Serious Vulnerability In Firefox 2.0.0.12
Oh, Not Now writes "Mozilla Firefox 2.0.0.12, mere hours old, is vulnerable by default to a directory traversal trick, via the view-source mechanism. Although mitigated by the NoScript plug-in, this is quite a serious bug — the default installation is vulnerable from the get-go."
Also, one thing that I have noticed about OSS bugs is that those severe enough to cause execution of code, there are very very few utilities to easily attack systems unlike their MS counterparts. Most OSS flaws are rarely exploited in the wild. The only thing that annoys me about them is that someone will surely come up to me on Monday stating how bad Firefox is because of this while blissfully ignoring all the flaws that Windows/IE has had for years.
There is no "disagree" moderation, and troll, flamebait and overrated are not valid substitutes
Why isn't NoScript just a mandatory extension at this point? It seems like it would be pretty unobtrusive with default settings at a slightly reduced paranoia level.
Insert self-referential sig here.
Why stop downloading it?
;)
I cannot work out from the article whether older versions of Firefox are vulnerable or not.
If its an unfixed bug from previous versions you should continue to download.
Which would you rather:
have 20 known vulns in the wild (stay as you are),
have 1 known vuln wild (latest update).
Until we can be certain though, just click pause
liqbase
It makes me happy that this type of vulnerability is what we call serious these days. If you remember, just a couple of years ago microsoft was downplaying the WMF vulnerability. It was not considered "critical" because the target needed to manually visit a malicious website for the attacker to take over the target machine.
:-)
While this is a really neat find, and I am glad that it will be patched pretty soon, I don't think it is quite at the level of "sky falling" etc. From what I understand, an attacker that can execute javascript in your browser has the ability to read any file in the targets mozilla directory. This worst that I think an attacker could do would be to grab your stored password file. While this is definitely something to be concerned about, the headline had me pretty worried
Doesn't look like a vulerability to me. So it can read files in /usr/lib/firefox, but those are just the standard files from the firefox package. User configuration and stored passwords etc are not stored there... It still can't get to $HOME/.mozilla...
--- Hindsight is 20/20, but walking backwards is not the answer.
gre is constant data. This report is FUD.
Firefox is open source; anyone who wants to view view-source:resource:///greprefs/all.js can just as easily load http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla1.8/source/modules/libpref/src/init/all.js?raw=1 it has the same content.
all.js is *not* user data, it's *public* app data. Your preferences are stored in prefs.js which are not exposed by greprefs.
Seriously, this title should be changed now (get rid of "Serious"), and a "!serious" tag added. The author of the article is an asshole who just waited for this release to fear monger and gain some attention. This bug exists in previous versions, this is not a new issue. The fact is, 2.0.0.12 fixes issues from previous issues, and does NOT introduce this "new" bug.
You should still upgrade. You are already vulnerable to this "attack" without it, but you can at least gain some new fixes for other issues.
You know, we're trying to promote open source software. To scream that firefox has a "serious vulnerability" when it in fact doesn't is IT treason.
http://noscript.net/getit.
Parent is an idiot or a troll, not informative.
To quote the link itself, where it is written in large bold print right above what was quoted (emphasis mine):
FIXED in Firefox 2.0.0.12
If you take a look at what this is doing, there's much less to it than meets the eye.
The way the page works is that it is able to load the file all.js in the greprefs directory inside your firefox installation. However, it is not *reading* this file and making it available to the javascript interpreter, it is *executing* the file. The file is a big list of browser preferences, each set with a call to a function with the signature pref(name, value). There is no code in there other than calls to pref. What the page does is define its own pref(name, value) which gets called, and the names and values are therefore available to the javascript interpreter.
So:
I would additionally point out that the view-source: part of the URI appears to be unnecessary, since at least for me (Ubuntu FF 2.0.0.12) the "exploit" worked just fine without it.
Indeed,
From TFA: "We can trick Firefox itself in traversing directories back".
but then it says:
"we are able to read out all preferences set in Firefox, or just open or include about every file stored in the Mozilla program files directory"
Since TFA is not clear, I have tried it myself and I WAS NOT ABLE TO TRAVERSE a directory back with resource:///../
So the only files someone can read with this vuln are the files inside firefox directory which from what I can see are just default files and no cookies or passwords.
If anyone thinks any different please let me know.
Depends.
Firefox extensions (Like the oh-so-important NoScript and AdBlock Plus, or the must-have for every
On the other hand, web-browser plugins (like Adobe Macromedia Flash, Sun Java, etc.) are binary code in dynamically linked libraries (DLL or SO depending on what's standart on your OS). That's why there are really serious portability problems with closed source companies providing plugins compiled only for a handful of operating system (often without 64bits support).
There are two strategies :
- most of the time open-source projects use very light libraries which obtain the parameters from firefox and launch a player in a separate process that get its output embedded inside the page display (mplayer's plugin just luanch a sepparate mplayer session, gnash' plugin runs gtk-gnash to open the flash movie, webgcjplugin compiles and runs the java applet using gcj, moz-plugger is an universal embedder, etc...)
- whereas most of the proprietary project try to cram everything inside a huge DLL that runs inside firefox' own process (macromedia flash, acrobat reader {BTW who does still use that piece of junk}, etc.)
The Javascript extensions play some role because the javascript engine of current Firefox isn't very fast (Hopefully the integration of Tamarin VM in some future version will help). If a user has way too many of them, the firefox experience can become slow. But most of the time quite, the extensions are event-driven : they usually add entries in the main menu and the javascripts are only executed when the user clicks the entry.
The other problems comes with memory leaks.
- Javascript extensions, because they are only ran on demand and because of the garbage collector, aren't subject to many leaks. But anyway really badly written code can actually degrade firefox performance and eat up memory.
- Dynamically linked web browser plugins are a completely different animal : because they run inside the browser process (at least, not the open-source one which only launch an external process) if they leak memory, the whole firefox process will get its memory usage up and will only free the memory when the whole program is exited. Also, firefox isn't heavily multi-threaded and if some plugins freezes the whole program gets unresponsive (I've had some awful experience with acrobat and older versions of flash). Similarly crashes inside a dynamically linked library will bring down the whole process that called the function, and any exploit discovered inside flash can be used against firefox itself.
I strongly suspect that most of the memory leaks reported by users are actually due to browser-plugins, because I haven't experienced any leaks even if a use several extensions, whereas I don't run closed proprietary browser plugins at all (mplayer and gnash only !) because of the awful experience with acrobat and flash.
"Sufficiently advanced satire is indistinguishable from reality." - [Tips: 1DrYakQDKCQ6y52z6QbnkxHXAocMZJE61o ]