Slashdot Mirror
Schneier on Security
brothke writes "There is a perception in both the
private and government sector, that security, both physical and digital, is
something you can buy. Witness the mammoth growth of airport security
products following 9/11, and the sheer number of vendors at security
conferences. With that, government officials and corporate executives
often think you can simply buy products and magically get instant security by
flipping on the switch. The reality is that security is not something
you can buy; it is something you must get." Keep reading for the rest of Ben's review.
Schneier on Security
author
Bruce Schneier
pages
336
publisher
Wiley
rating
10
reviewer
Ben Rothke
ISBN
978-0470395356
summary
The best articles from one of security's best
Perhaps no one in the world
gets security like author Bruce Schneier does. Schneier is a
person who I am proud to have as a colleague [Schneier and I
are both employed by the same parent company, but work in different divisions,
in different parts of the country]. Schneier on Security is a
collection of the best articles that Bruce has written from June 2002 to June
2008, mainly from his
Crypto-Gram
Newsletter, his
blog,
and other newspapers and magazine. The book is divided into 12 sections,
covering nearly the entire range of security issues from terrorism, aviation,
elections, economics, psychology, the business of security and much
more.
Two of the terms Schneier uses extensively throughout the book are intelligence and economics. From an intelligence perspective, he feels that Washington has spent far too much on hardware and other trendy security devices that create a sense of security theater. The security theater gives an aura and show of security, but in reality, has little real effect.
The lack of intelligence is most manifest with airports, which are a perfect example of misguided security. Schneier notes that current trends in US airport security requires that people remove their shoes, due to a one-time incident with shoe-based explosive. Such an approach completely misses the point. Also, Schneier notes that the attempt to create a no-fly list, by feeding a limited set of characteristics into a computer, which is somehow expected to divine a person's terrorist leaning, is farcical.
Schneier therefore feels that the only way to effectively uncover terrorist plats is via intelligence and investigations, not via large-scale processing of everyone. Intelligence is an invaluable tool against terrorism, and the beauty of it is that it works regardless of what the terrorists are plotting. The bottom line according to Schneier in the book is that too much of the United State's counterterrorism security spending is not designed to protect us from the terrorists; but instead to protect public officials from criticism when another attack occurs.
Schneier also astutely notes that for the most part, security is not really so much of a technical issue, rather one of economics. A perfect example he gives is that of bulletproof vests. Since they are so effective, why doesn't everyone wear them all of the time? The reason people don't is that they do not think they are worth the cost. It is not worth the money or inconvenience, as the risk of being shot for most people is quite low. As a security consumer, people have made the calculation that not wearing a bulletproof vest is a good security trade-off. Schneier also notes that much of what is being proposed as national security is a bad security trade-off. It is not worth it and as consumers, the public is being ripped off.
Another recurring theme throughout the book is how the Bush administration has little by little eroded the Constitution, all in the name of fighting terrorism. Schneier notes that the brilliant framework the founding fathers created by creating divisions of power (executive, legislative, judicial) with checks and balances violates a basic unwritten rule, that the government should be granted only limited powers, and for limited purposes. Since there is a certainty that government powers will be abused.
Schneier observes that the USA PATRIOT is a perfect example of this abuse. The Constitution was designed and carefully outlines which powers each branch may exercise. While Schneier is best-known as a cryptographer and security expert, Schneier on Security also shows him to be a defender of the Constitution. In a number of essays in the book, he shows how unchecked presidential powers is bad not only for security, but for the preservation of democracy.
In chapter 8, on the topic of the economics of security, Schneier suggests a three-step program for improving computer and network security. He notes that none of them have anything to do with technology; they all have to do with businesses, economics, and people.
In chapter 9, on the psychology of security, Schneier writes that he tells people that if something is in the news, then they do not have to worry about it. He writes that the very definition of news is something that hardly ever happens. It's when something is not in the news, when it is so common that it is no longer news, drunk drivers killing people, domestic violence, deaths from diabetes, etc., that is when you should start worrying. And much of the terrorist threats that the Department of Homeland Security is spending tens of billions of dollars on, are those news threats, such as shoe bombers and liquid explosives that present very little real threat to the people of the US.
A fundamental theme of the book is that security is a trade-off. And far too many people have made the security trade-off without thinking if it is truly worth it. In essay after essay, Schenier challenges those assertions. Since 9/11, much has been given up in the name of terrorism, and that has been personal privacy and security. Schenier asks, has it been worth it?
Schneier on Security is an exceptionally important book that is overflowing with thought-provoking articles. Schneier gets above vague adages such as the war on terror and gets to the heart of the matter. His insight details what the real threats are, and what we should really be worrying about. The irony is that what Washington does is often the exact opposite of what should be done.
Much of the security carried out in the name of 9/11 has proven to be infective in the seven years since the attack. Schneier on Security is a manifesto of what should have been done, and what should be done. The book is eye-opening from the first page to the last. It lets you know that the next time you see grandma asked to take her shoes off by a TSA agent at the airport, why she is simply a bit player in the large security theater. And why spending tens of billions on a charade like that, makes that a tragedy of epic proportions.
Ben Rothke is the author of Computer Security: 20 Things Every Employee Should Know.
You can purchase Schneier on Security from amazon.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
Two of the terms Schneier uses extensively throughout the book are intelligence and economics. From an intelligence perspective, he feels that Washington has spent far too much on hardware and other trendy security devices that create a sense of security theater. The security theater gives an aura and show of security, but in reality, has little real effect.
The lack of intelligence is most manifest with airports, which are a perfect example of misguided security. Schneier notes that current trends in US airport security requires that people remove their shoes, due to a one-time incident with shoe-based explosive. Such an approach completely misses the point. Also, Schneier notes that the attempt to create a no-fly list, by feeding a limited set of characteristics into a computer, which is somehow expected to divine a person's terrorist leaning, is farcical.
Schneier therefore feels that the only way to effectively uncover terrorist plats is via intelligence and investigations, not via large-scale processing of everyone. Intelligence is an invaluable tool against terrorism, and the beauty of it is that it works regardless of what the terrorists are plotting. The bottom line according to Schneier in the book is that too much of the United State's counterterrorism security spending is not designed to protect us from the terrorists; but instead to protect public officials from criticism when another attack occurs.
Schneier also astutely notes that for the most part, security is not really so much of a technical issue, rather one of economics. A perfect example he gives is that of bulletproof vests. Since they are so effective, why doesn't everyone wear them all of the time? The reason people don't is that they do not think they are worth the cost. It is not worth the money or inconvenience, as the risk of being shot for most people is quite low. As a security consumer, people have made the calculation that not wearing a bulletproof vest is a good security trade-off. Schneier also notes that much of what is being proposed as national security is a bad security trade-off. It is not worth it and as consumers, the public is being ripped off.
Another recurring theme throughout the book is how the Bush administration has little by little eroded the Constitution, all in the name of fighting terrorism. Schneier notes that the brilliant framework the founding fathers created by creating divisions of power (executive, legislative, judicial) with checks and balances violates a basic unwritten rule, that the government should be granted only limited powers, and for limited purposes. Since there is a certainty that government powers will be abused.
Schneier observes that the USA PATRIOT is a perfect example of this abuse. The Constitution was designed and carefully outlines which powers each branch may exercise. While Schneier is best-known as a cryptographer and security expert, Schneier on Security also shows him to be a defender of the Constitution. In a number of essays in the book, he shows how unchecked presidential powers is bad not only for security, but for the preservation of democracy.
In chapter 8, on the topic of the economics of security, Schneier suggests a three-step program for improving computer and network security. He notes that none of them have anything to do with technology; they all have to do with businesses, economics, and people.
In chapter 9, on the psychology of security, Schneier writes that he tells people that if something is in the news, then they do not have to worry about it. He writes that the very definition of news is something that hardly ever happens. It's when something is not in the news, when it is so common that it is no longer news, drunk drivers killing people, domestic violence, deaths from diabetes, etc., that is when you should start worrying. And much of the terrorist threats that the Department of Homeland Security is spending tens of billions of dollars on, are those news threats, such as shoe bombers and liquid explosives that present very little real threat to the people of the US.
A fundamental theme of the book is that security is a trade-off. And far too many people have made the security trade-off without thinking if it is truly worth it. In essay after essay, Schenier challenges those assertions. Since 9/11, much has been given up in the name of terrorism, and that has been personal privacy and security. Schenier asks, has it been worth it?
Schneier on Security is an exceptionally important book that is overflowing with thought-provoking articles. Schneier gets above vague adages such as the war on terror and gets to the heart of the matter. His insight details what the real threats are, and what we should really be worrying about. The irony is that what Washington does is often the exact opposite of what should be done.
Much of the security carried out in the name of 9/11 has proven to be infective in the seven years since the attack. Schneier on Security is a manifesto of what should have been done, and what should be done. The book is eye-opening from the first page to the last. It lets you know that the next time you see grandma asked to take her shoes off by a TSA agent at the airport, why she is simply a bit player in the large security theater. And why spending tens of billions on a charade like that, makes that a tragedy of epic proportions.
Ben Rothke is the author of Computer Security: 20 Things Every Employee Should Know.
You can purchase Schneier on Security from amazon.com. Slashdot welcomes readers' book reviews -- to see your own review here, read the book review guidelines, then visit the submission page.
Two things:
First, Van Gogh painted Bruce Schneier's portrait over a hundred years ago.
Well ok, that's not Bruce but it sure looks like him, doesn't it? The linked picture is a Van Gogh self-portrait.
Secondly, I want to point to an afterward to Cory Doctorow's Little Brother. Bruce Schneier writes:
That's just a snippet, as the book is one long HTML page do a word search on "Bruce Schneier" to find the afterword.
Free Martian Whores!
The price is usually money, time, emotional energy, study, and perhaps reduced functionality.
Then again, that's probably the point of the book.
Knowledge is how to play a game, intelligence is how to win, wisdom is knowing what game to play.
If Chuck Norris tried to break Bruce Schneier's security, what would happen?
Fascism starts when the efficiency of the government becomes more important than the rights of the people.
Everything he talks about is just dealing with the symptoms. Terrorism is a symptom of very desperate people who feel that they're being shit on by someone.
I've been thinking about terrorism lately and its causes and its implementers. most terrorism is centered on what's happening in the Middle East. Now before someone accuses me of being anti-Islamic or racist or whatever, hear me out.
Terrorism is the result of very desperate people who have lost all hope and feel powerless. The Middle East and its people have been shit on for a couple of millennia; whether by western powers, other in the Middle East (Persians and Turks), Asians. These are people who have felt shit on by the World and there's nothing they can do about it. The creation of Israel was the straw that broke the camels back - so to speak.
To make a long story short, if we gave autonomy to the Middle east (Oil supplies be damned!), meaning pull out completely. I think terrorism would stop or at the very least, decrease dramatically.
I also disagree with folks who think that if we were to leave the Middle East, others would gain control of the Oil thereby sending us into a depression or putting our military and defense in jeopardy. It won't happen.
He simply decrypts the truth.
Educating users is probabaly the easiest and cheapest way to reduce risk. It doesn't cost a lot of money or take a lot of time. The problem is most companies just don't do it. You might be looking at a cost of $100 per employee per year and 30 minutes to an hour to take a class.
Most companies mention it during orientation but never provide on-going training or support to their employees when it comes to security issues. In this case the infosec team needs to get out of their cubes and walk around and talk to people to be sure they can advise fellow employees on security risks and get the lowdown on which manager proposed something stupid this week. 90% of the security teams job should be education be it educating developers, system admins, general counsel, marketing, exec admins, or the board of directors.
People who bite the hand that feeds them usually lick the boot that kicks them
Maybe in the military or in geek super spook krad fantasy land. In the real world of business there is little to no impact to a business as a whole over any security breaches. The public record is replete with examples of businesses who seriously dropped the security ball but the effect was about as dramatic as a bug getting squished on the corporate windshield. Sure there's some goo to wipe off but the car doesn't slow down.
Microsoft, Netscape, credit card processors, insurance companies, civil administrations, many companies have slacked in their security but the worst that happened was a few negative articles in the press that were soon forgotten.
Find just one company that was shut down or went out of business because of a security breach. You just can't do it. Execs rarely even get fired over this stuff.
That's why businesses continue to have poor security. It's just not worth it. You just have to manage it, like everything else.