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Google's Obfuscated TCP

agl42 writes "Obfuscated TCP attempts to provide a cheap opportunistic encryption scheme for HTTP. Though SSL has been around for years, most sites still don't use it by default. By providing a less secure, but computationally and administratively cheaper, method of encryption, we might be able to increase the depressingly small fraction of encrypted traffic on the Internet. There's an introduction video explaining it."

18 of 392 comments (clear)

  1. Firefox isn't helping by vux984 · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Firefox isn't helping the lack of SSL on the web by throwing a ridiculous warning when using self signed certs. Browsers should treat self signed certs as 'unsigned with the added bonus that communications can't be eavesdropped' instead of freaking out that you might not know who you are talking too.

    self signed certs aren't appropriate for processing credit cards... but not every site that has forms needs that... and simply removing eavesdroppers would be a step in the right direction.

    1. Re:Firefox isn't helping by Free+the+Cowards · · Score: 4, Insightful

      The point being that this is the actual security hierarchy, from best to worst:

      1. SSL with cert signed by a trusted certificate authority
      2. SSL with self-signed cert
      3. Plain HTTP

      Whereas most web browsers make it appear like this:

      1. SSL with cert signed by a trusted certificate authority
      2. Plain HTTP
      3. SSL with self-signed cert

      Any browser that warns you about self-signed certs should make at least as much of a fuss about using plain HTTP, but they don't. Firefox takes it to ridiculous extremes but they're all faulty in this respect.

      And really, if browsers would save the self-signed cert and then alert me if it changes the way SSH does, then the result will be very good, nearly as good as a regular cert (and potentially even better, since there's no potential for compromising the trusted certificate authority).

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    2. Re:Firefox isn't helping by Zadaz · · Score: 4, Insightful

      Whereas self-signed certs let the eavesdropper send you a certificate which makes you think your connection is secure when in reality they're listening to everything you send.

      aka: "Whereas having a keyed lock on your door lets a thief pick the lock and steal everything inside."

      Therefore we should make it less convenient to put locks on doors.

    3. Re:Firefox isn't helping by QuasiEvil · · Score: 5, Insightful

      SSL without a trusted certificate provides NO additional security over communicating in the clear. AT ALL.

      Bzzzt, wrong, thanks for playing.

      Yes, the man in the middle attack is very real. However, it takes a great deal more work to set up than a simple sniffer, because you have to either capture/block/proxy/rewrite packets so that each side thinks it's speaking with the other, or spoof the DNS somehow.

      On the other hand, a simple network sniffer can capture almost everything send in the clear, no special network tricks needed.

      Authentication requires encryption. Encryption does not require authentication, but should then be considered somewhere between truly secure and just wide open. Call it a nice-to-have that prevents casual sniffers from picking up passwords to your home server, reading your webmail, and the like.

      Your assertion assumes that there are no casual crackers/script kiddies out there who won't immediately escalate to some invasive and rather difficult MITM attack, or that sniffing is not a real danger. I'd argue that 90% of the insidious activity comes from just sniffing cleartext off the wire, and that more sophisticated attacks are significantly rarer. Encrypting the over the wire traffic is a way of mitigating a significant portion of that risk.

    4. Re:Firefox isn't helping by Free+the+Cowards · · Score: 5, Insightful

      So stop displaying the lock symbol! Nothing requires you to treat "real" SSL and self-signed SSL identically. It should be obvious that the current standard approach of making them look exactly the same except for a scary warning that appears the first time you hit a self-signed site is broken. But nobody cares about doing better because it's the "standard".

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    5. Re:Firefox isn't helping by vux984 · · Score: 5, Insightful

      Most users are too dumb to check for SSL, good luck getting them to discern insecure, 'insecure but can't be eavesdropped', and secure.

      Fair enough. So don't put the secure green lock up for self signed SSL. Put up a totally different icon in some neutral color like blue. If they click on it it says, the connection is encrypted and can't be eavesdropped but there is no gaurantee you are talking to who you think you are.

      Hell, most users would be shocked to find out you can eavesdrop on their traffic in the first place.

      Good point! Maybe firefox 3 should pop up a huge error screen every time you try to connect to a site with plain http. It could say something like:

      The server you are connecting to is insecure. Maybe there is a configuration error on the server. Or maybe someone is trying to impersonate it. Oh, and by the way, not only that, but any communication with them maybe trivially intercepted by any 3rd party...

      Are you sure you want to communicate with them?

      Then it could have friendly buttons like:

      "Hell no get me out of here." or "Ok, I don't mind getting pnwed!"

    6. Re:Firefox isn't helping by KermodeBear · · Score: 5, Insightful

      I dunno. I just click "Okay" until the windows go away and I can see the website.

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  2. surveillance by TheSHAD0W · · Score: 4, Insightful

    The video starts out saying that increased encryption is needed thanks in part to warrantless government surveillance. It then goes on to describe a system that assumes no MITM attacks can exist. The fact is, however, that governments are entirely capable of performing MITM attacks, as can telecommunications companies; and if it becomes popular we may see more techniques that allow individuals to perform MITM attacks. While this algorithm has significant merit, care needs to be taken to avoid a false sense of security.

    1. Re:surveillance by Free+the+Cowards · · Score: 4, Insightful

      It does not "assume no MITM attacks can exist". It deliberately does not protect against them. This is not the same thing, as one is a position of ignorance whereas the other is an intentional choice not to defend against that threat.

      In practical terms, MITM is considerably harder than simply listening in. Wide-scale surveillance such as what caused the big recent flap with FISA and the NSA simply can't perform MITM attacks. Protecting against pure eavesdropping while remaining open to MITM attacks is useful, it's just not a 100% solution. As long as it doesn't sell itself as one (and I see no indication that it is) then there's absolutely no problem with that.

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  3. Trusts DNS instead of CA signature by mikenap · · Score: 5, Insightful

    So, basically we have the same concept as SSL, except instead of trusting the CA signature on the certificate, we trust DNS.

    Forging a CA signature on a certificate would be a BIG DEAL.
    Forging a DNS entry, especially with ISP cooperation(read government snooping), is DEAD SIMPLE.

    So we replace real security with, well, a CPU hog that's only a smidge better than running everything in the clear. It only keeps out the MOST casual, lazy, and uninterested snooper.

  4. Re:Problem isn't computation... by this+great+guy · · Score: 4, Insightful
    You have 2 solutions:
    • Run your websites on different ports, you have 65535 of them per IP. Make http://site1/ redirect to https://site1:1111/, http://site2/ redirect to https://site2:2222/, etc. I concede this prevents users from directly typing the https url in their address bar as they don't know the port number in advance, but again 99% of the users let themselves be redirected to the https content on most websites anyway (except paranoids like me :P).
    • Use certs with the "subjectAltName" X.509 extension that let you create a single cert valid for multiple DNS names. I do this (with a CA I created & control), it works very well. The downside is that I think commercial CAs make you pay extra bucks to sign such certs (if they even accept to do that).

    Anybody remembers what hapenned to RFC 2817 ? It tried to address this very pb by introducing the "Upgrade: TLS/1.0" header and the "426 Upgrade Required" status code, but I don't think any browser or server implement them.

  5. Re:The implications? by 19thNervousBreakdown · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Implications?

    but it can assuage untargeted, dragnet sniffing of backbones

    Can you read the subtext there? Snap, how's that for an implication? Privacy. (from the government.)

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  6. Re:Problem isn't computation... by pv2b · · Score: 4, Insightful

    Running your web sites on non-standard ports is a great way for your web site not to be accessible to users accessing the internet through firewalls that limit egress traffic based on TCP destination ports.

  7. Re:The implications? by NFN_NLN · · Score: 4, Insightful

    It may be slightly off-topic but the parent has a VERY valid point. Self-signed sites are encrypted but best of luck trying to get people to use them thanks to the 3-clicks required and SMALL text. When I used the new firefox release I was even confused at first.

    Now back to obfuscated TCP: This is on par with using NAT to fix the lack of IP addresses. Just fix the damn thing properly and stop screwing around with time wasting half-fixes (yeah they admitted it).

    About the only thing this is going to do is make troubleshooting problems with Ethereal or other packet sniffers a pain in the a$$. Thanks.

  8. Re:Problem isn't computation... by enoz · · Score: 4, Insightful

    For a public site using non-standard ports is an easy method to shoot yourself in the foot - you immediately block all users behind proxies or firewalls that only allow communication on "standard" web ports.

  9. Re:The implications? by BitHive · · Score: 4, Insightful

    This is stupid. Nobody crawls the web by sniffing traffic. Google and everyone else connects to webservers the same way you do. For your post to make any sense we have to assume that this would make sites using Obfuscated TCP inaccessible by default, which goes against its entire design philosophy.

  10. Arrgghh! No more videos! by Anonymous Coward · · Score: 5, Insightful

    If you watch the "video"

    If you watch the video, your brain will leak out through your ears. It's terrible. Why produce a video which seems to be a black screen with a dark blue line wiggling when the person talks? Why pick a person with a crappy British accent and a speech impediment? Who's going to understand? Why flash up a couple of words here and there like "SSL" and "HTTP"? Why produce such a steaming pile of crap and call it an "introductory video"?

    Instead, whoever is the video star in this could have written down their ideas in plain text. That would allow for easy reading and comprehension by people all over the world. Maybe I can read quickly. Maybe I don't want to sit around waiting for you to lisp and stammer through your presentation. Maybe I'd understand it better if I read it than if I heard it on a crappy video. Maybe I don't want to waste my bandwidth downloading several megabytes of video, where the same information in plain text might be a few kilobytes.

  11. Re:The implications? by pipatron · · Score: 4, Insightful

    you're [sic] traffic's still encrypted and secure from eavesdropping

    Except from the party that did the MITM attack, which is most often the party that you want to prevent watching your traffic, you know, the one that is actually interested in sniffing your traffic..

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