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Why Shoot Down a Satellite? Analyzing an Analysis
A reader, name withheld by request, writes "Writing in the IEEE Spectrum, James Oberg analyzes whether there was, in fact a significant risk to humans from the satellite which the US military shot down on 21 February, purportedly 'to head off the possibility of its splashing a half ton of toxic hydrazine fuel somewhere on Earth.' Previous experts had 'scoffed' at the rationale put forth, pointing out that there was trivial possibility that any significant amount of toxic fuel would make it to the ground intact. Oberg's analysis, titled 'the inside story,' purports to debunk this, and claims that indeed it's possible, and even likely, that there could be a danger to the ground. Unfortunately, the analysis is full of flaws and lack of rigor — indeed, lacking any sort of numerical reasoning. It seems to be too much repeating official 'spin,' and could have used a hefty dose of skepticism — and could also use a little bit of actual analysis using numbers, rather than handwaving." Read on for the rest of an interesting analysis of a topic that suddenly seems more complex.
The submitter continues:
"Here's the first number that Oberg should have quoted: 32 Megajoules per kilogram. That's orbital energy, which is how much energy has to be removed by ablation or otherwise dissipated for the hydrazine tank to enter the atmosphere and hit the ground undamaged. For reference, TNT holds about 4.6 MJ/kg.
Oberg quotes 'Hydrazine requires a tremendous amount of energy to go from solid to liquid.' This energy is known as the heat of fusion, and for hydrazine it is just a little under 400 kJ/kg. That's about 1% of the energy released by entry heating. Hardly a 'tremendous' amount of energy, compared to the entry energy that's nearly a hundred times greater.
Oberg goes on to quote 'There is a widespread notion that meteorites falling to Earth arrive red hot.' He is correct here. In fact, meteorites falling through the atmosphere typically explode, shattering into dozens or hundreds of pieces; something that occurs at the point when the dynamic pressure on the leading face exceeds the yield stress of the material. This occurs for meteoroids of all compositions, including nickle-iron meteorites that are far more robust than hydrazine tanks. If the atmospheric entry of meteorites is relevant, it hardly bolsters the case that a tank will enter intact (and if it's not relevent, why did Oberg bring it up?)
Furthermore, if you look at a typical nickle-iron meteorite, you'll see a surface pitted and mottled with holes ranging from the size of golf balls up to pits the size of baseballs. These are known as regmaglypts; they are the areas ablated away by the entry plasma. Even a single such ablation pit would, of course, destroy a hydrazine tank.
The second number Oberg should have quoted is a number called ballistic coefficient, the mass divided by the area of the tank. Basically, the smaller the ballistic coefficient, the less stressful the entry will be. Unfortunately, a full hydrazine tank has a very high ballistic coefficient. It is an empty tank, not a full one, that is likely to enter intact. Talking about empty film canisters, or even empty fuel tanks, making it intact through atmospheric entry is really about as relevant as talking about dropping a piece of paper on the floor.
The article contains a quote from Andrew Higgins, with a link to (purportedly) the research done that contains the quote. Unfortunately the link does not actually contain the quote used in the article; in fact, it seems to be mostly a discussion of a side issue. Let me emphasize this: Higgins did not say what he is quoted as saying in the place he was reported as saying it. This may merely be sloppy journalism — maybe he said it somewhere else — but I am again left with the question: if I can't even trust the simplest things he says that can be easily checked, why should I trust anything else?
In short, Oberg's article is poorly thought out, avoids even simple back-of-the-envelope calculations, and accepts uncritically information that should have been aggressively questioned. He concludes that a well-defined and thoroughly researched technological hazard assessment — of a kind that someday, for better or worse, will be needed again — has wound up buried in obscurity and obfuscation. This may be true, but no well defined nor thoroughly researched technological hazard assessment was anywhere in evidence. The analysis he gives in the article is buried in obscurity and obfuscation.
(apologies for posting as Anonymous Coward. I work in the field.)"
Oberg goes on to quote 'There is a widespread notion that meteorites falling to Earth arrive red hot.' He is correct here. In fact, meteorites falling through the atmosphere typically explode, shattering into dozens or hundreds of pieces; something that occurs at the point when the dynamic pressure on the leading face exceeds the yield stress of the material. This occurs for meteoroids of all compositions, including nickle-iron meteorites that are far more robust than hydrazine tanks. If the atmospheric entry of meteorites is relevant, it hardly bolsters the case that a tank will enter intact (and if it's not relevent, why did Oberg bring it up?)
Furthermore, if you look at a typical nickle-iron meteorite, you'll see a surface pitted and mottled with holes ranging from the size of golf balls up to pits the size of baseballs. These are known as regmaglypts; they are the areas ablated away by the entry plasma. Even a single such ablation pit would, of course, destroy a hydrazine tank.
The second number Oberg should have quoted is a number called ballistic coefficient, the mass divided by the area of the tank. Basically, the smaller the ballistic coefficient, the less stressful the entry will be. Unfortunately, a full hydrazine tank has a very high ballistic coefficient. It is an empty tank, not a full one, that is likely to enter intact. Talking about empty film canisters, or even empty fuel tanks, making it intact through atmospheric entry is really about as relevant as talking about dropping a piece of paper on the floor.
The article contains a quote from Andrew Higgins, with a link to (purportedly) the research done that contains the quote. Unfortunately the link does not actually contain the quote used in the article; in fact, it seems to be mostly a discussion of a side issue. Let me emphasize this: Higgins did not say what he is quoted as saying in the place he was reported as saying it. This may merely be sloppy journalism — maybe he said it somewhere else — but I am again left with the question: if I can't even trust the simplest things he says that can be easily checked, why should I trust anything else?
In short, Oberg's article is poorly thought out, avoids even simple back-of-the-envelope calculations, and accepts uncritically information that should have been aggressively questioned. He concludes that a well-defined and thoroughly researched technological hazard assessment — of a kind that someday, for better or worse, will be needed again — has wound up buried in obscurity and obfuscation. This may be true, but no well defined nor thoroughly researched technological hazard assessment was anywhere in evidence. The analysis he gives in the article is buried in obscurity and obfuscation.
(apologies for posting as Anonymous Coward. I work in the field.)"
To test our new weapons and show the Chinese how we roll.
What was the risk of shooting it down? It seems close to "none." The missile used would surely have a mechanism to self-destruct in the event of a miss, and even if it didn't, I don't see how its falling could be any more dangerous than the hydrazine. Plus, it was probably a useful training exercise, should they ever need to shoot down a "really" dangerous satellite.
Of course, since it was done months ago, it's all hypothetical anyway.
Comment of the year
From the link about why the satellite was no threat:
"The hydrazine tank is a 1-meter sphere containing about 400 liters of hydrazine. The stated hazard area is about 2 hectares, something like 1/10,000,000,000 of the area under the orbit," he adds. The potential for actual harm in unbelievably small. Which means the hydrazine rationale just doesn't hold up, literally not within orders of magnitude."
That's it for any analysis - the rest of the article was devoted to analyzing the political and military reasons why the explanation was bogus. And most of the analysis seemed to be delivered with substantial chips of the speakers shoulders. As for the numbers, while they may be *statistically* insignificant, that is pretty irrelevant next to the political consequences to a military that says "Yeah, we could have shot it down, but the odds were so small it wasn't worth the money. Our bad."
Then the "analysis" with the post - sounds good, until you get to the end: "Posted anonymously". Sorry, but that's a fail right there. He could be a 13year old in his Mom's basement, or Feynman blogging from the grave, but without attribution I just can't take it seriously.
"As God is my witness, I thought turkeys could fly." A. Carlson
I think they shot it down because they decided it was a good idea. What's the problem? The US is going to get criticized by someone for any choice it could possibly make, including doing nothing. This was probably the choice with the least uncertainty.
If such a paper cannot tell why a shootdown was warranted, why waste time writing and printing it?
Except that James Oberg is an expert (or at least damn close to one, read the resumes linked off the second link.) - having been a mission controller for NASA and a professional space engineer, analyst, writer, and journalist for decades. Synchronicity at work - as part of a research project I'm working on, Jim's 1982 book Mission to Mars sits right beside my coffee cup even as I type this...
That being said - the debunking is full of errors as well. The AC provides us with a wonderful handwaving smoke and mirrors show, but fails to acknowledge the role of the structure of the tank itself (which is insulated and has to be accounted for before the Hydrazine starts to vaporize). He also fails to acknowledge the role the structure of the satellite plays, as it too will act as shielding (and a drag brake!) for the tank. (I know Jim is aware of these factors because I've discussed them with him.)
In short, what the AC claims is a debunking is actually closer to being a partial rationale for conducting the shootdown.
I don't know what 'field' the AC works in, but to this knowledgeable non expert he doesn't sound like an expert at all - but rather sounds like someone with an axe to grind. If he is an expert, he has allowed bias to supplant analysis.
Most 8 year olds I know are good at making up a pretext for getting what they want.
A: I really wanna shoot down a satellite!
B: You can't do that, it'll make you look like a violent war provocateur.
A: But! But! But! What if it was a dangerous satellite. Like it was going to kill everyone or something. And we had to shoot it down to save everyone! And it had racing stripes and a turret on top and played the A-Team theme song!
B: Well.... Okay, but only if it's a dangerous satellite.
A: Yay! Mom! Dad says we can shoot down a satellite!
Um, this is mirroring exactly what I was thinking. Some one in the military wanted to shoot down a satellite. If they need a reason, give 'em 5-10 seconds, and they'll come up with something. Hey it might not be the best excuse in the world, but if it got them the o.k. to do what they want, then it was a pretty good excuse. ;)
If only we could invade Middle East/Africa and bring them up to our societal level with the same logic.
And you cannot practice simple human courtesy. WTF compels you to post that?
Or, it's probably a combination of factors, and not just a dick-measuring competition.
Consider the following:
1. A very expensive intelligence satellite is stranded in low orbit, useless. Said satellite contains expensive, highly-classefied equipment; there's a finite chance that some of this equipment might reach the surface relatively intact (see Skylab, Columbia). Obviously, certain groups (China and Russia, especially) would love to get hold of anything that survived and analyze it. It would be nice to ensure that this equipment is rendered unusable and worthless.
2. The hydrazine tank mentioned. Yes, I know the odds of it hitting anything were very, very small... but not zero. And the public outcry had it hurt or killed anyone would have been loud and swift. The decision-makers probably figured it would be better to face the inevitable international grumbling by shooting down the satellite than to face the very small (but potentially devastating) risk of impact in a populated area.
3. The Navy ABM system is going operational, and someone realizes it has the capability to shoot down low satellites. Someone probably figured "hell, we have this satellite problem; it's going to reenter soon anyways so it's a nice convenient test target. We might as well try it while we have the chance". Besides, the additional cost is a drop in the proverbial bucket.
4. At the top levels, there probably was a bit of "let's show them" going on. But I suspect it was as much a coincidence as anything else, with #1 above leading the "rational" reasons list. The hydrazine tank story just made for the best PR.
The meek may inherit the earth, but the strong shall take the stars.
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