics: The
Real Cost of Insecure Software, David Rice clearly and systematically
shows how insecure software is a problem of epic proportions, both from an
economic and safety perspective. Currently, software buyers have very
little protection against insecure software and often the only recourse they
have is the replacement cost of the media. For too long, software
manufactures have hidden behind a virtual shield that protects them from any
sort of liability, accountability or responsibility. Geekonomics
attempts to stop them and can be deemed the software equivalent of Unsafe at
Any Speed. That tome warned us against driving unsafe automobiles;
Geekonomics does the same for insecure software." Read on for Ben's take on this book.
Geekonomics: The Real Cost of Insecure Software
author
David Rice
pages
362
publisher
Addison-Wesley
rating
9
reviewer
Ben Rothke
ISBN
978-0321477897
summary
How insecure software costs money and lives
Now the bad news — we live in a society that tolerates 20,000 annual
alcohol-related fatalities (40% of total traffic fatalities) and cares more
about Brittany Spears' antics than the national diabetes epidemic.
Expecting the general public or politicians to somehow get concerned about
abstract software concepts such as command injection, path manipulation, race
conditions, coding errors, and myriad other software security errors, is
somewhat of a pipe dream.
Geekonomics is about the lack of consumer protection in the software market and how this impacts economic and national security. Author Dave Rice considers software consumers to be akin to the proverbial crash test dummy. This combined with how little recourse consumers have for software related errors, and lack of significant financial and legal liability for the vendors, creates a scenario where computer security is failing.
Most books about software security tend to be about actual coding practices. Geekonomics focuses not on the code, but rather how insecurely written software is an infrastructure problem and an economic issue. Geekonomics has 3 main themes. First — software is becoming the foundation of modern civilization. Second — software is not sufficiently engineered to fulfill the role of foundation. And third — economic, legal and regulatory incentives are needed to change the state of insecure software.
The book notes that bad software costs the US roughly $180 billion in 2007 alone (Pete Lindstrom's take on that dollar figure). Not only that, the $180 billion might be on the low-end, and the state of software security is getting worse, not better, according the Software Engineering Institute. Additional research shows that 90% of security threats exploit known flaws in software, yet the software manufacturers remain immune to almost all of the consequences in their poorly written software. Society tolerates 90% failure rates in software due to their unawareness of the problem. Also, huge amount of software problems entice attackers who attempt to take advantage of those vulnerabilities.
The books 7 chapters are systematically written and provide a compelling case for the need for security software. The book tells of how Joseph Bazalgette, chief engineer of the city of London used formal engineering practices in the mid-1800's to deal with the city's growing sewage problem. Cement was a crucial part of the project, and the book likens the development of secure software to that of cement, that can without decades of use and abuse.
One reason software has significant security vulnerabilities as noted in chapter 2, is that software manufacturers are primarily focused on features, since each additional feature (whether they have real benefit or not) offers a compelling value proposition to the buyer. But on the other side, a lack of software security functionality and controls imposes social costs on the rest of the populace.
Chapter 4 gets into the issues of oversight, standards, licensing and regulations. Other industries have lived under the watchful eyes of regulators (FAA, FDA, SEC, et al) for decades. But software is written removed from oversight by unlicensed programmers. Regulations exist primarily to guard the health, safety and welfare of the populace, in addition to the environment. Yet oversight amongst software programmers is almost nil and this lack of oversight and immunity breeds irresponsibility. The book notes that software does not have to be perfect, but it must rise to the level of quality expected of something that is the foundation of an infrastructure. And the only way to remove the irresponsibility is to remove the immunity, which lack of regulation has created a vacuum for.
Chapter 5 gets into more detail about the need to impose liability on software manufacturers. The books premise is that increased liability will lead to a decrease in software defects, will reward socially responsible software companies, and will redistribute the costs consumers have traditionally paid for protecting software from exploitation, shifting it back to the software manufacturer, where it belongs.
Since regulations and the like are likely years or decades away, chapter 7 notes that short of litigation, contracts are the best legal option software buyers can use to leverage in address software security problems. Unfortunately, most companies do not use this contractual option to the degree they should which can benefit them.
Overall, Geekonomics is an excellent book that broaches a subject left unchartered for too long. The book though does have its flaws; its analogies to physical security (bridges, cars, highways, etc.) and safety events don't always coalesce with perfect logic. Also, the trite title may diminish the seriousness of the topic. As the book illustrates, insecure software kills people, and I am not sure a corny book title conveys the importance of the topic. But the book does bring to light significant topics about the state of software, from legal liability, licensing of computer programmers, consumers rights, and more, that are imperatives.
It is clear the regulations around the software industry are inevitable and it is doubtful that Congress will do it right, whenever they eventually get around to it. Geekonomics shows the effects that such lack of oversight has caused, and how beneficial it would have been had such oversight been there in the first place.
To someone reading this review, they may get the impression that Geekonomics is a polemic against the software industry. To a degree it is, but the reality is that it is a two-way street. Software is built for people who buy certain features. To date, security has not been one of those top features. Geekonomics notes that software manufacturers have little to no incentive to build security into their products. Post Geekonomics, let's hope that will change.
Geekonomics will create different feelings amongst different readers. The consumer may be angry and frustrated. The software vendors will know that their vacation from security is over. It's finally time for them to get to work on fixing the problem that Geekonomics has so eloquently written about.
Ben Rothke is a security consultant with BT INS and the author of Computer Security: 20 Things Every Employee Should Know.
You can purchase Geekonomics: The Real Cost of Insecure Software from amazon.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
Geekonomics is about the lack of consumer protection in the software market and how this impacts economic and national security. Author Dave Rice considers software consumers to be akin to the proverbial crash test dummy. This combined with how little recourse consumers have for software related errors, and lack of significant financial and legal liability for the vendors, creates a scenario where computer security is failing.
Most books about software security tend to be about actual coding practices. Geekonomics focuses not on the code, but rather how insecurely written software is an infrastructure problem and an economic issue. Geekonomics has 3 main themes. First — software is becoming the foundation of modern civilization. Second — software is not sufficiently engineered to fulfill the role of foundation. And third — economic, legal and regulatory incentives are needed to change the state of insecure software.
The book notes that bad software costs the US roughly $180 billion in 2007 alone (Pete Lindstrom's take on that dollar figure). Not only that, the $180 billion might be on the low-end, and the state of software security is getting worse, not better, according the Software Engineering Institute. Additional research shows that 90% of security threats exploit known flaws in software, yet the software manufacturers remain immune to almost all of the consequences in their poorly written software. Society tolerates 90% failure rates in software due to their unawareness of the problem. Also, huge amount of software problems entice attackers who attempt to take advantage of those vulnerabilities.
The books 7 chapters are systematically written and provide a compelling case for the need for security software. The book tells of how Joseph Bazalgette, chief engineer of the city of London used formal engineering practices in the mid-1800's to deal with the city's growing sewage problem. Cement was a crucial part of the project, and the book likens the development of secure software to that of cement, that can without decades of use and abuse.
One reason software has significant security vulnerabilities as noted in chapter 2, is that software manufacturers are primarily focused on features, since each additional feature (whether they have real benefit or not) offers a compelling value proposition to the buyer. But on the other side, a lack of software security functionality and controls imposes social costs on the rest of the populace.
Chapter 4 gets into the issues of oversight, standards, licensing and regulations. Other industries have lived under the watchful eyes of regulators (FAA, FDA, SEC, et al) for decades. But software is written removed from oversight by unlicensed programmers. Regulations exist primarily to guard the health, safety and welfare of the populace, in addition to the environment. Yet oversight amongst software programmers is almost nil and this lack of oversight and immunity breeds irresponsibility. The book notes that software does not have to be perfect, but it must rise to the level of quality expected of something that is the foundation of an infrastructure. And the only way to remove the irresponsibility is to remove the immunity, which lack of regulation has created a vacuum for.
Chapter 5 gets into more detail about the need to impose liability on software manufacturers. The books premise is that increased liability will lead to a decrease in software defects, will reward socially responsible software companies, and will redistribute the costs consumers have traditionally paid for protecting software from exploitation, shifting it back to the software manufacturer, where it belongs.
Since regulations and the like are likely years or decades away, chapter 7 notes that short of litigation, contracts are the best legal option software buyers can use to leverage in address software security problems. Unfortunately, most companies do not use this contractual option to the degree they should which can benefit them.
Overall, Geekonomics is an excellent book that broaches a subject left unchartered for too long. The book though does have its flaws; its analogies to physical security (bridges, cars, highways, etc.) and safety events don't always coalesce with perfect logic. Also, the trite title may diminish the seriousness of the topic. As the book illustrates, insecure software kills people, and I am not sure a corny book title conveys the importance of the topic. But the book does bring to light significant topics about the state of software, from legal liability, licensing of computer programmers, consumers rights, and more, that are imperatives.
It is clear the regulations around the software industry are inevitable and it is doubtful that Congress will do it right, whenever they eventually get around to it. Geekonomics shows the effects that such lack of oversight has caused, and how beneficial it would have been had such oversight been there in the first place.
To someone reading this review, they may get the impression that Geekonomics is a polemic against the software industry. To a degree it is, but the reality is that it is a two-way street. Software is built for people who buy certain features. To date, security has not been one of those top features. Geekonomics notes that software manufacturers have little to no incentive to build security into their products. Post Geekonomics, let's hope that will change.
Geekonomics will create different feelings amongst different readers. The consumer may be angry and frustrated. The software vendors will know that their vacation from security is over. It's finally time for them to get to work on fixing the problem that Geekonomics has so eloquently written about.
Ben Rothke is a security consultant with BT INS and the author of Computer Security: 20 Things Every Employee Should Know.
You can purchase Geekonomics: The Real Cost of Insecure Software from amazon.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
It's spelled Britney Spears.
Software written for most industries where human lives could conceivably be on the line IS under the watchful eyes of regulators. As an example, if you are going to write software that goes into an airplane you can expect to have your work audited by the FAA. Similar circumstances exist for most other industries where a software failure could cause loss of human life or similar catastrophes.
Just to get in the troll everyone is going to use, even though it's pretty much a load of bollocks:
"This book could be summed up in three words: 'don't use windows'"
I suppose that should be suffixed with some 'tard thing like "lol!!111!!1one"
For a site about things like basic rights, Slashdot users sure do like to censor "dissent".
Few people (rightly so) would tolerate Boeings or Airbuses that fell out of the sky through faulty software.
And yet, as a former coder then vendor, I always found it hard to get people to pony up for better education for programmers, analysts, project managers, or better coding tools, exhaustive testing protocols, whatever.
Now as a consultant, I face the same struggle getting people to be serious about backups, redundancy/eliminating single points of failure...
As long as it's not their head on the block, even senior managers will most often favour commercial expendiency over prudence. This in the face of many high-profile disasters that cost a lot more to put right than they would have done to do properly.
Regulation is a means by which the established companies keep possible competition from developing. MS can pay for that overhead from pocket change; can Open Source developers?
In my experience there is so much feature creap in software projects that there always seems to be that last feature that needs to get squeezed into the next release at the last moment and there isn't time to test. "lets just hope that 10k line module works and is secure. Even if it's not, we can always release a SP after we have the product on the market". It is even to the point where major software companies (MS comes to mind) have a concept of Zero Bounced Bugs. That is the point where the bugs getting fixed equals the bugs being found. If no "major" bugs and you've reached ZBB you ship. Now I can see you can't wait forever to ship, but there is this inherit acceptance of flaws in software that you won't see in say bridge building.
Companies don't spend much time on security because features are what the customers want. If you want security and unlimited liability, by all means ask for it. Of course, it will cost you extra, due to the need for security audits and the outrageous cost of liability insurance, but you can certainly get it. If you pass a law to require perfect security and liability, the cost of software will rise even higher than it is today. Take your pick.
To get a loan for my $50,000 PC which requires $300/month insurance to operate.
I hope to pass my operators test so I can get my license.
what, a whole book review on software development, and not a single mention of open source? how did this make it onto slashdot?
OSS cracks aside, it would be nice to see if the book talks about that side of things at all; the impression i got from the review is that there's not much distinction drawn between software licensing and development models, and that it's all sorta lumped in together.
so if, as the book seems to suggest, software development were regulated more closely, who would be accountable, or audited, or whatever, for an OSS project with heavy community involvement that's seeing commercial applications? or with an OSS project that gets implemented as part of a for-profit piece of software?
i'm curious, because i have less than zero experience in how this stuff actually works, but it seems like it would be a weird situation. anyone have any insight?
/. is what happens when geeks talk. get used to it.
I say the market itself will solve the problems with software security. New companies or new software products will only replace existing ones if the new ones are better. And like the book mentions, "better" is often measured in features. However, if enough damage is done with the current software flaws, some of the new features will include better security.
Example: Company A is sued by Customer B when Attacker C exploits a hole in Company A's software resulting in a financial loss for Customer B. Like the book mentions, Customer B usually has no legal grounds to sue. However, if this happens multiple times, Customer B may get wise and ensure proper contracts when entering new agreements.
These contracts could be required by customers when dealing with both closed source and open source companies. Buying a support contract from Sun for MySQL _could_ include certain software security requirements. And if Sun does not support this service, a business opportunity exists for another company.
Dude! You need to take remedial Geekonomics! ~;-)
all the best,
drew
FreeMusicPush If you want to see more Free Music made, listen to Free
In general, computer software for mission-critical devices would be regulated by the same agency that regulates the accompanying hardware.
Think FDA, FAA, NRC, etc.
Now, systems that are nominally non-critical but which in fact are used as infrastructure may be unregulated and subject to the very problems described in the book.
For example, most smart cell phones aren't engineered for untra-security. If I am a terrorist and I know ACME Electric Company uses the Plinko 100(TM) cell phone to communicate with its field operators, I can hire some cyber-criminals to schedule an attack on their phones at the same time as I set off a few bombs that take out a few major transmission lines.
If ACME realized its phones were mission critical and used a hardened or at least fault-tolerant communications infrastructure, it would be a lot harder for me to knock out their communications when they need it most.
The problem isn't insecure computers per se. The problem is relying on them without understanding the risks and the consequences of failure.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
The book tells of how Joseph Bazalgette, chief engineer of the city of London used formal engineering practices in the mid-1800's to deal with the city's growing sewage problem.
Why is it that any time someone talks about software engineering they always bring up bridge/house/skyscraper building? Yes, Joseph Bazalgette used "formal engineering practices" to build London's sewers, but where did these formal practices come from? Why yes, through trial and error. Thousands of years of trial and error. Use concrete. Yes, it makes sense looking back because it worked, but what if it didn't work? What if the concrete failed? Or, What if he used clay pipes instead? Then we'd be saying "[insert name here] used formal engineering practices to deal with the city's growing sewage problem. Some guy before him failed miserably though." We simply haven't built up the software engineering toolbox yet. Software hasn't even been around for 100 years! But we're learning, and if you look in specific industries like medicine, banking, and avionics spring to my mind, they all spend billions of dollars to make sure their software works correctly because being correct for them is worth the cost.
Flaws in books can have disastrous consequences if someone depends on them to be flawless.
Imagine a repair manual for a gas stove that said "blow out pilot light, turn on gas, wait one hour, invite your friends over, and light a match." Sure, it might not steal credit card numbers but in the face of an ignorant and trusting user, it could prove fatal nonetheless.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
But this isn't because we don't care.
Obviously, all those things I listed show that people do care; however, they are going the wrong things to address the problem. We have allowed special interests like MADD, who are modern-day temperance societies, dictate these changes to us with little review or oversight. It has been statistically proven that fatalities do not decrease with aMaybe we need to do more. But remember that there will always be people who insist on doing the wrong thing, and finding a way to do it.
Gamingmuseum.com: Give your 3D accelerator a rest.
If it costs 10x as much to fix a problem than prevent it, but for every $100 you spend on prevention you only prevent 1 failure, you are in the hole $10. That's rational math at work.
If you are a greedy-bastard manager and you expect to be in your position for only a few years, all you care about is the failures that will come back to haunt you. You don't care if spending $5M now will save $1M in expenses over the next 5 years but save an additional $20M 10 years down the road. By then you and your greedy self-interested wallet will be out of harms way.
On the other hand, if you are a human manager with a conscience, you'll look at things long-term and either ante up now or make sure the problem is addressed before it is too late.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
"... Bad software costs us 180 billion dollars a year? That would be about $600 per person in the US. Per year. I call bullshit."
I disagree. Add up all the time spent re-installing windows, cleaning PC's, deleting or countering spam, etc, etc. I think they are right on target, spam, spyware, buffer over-runs, worrying about your popular website being hacked and extorted by crime.
A few points:
1. Organized crime takes advantage and exploits / extorts companies (the kid who made the milliondollarhomepage was threatened with extortion).
2. The capacity for economic espionage is quite large.
3. Then there is 'just for kicks' aspect of causing havoc.
4. Bad people who don't like us attack our networks/software/etc.
5. Orwellian trojans (i.e. governments, criminals, or corporations of the world infecting your computer with rootkits, i.e. we already have one example: Sony).
Also corporations who are criminals such as Mediadefender, which was hacked
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/01/interview-with.html
This Amazon.com review mentions Mr. Rice's opinions on open source:
Geekonomics reviewed by Richard Bejtlich:
As far as open source goes (ch 6), the author makes several statements which show he does not understand the open source world. First, on p 247 the author states "While a binary is easy for a computer to read, it is tremendously difficult for a person -- even the original developer -- to understand." This is absolutely false, and the misunderstandings continue in the same paragraph. Reverse engineering techniques can determine how binaries operate, even to the point that organizations like the Zeroday Emergency Response Team (ZERT) provide patches for Microsoft vulnerabilities without having access to source code!
Second, on p 248 the author states "The essence of open source software is the exact opposite of proprietary software. Open source software is largely an innovation after-the-fact; that is, open source software builds upon an idea already in the marketplace that can be easily replicated or copied." On what planet?
Third, on p 263 the author states "[O]pen source projects are almost always threatened by foreclosure," meaning if the developer loses interest the users are doomed. That claim totally misses the power of open source. When a proprietary software vendor stops coding a product, the customers are out of luck. When an open source software developer stops coding a product, the customers are NOT out of luck. They can 1) hope someone else continues the project; 2) try continuing the project themselves; or 3) hire someone else to continue developing the product. Finally, if the author is worried about open source projects not having an organization upon which liability could be enforced, he should consider the many vendors who sell open source software.
David Rice responds on his blog.
The problem is that with the rise of 1) mass e-commerce, e-government and Internet banking, and 2) Internet-enabled desktops, now EVERY piece of conceivably internet-facing software installed on a consumer desktop carries the risk of exploitation, criminal intrusion and identity theft.
Yes, a security hole in a web browser won't directly cause loss of *life*. However, what it *can* do by allowing a trojan in is:
a) Drain all your life savings from your bank
b) Place illegal pornography on your computer, leading to serious prison time
c) Propagate spam, worms, viruses and botnet epidemics
d) Activate your webcam remotely and film you in your bedroom
e) Directly financially support criminal organisations
Those are now serious enough consequences - and given a single security hole in a mass-produced product, easy to reproduce on a mass planet-wide scale - that ALL developers of even the most trivial desktop software need to start thinking in terms of the kind of hard security requirements of banking, military, avionics and medical gear.
But they're not, because they haven't caught up with reality.
You are not a brain: http://books.google.com/books?id=2oV61CeDx-YC
Well, that may be true. How much is good software going to cost us if everyone is liable for the code they write?
There are three avenues I can see that a company or individual doing development in the US could take if this becomes law:
1) Pay the costs to develop bug free software.
2) Stop developing software.
3) Move to a country with a less onerous position.
Of the three, the only one that is actually not feasible is 1! Why, you might ask? Because the company must make a profit, thus must sell the software for more than they developed it for.
Yes, the shuttle software has ~0 bugs. The cost of that has also been estimated at $1000 per LOC. Apache, for example, might have around 81852 lines of code... $81,852,000, which is not bad considering! The linux kernel (2.6) ~5.2M LOC. Hmm $5B??? Not to mention the glacial pace that shuttle sw moves. The pace Hurd is moving at would look like light speed compared to changes to any medium to large sized codebase.
But, you might say, what about people who give their software away for free? After all, I just used Apache and linux as examples of what it might cost if commercially developed but they were not! We could just get all that work for free. Free!
Well, show of hands - who wants to give some software away for free and be liable for the results? Put something up as an individual and one lawsuit (even if wrongly brought) is enough to bankrupt you. I guess there is always posting anonymously but I assume any distributor of the software would then be liable. How many projects on SourceForge would be available if either the contributors (non-anonymous) or SourceForge (for anonymous projects) were liable? Likewise e.g. RedHat, could all be held responsible for not only code they wrote but what they distribute if it was anonymous code.
Then there are shared objects like libraries. Is is misuse of the library by the end developer that caused the issue or a bug in the library itself? Or should this have been caught by the QA of the end developer? Are both liable? It could get very entertaining.
So, we may be experiencing $180B loss for bad software, but I happen to think that we might lose much much more if software liability were a reality.
Not that MS, IBM, Oracle, Apple, Adobe, RedHat, etc... would ever allow this to happen.
Please note: Nothing in the above states that I'm for buggy software being written. I believe that we simply don't have the tools to liability proof these types of products yet in a cheap, fast way. We can write good software. We can even write great software. But that one bug you didn't catch is the one they will sue you for.