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A Cheap, Distributed Zero-Day Defense?
coondoggie writes "Shutting down zero-day computer attacks could be carried out inexpensively by peer-to-peer software that shares information about anomalous behavior, say researchers at the University of California at Davis.The software would interact with existing personal firewalls and intrusion detection systems to gather data about anomalous behavior, says Senthil Cheetancheri, the lead researcher on the project he undertook as a grad student at UC Davis from 2004 to 2007. He now works for SonicWall."
If you could break into that process, you could rule the world.
Oliver's law of assumed responsibility: If you're seen fixing it, you will be blamed for breaking it.
Six Inches of Air?
Zhrodague.net - I do projects and stuff too.
On the face of it, it sounds like he's proposing a "trusted" infection vector. A way to distributed code intended to patch holes to systems that want it. The obvious problem with such a system is the consequences of it being compromised. Then it becomes a way to distribute malicious code much more effectively than the way bot-nets infect new hosts now.
When information is power, privacy is freedom.
What is the zero-day defense protocol for the zero-day defense software?
I have to giggle whenever someone thinks they need some sort of Verizon High Speed Internet CD to use the internet.
It's almost as funny as the people who use AOL because it is the "internet" even though they are just hooked into a router and cable modem like everyone else. - this used to be acceptable when people used AOL's dialup service (or shudder- continue to use it)
"It depends on the number of events and the number of computers polled, but if there is a sufficient number of such samples, you can say with some degree of certainty that it is a worm,â Cheetancheri says. For that decision, the software uses a well-established statistical technique called sequential hypothesis testing, he says"
I'm also skeptical that you could rely on a vast network of machines that have presumably fallen prey to an attack to share information between each other fast enough to correctly diagnose an attack with the kind of results the researcher seems hopeful of.
Given that no method for correctly identifying "malicious" code 100% of the time currently exists, I don't think it's wise to allow a software program to run with the decision of shutting a machine down on notice of a perceived threat.
The concept seems like an interesting idea, but I doubt It could be terribly effective in practice.
while I don't agree with the way this was put, I do agree that if this lady wasn't smart enough to due to research and double check her order before pushing "check out" then its not really Ubuntu's fault she bought some thing that does not meet her requirements.
Yeah, I've got nothing...
Comment removed based on user account deletion
User education.
Question everything
Who watches the watchers?
Any system like this would be a premium cracker target. All it would take is one false positive or false negative before no one would trust it again.
Six months later, some other researcher would make a new proposal for a p2p system to guard the broken p2p system.
Infuriate left and right
Yes, I'll agree the article isn't revealing. The difference between our work and "Autograph" type approaches that WormShield builds on is that we are doing traffic anomaly detection and these more involved approaches attempt to automatically build a signature. The paper is available (only, sigh) from Springer, in "Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection 11th International Symposium", RAID 2008, Cambridge, MA, USA. -JMA