TSA Changes Screening Based on Blog Suggestion

hhavensteincw writes "Less than a week after it launched a new blog aimed at gathering suggestions from air travelers to improve airport security processes, the Transportation Security Administration changed a practice where some screeners were requiring passengers to remove all electronics, including Blackberries, iPods, and cords from carry-on luggage. Seems the TSA didn't know this was going on, and after the question was raised on its blog, it clamped down on the practice. The TSA also provided a detailed description of their reasoning behind the liquids policy. We discussed the opening of the blog last week."

Comments

Prediction

[ezzzD55J]

The blog will close (or be neglected) in a month or so after the flood of complaints become too much for them. They might blame the abundance of unreasonable or irrational people on the internet for having a blog up not being practical. (Actually I think it is true a blog is a terrible medium for handling complaints - use a ticketing system instead.) I hope not though, this looks really great on the surface. What's the catch?

RTFS

[moosesocks]

It's right there in the summary.

No policies were changed as a result of blog comments.

What *did* happen was that a few bloggers indicated that TSA employees were searching bags in a manner that is prohibited by the TSA's own rules.

Given just how much organizations like the TSA love rules and procedures, the fact that they clamped down isn't a surprise at all. Although it's a big step for the TSA to actually be accountable to its own rules, we still have a long way to come.

If I walk into Safeway/Kroger/Food Lion, and tell the manager that one of their cashiers is stealing money out of the register, there's no doubt that he'll respond immediately. If I walk in and tell the manager that his store is dirty, and that prices are too high, I doubt I'll receive any sympathy.

Re:Liquids and a /. car analogy.

[SharpFang]

But that doesn't mean that locking the doors and setting the alarm (x-rays and searches) is a bad idea......

Unless you spend over 15 minutes in front of the door fumbling with the multiple locks and alarms, you call in locksmith twice a month to let you in, and you got arrested twice for attempt to get inside your own car.

Problem is with hijacking, not bombing.

[v(*_*)vvvv]

The true threat with aircraft security is hijacking. A hijacker can take over an aircraft and use the plane as a missile. As someone pointed out earlier, if the goal was to just kill people, terrorists could just blow up prior to reaching the security check point or suicide bomb a crowd somewhere else. There are plenty of places to just blow up that would kill more people that can fit on a plane.

If hijacking is the real threat, then the cockpit is what needs to be secured. Have it lock automatically prior to boarding, and have it unlock automatically after the plane is emptied. If terrorists can't get to the cockpit, then they cannot take over a craft.

Re:Didn't know?

[ta bu shi da yu]

Precisely. I find it quite amazing that there are "field offices" who can just make up policy on the fly. I'm even more amazed that little or no information is being shared between offices and the main operations!

If this is the level of coordination to protect U.S. citizens from being blown up, then I think that there's a big problem with this agency.

Imagine it. They found out about this from a blog. They don't appear to do regular reviews of field offices (else they'd have known about this practice). What else is slipping through the net? Terrorists?

What a monumental and sterling example of bureaucratic incompetence.

Take two bottles onto the plane?

[itsdapead]

But that complexity, from what I can gather, is precisely the point (according to the TSA blog post) of restricting the liquids in secure areas of airport terminals.

Except the argument went something along the lines of:

Q: Why can't we take more than 100ml of liquid on board?
A: Because its possible you might mix up a binary liquid explosive on the plane!

Q: So why can't several people work together and each bring 100ml of binary explosive makin's?
A: Because you need the other people to carry the ice bath, liquid nitrogen, bunsen burner, pipette, magnetic stirrer, thermostatically controlled heater, fume cupboard and all the other lab gear you need to successfully mix up a binary liquid explosive; so making them carry the ingredients in several 100ml bottles is going to be the last straw that makes them abandon their dastardly plan!

Q: But they could all bring on small quantities pre-mixed explosives?
A: No, because liquid explosives are too unstable to carry pre-mixed.

Q: So you're confirming that its nigh-on impossible to blow up a plane with liquid explosive?
A: (mumbles) - we've found several bad 'uns manufacturing TATP.

Q: Correction - you found pieces of several people who attempted to make TATP in the comfort of their own homes - oh, PS, TATP isn't a liquid.
A: Oh look - butterfly!

Re:Take two bottles onto the plane?

[niiler]

I especially liked this part:

The preparation of these bombs is very much more complex than tossing together several bottles-worth of formula and lighting it up. In fact, in recent tests, a National Lab was asked to formulate a test mixture and it took several tries using the best equipment and best scientists for it to even ignite. That was with a bomb prepared in advance in a lab setting. A less skilled person attempting to put it together inside a secure area or a plane is not a good bet. You have to have significant uninterrupted time with space and other requirements that are not easily available in a secured area of an airport. It adds complexity to their preferred model and reduces our risk, having the expert make the bomb and give it to someone else to carry aboard. They are well aware of the Richard Reid factor where he could not even ignite a completed bomb. Simple is truly better for them. Also, bomb-makers are easier for us to identify than so-called clean 'mules.'

So what they are saying is that with top of the line equipment, even their experts had a tough job of it. I'm not sure how this helps their argument at all.

Wow!

[dpaluszek]

You know, I'm not the biggest fan of the TSA, but I'm pretty impressed with them getting government approval and hosting a blog where they discuss this type of material. As someone who's been working for government agencies for years, this is definitely something that I haven't seen before nor would of gotten approved through multiple government agencies/directorates.

Kudos to the TSA to spend the time and resources to do something like this. It blows my mind that, in my opinion, a government agency did something practical for once.

On liquids

[Zolodoco]

Funny. The comment I posted on the TSA's blog that mentioned various scenarios not addressed by passenger screening never made it past moderation. For example, garroting a passenger or crew member with your shoelaces, or carrying on ammonia and high concentration chlorine in your allowed 3oz containers to create mustard gas. My point was of course that, considering the fraudulent nature of the the Justice Dept's claims regarding the so-called liquid bomber plot, there's absolutely no reason to ban liquids. If we want to cover every potential for violence, we'd have to take away everyone's belts, shoelaces, all liquids, all sharp or pointy objects, trim their fingernails, and bind all passengers' hands and feet.

Re:Didn't know?

[afidel]

It's not that the devices themselves are a threat per se, it's that the complex xray signature of an electronics device with a battery makes it difficult to interpret what you are seeing when there are things above and below them. Therefore they have you remove them to get a cleaner picture of both your luggage and the devices. I'm surprised this isn't national policy considering that laptops are already singled out to the point of them having to be out of any type of satchel.