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Users' Admin Logins Make Most Windows Malware Worse
nandemoari writes "A new analysis claims that over 90% of the Windows security vulnerabilities reported last year were made worse by users logged in with administrative privileges — an issue Microsoft has been hotly debating recently. According to BeyondTrust Corp., the result of the analysis of the 154 critical Microsoft vulnerabilities indicated that a full 92% could have been prevented if users were not logged into their systems with administrator status. BTC believes that restricting the number of users who can log in with these privileges will 'close the window of opportunity' for attackers. This is particularly true for users of Internet Explorer and Microsoft Office."
Would you like to install a virus? [Cancel/Allow]
Not running as a fully-privileged user reduces your security risk? Who knew!
This is not news. The question is why it hasn't been meaningfully addressed in Windows for such a long time.
To fight the war on terror, stop being afraid.
sudo apt-get with the times, microsoft!
-I only code in BASIC.-
The vulnerability is in Windows 7's UAC, not Vista's, so that part of the story is not only wrong but a dupe of the previous "UAC vulnerability" article. As for the rest of the story, it's just marketing copy for BeyondTrust Corp. Congratulations samzenpus, you've posted perhaps the first article that's wrong, dupe, blogspam, and slashvertisement all at the same time!
The history and culture of Windows is at least as responsible for the "run as root" problem as any shortcomings, and there were many over the years, in the OS itself and although Windows OSes has progressively improved security over the years there is only so much to be done, on any system, when users have been trained to run as root and click "yes" everytime. Of course, malicious programs like downadup and the infamous ClickYesToContinue ActiveX certificate debacle don't help matters.
What's really annoying is that too many programs still insist on "administrator" privileges for installation. Installation needs to be a far more contained process, with limited authority. Most applications don't really need the ability to manipulate elements of the system outside their own directory subtree and their own subtree of the Registry. Installation of "normal" applications (especially games) should be contained accordingly. Most applications are, in a security sense, "leaf nodes"; nothing else depends on them. But Microsoft doesn't make that distinction. (Nor do most Linux application installers, even though Linux/UNIX doesn't have the registry issues that Windows does.)
What they need to do is limit all users to not be administrators. They should create the admin account so that it can ONLY do admin tasks. It cannot run programs like office or games. It can only run security and diagnostic apps, adding-remove apps. If they restricted admin users from using their account for daily use and only for admin use, that would significantly reduce the attack surface for crackers.
Or you could use a modern antivirus like antivirus2009
It stops everything.
Help stamp out iliturcy.
Lame blogs aside, The Fucking Article is damn near worthless. Highlights include:
In conclusion: Running everything with admin privileges is bad, which is why Microsoft fixed this 2 years ago with UAC. It's a lame PR piece about an equally lame study from a company that wants to sell you stuff to do things that MS did years ago. If you are here reading Slashdot, there's nothing here you didn't already know.
Problem is that they assume that when the security bulletin says that successful exploitation will allow the attacker to run as the current user, this does not mean that the attacker will be able to run as admin, even though the user is an admin.
Indeed (with UAC on) IE7 runs in protected mode which is a "sandbox" where the users' security tokens have very limited rights, thus intrinsically protecting the OS.
The Vista protected mode effectively runs the process as a limited user, even though it preserves the users identity.
Even if the attacker can somehow trick the browser or user into downloading a malicious file and start it, it will still need elevation (yes, the cancel/allow thingy) to assert admin privileges.
So, another way to spin this would be "Vista UAC protects against exploitation of 92% of vulnerabilities".
Reading slashdot one-liner: (irm http://rss.slashdot.org/Slashdot/slashdot).rdf.item | fl title,desc*
I swear those guys are like that guy who just installed Linux, runs it as root all the time because he "knows what (he's) doing" and enables telnet and hands out logins to all his friends. Except that guy learns after the first or second time his system gets rooted that maybe he should stop being such a goddamn jackass and run his system the right way from now on. Microsoft never got past the jackass phase. They keep implementing half-assed fixes because they think they can do it better. You'd think 30 years of failure would convince them otherwise...
I'm trying to teach myself to set people on fire with my mind... Is it hot in here?
I am sure this is not news to anyone whether you love or hate Microsoft. The fact is the coding practices commonly followed under DOS and then under Windows have been rather poor. The reasons for it are many, but largely because of a thirst for performance. But in order to keep people hooked on Windows, they have to keep supporting the mistakes of others as well as their own. This is what they call "backward compatibility."
But there is a way out of it and for some reason they seem unwilling to do it. Write a new OS, virtualize old Windows for "legacy support" and eventually all the software vendors will port their code to work with the new Microsoft OS natively just as they did with Mac OS X. I can't imagine why Microsoft is unwilling to do that... got any suggestions anyone?
I have been suggesting this for years. Enterprise (Microsoft's most important customer base), in general, does NOT want it. Seemingly they want the 'good ole' x86 to live forever and Windows to run programs written for DOS 5.0 even in 2009 and beyond. Ridiculous, but it is true.
If you are a business who relies upon some certain software to get work done and do NOT have the time, money or resources to switch to something else, it is in your interest to demand your software vendor (in this case Microsoft) NOT to remove compatibility for X application.
If you look at the Windows 2000 leaked source code, you can find plenty of comments about VERY specific application fixes. Yes, XP broke stuff. Vista broke more. But it probably did not break what the enterprises care about (Vista likely did break many things, hence why 7 is being rushed and so many enterprises skipped Vista and will go to 7 after some extensive testing).
Today I experienced a game that does not work on Vista. Microids' Corsairs from 1998, made for Windows 9x. Tried compatibility modes, the latest patches, etc. It just kept crashing. Microsoft does not care about your 'classic' games at all. All they care about is the enterprises who actually buy the expensive volume licenses Microsoft is always trying to sell.
A Mac fan extolling the merits of the command line.
It's going to take some time to get used to. Forgive me.
Help stamp out iliturcy.
But Valve will go after you for trying.
My question:
Customer 06/11/2006 04:15 AM
I am not willing to play (and let other people play) HL2 using the Admin account on my computer because of the obvious security implications (I don't want my computer infested with malware).
Is there any way to run it without admin privileges? I installed it using admin privileges and went back to my unprivileged account but turns out it needs to write data to the install folder (bad programmer - no donut for you).
Which are the files STEAM tries to write to in the install folder?
If it turns out to be too complicated I'll just download the no-steam version with BitTorrent ;-).
Their response:
Response (Josh) 06/13/2006 01:34 PM
Thiago, It cannot be run without admin privileges. I know you were probably joking, but I would also encourage you to avoid any product that claims to get around Steam. We take cheating and hacking very seriously.
of road warriors, bluetooth, pirate WAPs, Promiscuous mode, and a lot of other modern technologies. Your network is not the hallowed ground you think it is.
The only trusted host on the network is a Known Host with a secure connection. Ever and always. There is no excuse for having open ports ever, let alone by default on a desktop, unless you intend to deliver a service on that port to untrusted strangers.
This has been common knowledge and best practice for at least 15 years.
Help stamp out iliturcy.
It's a combination of ignorant users and ignorant IT people. I've never seen a single IT person use "runas" (impersonation), ACLs on the Windows file system or registry or and this is the damning one, a command line utility that allows you to selectively strip administrative rights on applications as you use them thatâ(TM)s been on Microsoftâ(TM)s site for years (after I pointed it out to them).
There was a reason once upon a time Microsoft chose to release Windows XP in such a way as to have users running with administrative rights. A reason that is extremely weak now - many people were upgrading to Windows XP from Windows 9x/ME and Microsoft didn't want to incur the support cost (or their partners) of having lots of applications stop working. Among them is the popular WinAmp. It used ancient APIs for its configuration file, WINAMP.INI, that stored global preferential data (as opposed to per user) in C:\WINDOWS\WINAMP.INI. If you didn't have administrative rights, it would just hang when you fired it up. Google Desktop when first released would *NOT* work on a non-administrative desktop. The list of offending applications goes on and on, e.g., a friend of mine had oceanic navigation software that insisted running with admin rights.
However, it turns out there is a programmatic mechanism in place in every copy of Windows XP (and Windows 2000) that allows you to strip administrative rights when you launch a process. Microsoft never exposed users to this ability for reasons that to this day are unclear to me. The magic API in question is CreateRestrictedToken.
But what really was an eye opener to me is when I would point out a tool on Microsoft's site to strip out administrative rights when you run a program. Namely, years ago you could have made the situation tenable in the case of apps like WinAmp and Google Desktop by yes, logging onto your desktop as an administrator but launching most Internet facing application without administrative rights but hereâ(TM)s the clincher *AND NOT CHANGING USERS* . In fact, I've been doing this for years.
Nonetheless I observed an incredible amount of laziness on IT professionals when I pointed out these capabilities. Laziness, apathy and the usual suspect of insecurity ("Don't tell me what to do, I know what I'm doing"). Yes, that's right, you manage a CISCO PIX firewall, you must be a security guru all around and follow best practices.
So given my former life as a Windows software developer I took it upon myself to create a turn key installer that at least protects Jane & Joe Average called *RemoveAdmin*:
http://www.download.com/RemoveAdmin/3000-2381_4-10824971.html?tag=lst-1&cdlPid=10835515
RemoveAdmin is a utility to strip administrative rights off apps as they're launched under Windows XP and Windows 2000 where unfortunately 99.9% of home users run with administrative rights.
The default RemoveAdmin installer creates shortcuts for IE and Firefox but if you analyze the shortcut, you see IE and Firefox are passed as an argument to the removeAdmin.exe program.
You can trivially setup another shortcut for Opera and/or any other Internet facing application... as you should since you can't trust foreign computer systems you connect to.
Itâ(TM)s version 0.1 since I havenâ(TM)t created a FAQ and thereâ(TM)s the situation that if you have multiple administrative SIDs it wonâ(TM)t work (not the case for most people). I need to fix that, create a FAQ and also offer to adjust the ACLs on the Startup folder to tighten security such that when combined with RemoveAdmin, breaching your system on account of your browsing becomes because crazy hard.
I never thought of that. Windows is such a pain to use at all without the admin access that most people just shrug, set themselves up as a Power User just so they can use the damn thing.
But when you think about it, in the *nix community running as standard users is a staple...the norm if you will of computer operation. If you're logged on as "Bob" and you need the Admin-level access (install something, access a file that is not owned by your account, etc) you fire up "sudo" or a terminal window and SU it for a while.
If it's a nice graphical interface in either usage or installation...it'll even pop up and say "I'm sorry, you need admin access. Do you have the password?" And if you do then it'll just shrug and bloody well go and do it.
This is something that needs to be put in future versions of Windows. That and stop requiring The Sims 2 to have administrator access just so you can play paper dolls.
Phoenix
-- Wiccan Army, 13th Airborne Division "We will not fly silently into the night"
Did you setup the "MOM" account FIRST, before installing software as admin?
Eh???? Why would you have to install software second? At some point, you will want to add other users. Will they not be able to access the software?
I prefer the "u" in honour as it seems to be missing these days.
The reason why Windows is such a pain in the ass is because Windows was never designed for this.
Let's say I install OSX. The OSX app is self-contained, which means that it does not need anything outside of its circle.
Let's say that I install on Linux. The Linux app can either be installed locally per the user or for everybody. But it is a clear cut case.
Windows? WTF... I need to access the registry, the windows system directory, the program files directory, and the local user directory. It is a bleeding mess!
Microsoft to this day does not understand that the issue is the fact that they have not revamped the complete installation process. There is absolutely no need for Office, or any other application to need anything other the system files if it is running in "install to user" mode.
This is the problem, and until Microsoft understands that nothing will change.
"You can't make a race horse of a pig"
"No," said Samuel, "but you can make very fast pig"
The problem with your post is your assumption that the design of Windows makes sense, versus being organically tacked-on after the initial mistakes. Don't worry, it's a common misconception.
My blog. Good stuff (when I remember to update it). Read it.
I can't really think of anything to say, so I'm going to do the green thing.
This comment is made of approximately 80% recycled material(s?).
From TFA:
In other words, it's a dup of the recent disussion about the Security Hole In Windows 7 UAC.
Recycle your old comments here.
Random Thoughts From A Diseased Mind (Not For Dummies)