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NXP RFID Cracked
kamlapati sends us to EETimes for news that the Chaos Computer Club in Germany and researchers from the University of Virginia have cracked the encryption scheme used in a common RFID chip, NXP's Mifare Classic. According to the article the device is used in many contactless smartcard applications including fare collection, loyalty cards, and access control cards. NXP downplays the significance of the hack, saying that that model of RFID card uses old technology and they do a much better job these days.
What sort of security implications would this hack cause?
Is this simply lowering the security down to the same level as a barcode but with radio transmission?
Since RFID needs close proximity to be read, I'm TOO concerned.
It'd be pretty noticeable if someone had a high powered RFID antenna/reader - if they were trying to move it.
But, since it would be easy to install a modified high power RFID reader in a convenience store stand, near a window or in a mailbox on a street corner, this could become a problem.
I guess it means that I'll be wearing tinfoil pants as well as a hat, to keep THEM from reading my mind, and my credit card. And password. And the chip in my dog.
I don't doubt for a minute that NXP does a much better job on security these days. But based on past performance, you can bet a lot of the old ones are still floating around, and will be for a long, long time to come.
I've calculated my velocity with such exquisite precision that I have no idea where I am.
I'm sure it will be possible to change/hack a farecard soon enough. there are millions of people who use the cards every day, and many of them are nerds/cheep-asses. its only a matter of time.
A few years ago, my roommate and I built a credit card reader/copier for under $10.
We copied a few metro passes (magnetic strip, no RFID)just to see if it would work, and we learned that it does, but you can't pass the 'same' card through the system 2 times n a row. my friend got the embarasing warning buzzer, and he was the one with the legetimate pass!
they accsed us of doing a passback. we just played dumb.
"no we didn't! i made a copy of his card! its right here! try it! see! there was no passback!" is a very bad defence.
we only used it once, just to see if it would work, then destroyed it.
My advice is: you should be very careful with this kind of stuff. Not only unethical and wrong, it is also illegal.
-I only code in BASIC.-
This is why RFID is bad. It gets hacked, the banks and credit card companies ignore it and claim it is secure. Wait a week or two and repeat.
Sure it MIGHT be slightly more convenient, but I would rather take the 3 seconds to swipe the card and not have to deal with fraud and identity theft which will take up more time.
RFID is a terrible concept, but at the very least they should make cards with an off switch.
It depends on the card technology. Most stuff these days (transit passes, etc.) seem to be using 13.56 MHz equipment, but some low-security access applications still use the old 125 kHz technology. I don't really know anything about 13.56 MHz equipment. As for 125 kHz stuff, it's trivial to read the data from the card, and there are a lot of RFID kits out there that will let you write data to cards. I am specifically looking at this kit for writing to 125 kHz cards.
First thing you'd need to do is to find out what kind of reader it is - get the brand name, go to the website, and find the model that looks like your reader. Check the datasheet to find out what kind of cards it reads, etc. That'll get you started. All that said, it'll probably be a lot simpler (and for one or two cards, cheaper) just to buy them :-)
"Anyone who [rips a CD] is probably engaging in copyright infringement." - David O. Carson
That's right. Science. We have reached the point where we might have to send a technician out to do a firmware update on *a crate of soup*.
"Oh, no, sonny. That there pallet's running v1.47a -- the cyberinjuns cracked that dekacycles ago. Hardly know what's in there now. Could be tomato, could be chicken noodle. Send that back on the factory. We'll get you some nice v1.49 soup out here. Won't be half a cycle."
Yahoo! Pipes are awesome. How awesome? http://pipes.yahoo.com/jesdynf/slashdot
To clarify a few things. First of all this has been known for a few months. The earliest mention I saw was December 29, 2007: MiFare's CRYPTO1 algorithm mostly reverse-engineered. More information, including a slide show, is presented in this January 1, 2008 post: Mifare crypto1 RFID completely broken
Quick background: NXP (Philips) creates a line of smart cards called "Mifare" based on proprietary protocols, including the CRYPTO1 cipher (undocumented, proprietary). There are a lot of Mifare cards deployed, and there is a huge element of security through obscurity especially if you rely on proprietary protocols, such as CRYPTO1 algorithm.
This research, as linked above (and posted in this slashdot article... old news) shows that CRYPTO1 stream cipher is horribly broken, based on a terribly insufficient random number generator. Besides busting this example of security through obscurity, the target technology is actually deployed in a very wide range of uses. Meaning, this attack has many real world consequences.
I've seen a lot of very uninformed comments on 'high gain antennas'
MiFare is a 13.56MHz system (ISM band), that uses H-Field coupling (ie near field magnetic coupling) in a loose transformer coupled arrangement.
The near field attenuates at 1/r^3, and as a rough guide you can read this type of tag to about 1.5 x loop diameter.
At 13.56Mhz, you can only make the antenna so large before the inductance of the antenna makes it impossible to resonate.
We in fact have a complex stub tuned antenna of about 1m diam, and that was difficult.
Another problem, is you have to start pumping out so much power, it becomes extremely difficult to see modulation on the carrier above the TX noise.
Now that said, it sounds like NXP (who have one of the worst web sites on the net), are in deep doodoo.
The reason is that MIFARE has huge rollouts in transportation systems, especially in asia, and these cards contain real monetary value.
System integrators, are now going to have to put extra work into either live back to central database checking (which will be hard on mobile platforms like busses), or upgrade systems to the triple des encrypted (and more expensive) cards.
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