Slashdot Mirror
New SQL Injection Attack Fuses Malware, Phishing
PainMeds tips a recent post in Secure Computing's research blog describing a new SQL injection attack that had infected thousands of MSSQL-based web servers by last weekend, turning them into malware delivery systems. The attack apparently rewrites the server's Web pages to include JavaScript which pushes malware to the visitor as if it were from the genuine site. Sites using Sybase might possibly be vulnerable, as it uses the same exploited syntax that MSSQL does. The post includes an example of the attack. Unlike most malware attacks, this one appears to originate from the site the user is actually visiting. From the blog: "'Similar to phishing, this attack takes advantage of the website visitor's trust in the site they are visiting. Instead of phishing for information, however, malware is sent to the client, which the client has a higher likelihood of accepting being from a trusted site... These web pages are associated with Web sites from around the world and supplying various content — including government sites, sales sites, real estate sites, and financial information sites among others."
Comment removed based on user account deletion
malware + phishing = phalware?
The Olympics are trying to hack your webserver?
I wasn't aware that Server CTF was an Olympic sport.
If I have nothing to hide, don't search me
This attack has been going on for months... http://hackademix.net/2008/04/26/mass-attack-faq/
You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.
You'd have to be an idiot programmer to have a site succumb to this... It's not even "microsoft specific".
It would affect any site that takes request parameters and passes them straight through to the db engine (well, not specifically this syntax, but the concept behind the attack).
To be fair to Microsoft (heresy here, I know) asp.net built-in validation throws an exception.
In other words, not only would a programmer have to use raw request string data with the db, he would also have had to specifically disabled the default page validation. In other words, an idiot.
My website got hit with this type of attack last week, and the attempts were all rejected by the default validation. Even if the default validation had got past, all of the database queries use parameterized stored procedure calls which pretty much ignore this kind of crap anyway.
Still, it's made me think more about security and additional parameter validation. Maybe the next attack will be a bit sneakier..
We were added to the attack list a few weeks back, and one of our largest, most popular websites was hit. Apparently, the developers had never thought to sanitize their data, and we had multiple vulnerabilities throughout the site.
I implemented a transparent reverse proxy server running Apache with mod_security that helped prevent further attacks from getting through, but the developers finally saw the error of their ways and converted hundreds of inline SQL calls into stored procedures.
Since we were added to "the list", I've been seeing the same attack happen across multiple pages every 20 seconds, so they are definitely not letting up anytime soon.
Why do you assume all code is new. Many SQL Calls are decades old and were copied and pasted assumed what isn't broke don't fix. Not really taking into account that the interface is not controlled by the server anymore. But can be easily altered by the client. being that the bug is threw Microsoft SQL there is a higher chance that it is threw Mr. Certified .NET Developer who knows .NET but has now clue on how the web works so he assumes that if he puts a size limit on that textbox or make important fields hidden he is safe. As well a bunch of people have a poor understanding on how to use SQL, they just think it is bit more optimized version of a flat file. Where the hard stuff are using joins. So they figure well this data isn't that important.
If something is so important that you feel the need to post it on the internet... It probably isn't that important.
This trojan, called Asprox or Danmec, has been around for a few years. It was originally intended as a Spam distribution system but I believe that sometime in 2007 an SQL Injection tool was installed via its botnet. It has been doing the rounds every so often on the Internet since at least January.
http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1122
http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/danmecasprox/?threat=danmecasprox
-dZ.
Carol vs. Ghost
There is also deliberate gross misconduct. A lot of the code is written by outsourced divisions, I-9 lackeys, or contractors who will be long gone by the time someone discovers the SQL injection bug. Most companies don't pay for audits of their Web code, nor do they care to.
Sad thing is that MS is doing their best to prevent this, but they still get blamed for what their customers do (or fail to do.)
Don't blame the contractors, If they mess up it is usually do to bad management on the company. Having worked as a contractor/consultant I can tell you when there is good management at the company I produce really good work. When there is bad management my work isn't that great. The case of leaving a bug and being long gone has a flaw. Because people want return business and a good name. Doing a Hit and run of coding doesn't allow for a good professional credentials. But with contractors they are often under the gun far more then W2 employees to be cost efficient, any work they do needs to be approved as the company doesn't want to pay for extra non-speced work, and if that spec doesn't cover SQL injections or security and they do the right thing and bring it up, bad management will say it isn't an issue and just do what is speced, thus causing the problem. If they did go and take an extra 4 hours to make it secure they will not get paid for it. If the manager was smart and listed to the advice then good quality code can be released.
If something is so important that you feel the need to post it on the internet... It probably isn't that important.
Many SQL Calls are decades old and were copied and pasted assumed what isn't broke don't fix.
All too true. My company maintains some sites that were originally written during the 90s by a different web consulting company. The sites were happily chugging along and serving up pages for upwards of 10 years, until last weekend when they were hit with the exact attack described in this article. Fortunately, the attack was noticed early and we were able to fix the problem quickly, resulting in a minimal impact on our client's users.
I wasn't involved much with the emergency fixes, but our team ended up installing a product called dotDefender that seems to have done a fantastic job of filtering out malicious requests. It inspects GET and POST data _before_ it's passed on to the vulnerable application and stops the request if it detects things like SQL injection, cross-site scripting, directory traversal, or other attacks. If you use IIS6 and have a lot of vulnerable code; or, like us, some of the bad code is contained within compiled libraries for which you don't possess the original source, I'd definitely recommend checking it out.
Alternatively, there's a free ISAPI filter that will perform similar pre-application-level checking of GET and POST data, though I believe it only checks for SQL injection, and I can't vouch for it since I've never seen it in action.
Unfortunately, I don't believe either of these solutions work with IIS7, so if your sites run on IIS7, I wish you luck!
@ASP.NET's parent-teacher meeting: "Little Johnny.NET is very bright, but he doesn't play well with others."
More likely to work:
del c:\boot.ini
Then, next time it's rebooted... it doesn't come up. It's not something noticeable right away.
For large sets, this will be our guide even unto death, for the LORD will work for each type of data it is applied to...
Don't blame management. If you were asked to make a kid's toy, would you ask 'do you want it the safe way, which will cost an extra $5 per unit, or do you want the cheap way?'.
You are a professional, it is your job to produce software that meets professional standards. If others screw up, fine, but don't deliver an unsafe product just because nobody told you to make it safe.
Let's see who's laughing when the Political Correctness brigade catch up with the Gregorian Calendar and hold it to task for picking on poor, old February.
You sound like a very competent developer. Too bad you will never contract at the company I work for (and many others I know of) because the management can't be convinced that using fixed bid doesn't limit liability. They continue to bid out work - fixed bid only - pay for that project, get a pile of garbage delivered, then pay more to get it fixed. I've given up that fight a while ago.
878659 - yep its prime.
As a contractor myself, here's how that scenario sometimes goes:
* Client requests bid for web project
* I produce bid for web project, allowing for secure practices
* Client thinks bid is "high", requests task itemization
* Upon further review, some involved employee of client asks "What would this part cost without all that secure coding stuff?"
* Regardless of my answer, the client responds "We don't need that, redo the bid without it"
* Attempting to "hide" the extra work in the itemization is dishonest, and the likely result is that someone else will get the work, or the client will decide not to do the work
* I can turn down an otherwise good contract, or I can produce insecure web pages; nice choice, that
Sometimes the best you can do is document the client's intent to cut corners.
- T