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Coding Flaws Caused Moody's Debt Rating Errors
An anonymous reader writes "The Financial Times has the story that billions in incorrect AAA ratings given out by Moody's were the result of a coding error in its computer models. 'Internal Moody's documents seen by the FT show that some senior staff within the credit agency knew early in 2007 that products rated the previous year had received top-notch triple A ratings and that, after a computer coding error was corrected, their ratings should have been up to four notches lower.'"
In any case, it sounds like they found a new scapegoat and they're going to take it for a test ride.
The problem is that the credit agencies used past data for new types of asset backed securities. While this works with most asset backed securities, the use of CDOs and MBSs caused a perfect storm. They assets they were backed up with were housing values and the AAA ratings they had made them very popular, inflating the housing values. When the housing values took a nosedive, there were no assets to back up these securities.
This isn't a trivial issue. False AAA ratings are what have caused the global credit crunch and mortgage crisis. For those who aren't familiar with a AAA rating, it is considered as good as a US government bond. It is a very hard rating to get and only 8 US companies are rated AAA by all of the credit agencies.
In my opinion, there is a very strong need for regulation of the credit agencies. If they didn't allow for CDOs and MBSs to get AAA ratings, this credit crunch and likely recession wouldn't have occurred.
This is another example of how good news in the economic field can easily go unchecked because it is beneficial for everyone involved (in the short term) for the world to believe them.
My favorite, and perhaps the most drastic, example is how the US government grossly misrepresents employment stats, the consumer price index, and the GDP. This creates another bubble; not for the New Economy or for the housing market, but for the US as a nation. As long as people keep believing in the "world's strongest economy", investments pay off much as they do in a pyramid scheme - but the point where they won't becomes ever more dangerous the longer the scheme holds.
I for one prefer investments in Europe if only for the seemingly more reliable numbers they have there. Investing in the US is a way too dangerous gamble right now.
blow your mind already
As an industry, we really need to start growing up and using the tools the mathematicians have provided us, just as other engineers do in other disciplines, to show our programs actually work as advertised.
The competent have nothing to fear from formal verification and anyone who is not capable of doing such verification should not be writing software anyway.
Simon
Suuuuure... a coding bug is to blame! Nevermind that the agencies selling this financial toxic waste *paid* Moody's, S&P and others to provide good ratings. Software bug or no, there is fraud all around within the US economy--and no one was complaining as long as people at the top were raking in billions of dollars in profits.
This entry at Calculated Risk openly wonders if Moody's jiggered its model expressly so that it would line up with whatever the Standard&Poors ratings were.
Personally, I'm concerned this revelation will result in a concerted effort to blame the whole mess on a computer error, rather than the profoundly bad judgment exhibited by fund managers and investment banks. Expect some hapless programmer to be located and pilloried.
Schwab
Editor, A1-AAA AmeriCaptions
IOW, they are blaming the coders for generating results that should have
failed even the most basic sanity checking. All of their finance geeks
upon seeing these ratings should have been individually and collectively
scratching their heads.
I'm not sure I buy it really. It just seems like corporate blame deflection.
I dunno. I'm no MBA but I would imagine that the rating of any composite
security should be the lowest rating of the most risky component.
A Pirate and a Puritan look the same on a balance sheet.
The Financial Times has the story that billions in incorrect AAA ratings given out by Moody's were the result of a coding error in its computer models.
So one of the top financial services companies in the world, staffed with MBA's and finance professionals, and none of them noticed a coding error that changed debt ratings by that big of a margin? That strains credibility to the breaking point. And on the other side of the table, none of the financial institutions buying collateralized debt instruments ever looked at those ratings and thought they were a little optimistic? Come on. The entire sub-prime mortgage mess was a computer glitch.
Guess that means cocaine use is alive and well on Wall Street. Because you have to be really, really high to field a whopper like that.
That's our life, the big wheel of shit. - The Fat Man, Blue Tango Salvage
while (true) {
if (isSECWatching = false) {
commitEgregiousFraud();
}}
Assignment vs. equality check strikes again!
They won't go after some low-profile wonk. The French bank with billions of losses from a couple of months ago is trying the same thing. It's not plausible.
This is very quickly how the scam works:
The way bond agencies survive is by acquiring new business. Let's say a utility issues a bond for a new water project. They shop the issuance around. Highest rating gets the business. The higher rating means (roughly) less "insurance" they have to carry and the more they can use free cash to do other things.
The bond agencies are as "financialized" as a low-end broker sweat shop. No one seemed to care when the money was flowing. It's easy to take shots after the fact.
Few people follow the Fed's TAF's and its junk-filled balance sheet. It's worse than the credit agencies situation. Who knows if that will ever blow up like the credit markets.
http://www.maxineudall.com/2010/02/should-economists-be-sued-for-malpractice.html
failed even the most basic sanity checking. Indeed. This isn't a coding error, it's a testing error. Or perhaps a process design error.
Any professional knows that coding has a certain error rate. So you add practices, like pair programming, unit testing, acceptance testing, external code reviews, parallel implementation, and black-box testing until you get below the error rate you need.
For some part-time e-tailer's web site, you can skip a fair bit of that; if you fuck up badly enough, you might cost them an entire $500. But in the financial world, they know that errors can cost a lot more, like a million times more, and so it's worth spending more on quality-oriented practices.
Blaming this on the coder who happened to make the key error (if indeed their was one) is like blaming the Titanic disaster on some guy who missed a rivet on that side. It's the purest bullshit, designed to deflect responsibility from the people in charge. If they set it up right, a single person would be unable to make a mistake of this magnitude.
To the extent that different investments in a portfolio (which is what a "composite security" is, in essence, a prepackaged portfolio) have independent risks, there is a leveling effect (this is why, e.g., when you roll two dice, the distribution of the results is tighter proportionate to the range than when you roll one, and tighter still when you roll three, etc.)
OTOH, to the extent they tend to vary together, they don't level each other. Assessing the degree to which two different investments are independent in their risks is, AFAIK, still more art than science to start with, and when the people doing the assessment often have financial interests (even if only indirectly) in promoting the sales of the packaged investments, well, the results are likely to represent those interests more than any rational assessment of reality.
Calculated Risk believes this is a case where S&P decided not to believe their own models and tweaked them to match the results derived by Moody's, which spit out the wrong results in the first place. Call it bug-compatibility, but it's also clear that there were plenty of financial incentives at the time for the rating agencies to deliver results in step with their peers lest they lose out on lucrative "second opinion" business.
Dog is my co-pilot.
This entire story is bullocks, and your analysis is accurate. We aren't talking about a trivial error here. The models were spitting out obviously false results, and Moody's (and everyone else) gladly accepted those bad results. For at least 3+ years now, several analysts have pointed out ratings were too high and that they didn't pass the "smell test". If Moody's is not responsible for their models, then why shouldn't I write some half-assed model of my own, demonstrate to lenders how in the short term it will make them money, and then when I get caught, just point out that I never claimed my models were accurate.
Actually, that's not a bad idea.
To put it in a language slashdotters will understand.
1. Invent model.
2. Lie about model's accuracy.
3. (Sell model)???
4. Profit.
These structured products are broken into what are known as tranches.
Even if you know you're holding a pile of dog crap mortgages, you know that most will be able to make first months payment. Each successive monthly payment pool is likely to have more defaults, and thus uncertainty grows. If you take 1000 loans, and group the payments together, you can theoretically predict the risk of each band of payments. If you buy the first band, aka tranch, you're far more likely to get paid than if you buy the junior tranches that are expecting payments 30 years from now.
Here's where the fun stuff happens. Those earlier tranches that are more likely to get paid will usually be given very high credit ratings, as it's likely that the owner will collect the income from the pooled debtors. Since the security their holdings is so highly rated, perhaps AAA, then other institutions are willing to accept that AAA security as collateral for additional borrowing. This all continues on in a crazy cycle of leveraging until you have hunders of dollars of leverage to cents of actual income. All the while, these leverage products maintain a high credit rating, because it's all based off of AAA securities.
What happens when people start to default on the orignal loans and the person who bought that orignal pools of loans doesn't get paid? They can't pay their interest to a person who in turn can't pay their interest to a person who gets screwed and has to bring this "safe" security onto their balance sheet and write it all off as a loss. TADA! Credit crunch.