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A Secure OS For the Dalai Lama?
Jamyang (Greg Walton) writes "I am editor of the Infowar Monitor and co-author of the recent report, Tracking Ghostnet. I have been asked by the Office of His Holiness, the Dalai Lama (OHHDL) and the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGIE) to offer some policy recommendations in light of the ongoing targeted malware attacks directed at the Tibetan community worldwide. Some of the recommendations are relatively straightforward. For example, I will suggest that OHHDL convene an international Board of Advisers, bringing together some of the brightest minds in computer and international security to advise the Tibetans, and that the new Tibetan university stands up a Certified Ethical Hacking course. However, one of the more controversial moves being actively debated by Tibetans on the Dharamsala IT Group [DITG] list, is a mass migration of the exile community (including the government) to Linux, particularly since all of the samples of targeted malware collected exploit vulnerabilities in Windows. I would be very interested to hear Slashdot readers opinions on this debate here." (More below.)
Jamyang continues: "Allow me to play devil's advocate for a moment here: in the short term, moving to a platform that is perhaps less familiar to the attacker provides considerable relief, but it is essentially less difficult to write exploits for Mac OS/Linux than it is for Windows, given the many anti-exploitation mechanisms Microsoft has embedded in the last years, so in the long run, if the attackers want your data, the entire move is moot. People should choose a platform based on their productivity requirements instead of purely security. Furthermore, most of the web servers broken into during these attacks (to be used as command and control servers) were not Windows, but Linux. What do you think?
(While I have the floor I'd also like to take this opportunity to plug two initiatives where Slashdot readers can directly help the Tibetan tech community, either through sharing your expertise or your cash! Firstly, one of the obstacles to migrating to Linux for a Tibetan speaker is the lack of decent Tibetan font — can you help? Secondly, Avaaz is raising funds for projects that will help End The Blackout in Tibet, including a proposal to support the deployment of Psiphon's circumvention network. Thanks, or in Tibetan, thuk.je.che!"
(While I have the floor I'd also like to take this opportunity to plug two initiatives where Slashdot readers can directly help the Tibetan tech community, either through sharing your expertise or your cash! Firstly, one of the obstacles to migrating to Linux for a Tibetan speaker is the lack of decent Tibetan font — can you help? Secondly, Avaaz is raising funds for projects that will help End The Blackout in Tibet, including a proposal to support the deployment of Psiphon's circumvention network. Thanks, or in Tibetan, thuk.je.che!"
Especially if the sysadmins take an active role in:
A. Customizing and minimizing the installed packages.
B. Configuring a very restrictive set of firewall rules.
C. Configuring a very tight SELinux policy.
The key to Linux is to not think of it as on Operating System so much as an "OS Toolbox" that lets you build just what is needed.
First of all, converting the Dalai Lama to Linux is about the coolest IT project I've ever heard of, so congratulations
That aside, there are practical considerations and there are philosophical ones you'll want to consider. Practically speaking, no platform is 100% secure. Linux has historically been more secure than Windows. MS has made a lot of progress in the last decade or so.
The question is, do you prefer the closed-source approach or the open-source one? Would you rather the problems be hidden away, or laid out for all to find? In the closed-source scenario, knowledge of exploits may be less common, but that cuts two ways. Less attackers will be aware of an exploit, but less defenders will be aware of it as well. That may well result in the exploits that do occur being much more severe.
Beyond those practical considerations, which approach fits better with the values of the Tibetan community and the Dalai Lama in particular? In my mind, open source is the embodiment of non-attachment.
Monkeytreats
Most of all, make sure that anyone that uses a computer is aware of the risks. Even more sure with higher clearance levels.
Your windows install has at least been verified by a known party.
Yes, a known incompetent party, which has very little concern for security or the vetting of source code, but has rather different interests foremost.
... and then they built the supercollider.
There are thousands of attack vectors into linux, far more than there are into any windows software.
How do you know this? A claim this large needs to be supported by something more than mere assertion.
There are thousands of attack vectors into linux, far more than there are into any windows software.
How much source code have you verified on your linux install ? Your windows install has at least been verified by a known party. Anyone wanting to get into your system will have to get past microsoft first.
Microsoft verify its software so well that it doesn't even know what it's privileged services do. They had to create an "archaeological" team to discover how their CIFS redirector works, just to be able to write the documentation the EU antitrust mandated them to write as a remedy.
It is well known that they historically never created. much less used extensive test suites.
Proof is the number of regressions you can see in their server software from one release to the other. Their testing method has always just been to run a battery of clients with Office and other "important" application to make sure they did not "break".
Now in theory getting into a linux system would require getting past redhat or canonical.
In practice, as several breaches have demonstrated, compromising ANY widely used project (who accept volunteers as full comitting members merely for showing a bit of ability) would be sufficient.
And yet there is no evidence that any reasonably popular Linux distribution is compromised.
It's easy to fantasize on what could happen, but empirical evidence shows this is mere speculation.
How many chinese spies are working on the linux kernel. Improving it, yes, but also ...
And how many have been working for Microsoft, with the added "benefit" that nobody can review the code outside of said organization? (which as mentioned above has already demonstrated it doesn't know its own code?)
Do you dare to bet your life on the answer being zero ?
As much as I can bet my life on any other hw/sw system.
A full linux install being trustworthy is dependant on tens of thousands of coders all being trustworthy (since in practice, nobody checks one another's work, and no "real" security audits are being conducted. Checking personnel is considered heresy, refusing code based on lack of credentials is something that cannot ever be mentioned).
Man so much FUD in a single sentence is staggering.
1) any major (and certainly any security sensitive project) is checked. Every single checking is normally reviewed by at least another developer. This is true both for the kernel and many other projects. So the idea that nobody checks one another work is total bullshit.
2) not only code is checked by automatic checkers for defects, a lot of cryptographic and security software is routinely certified (FIPS and others) and reviewed both internally and by external organizations.
3) There is no need to refuse code on the basis of lack of credentials, because the code is *reviewed* first. So if you do something that is not simply stupid but that is malicious you can bet none of your code will never be reviewed again, much less committed.
4) Obviously you have never developed any major FOSS software ...
You want to be secure against chinese interference ? Go to microsoft or ibm. Not because they do not have chinese spies in their organisations, but because they most likely do not have 1000 chinese spies in them.
1,10,100,1000, does it make any difference?
What you need is 1, and only 1.
Also, those spies have to get past at least a single code review (one hopes) before compromising all customer's security.
Ya, rly ?
Sorry to break the news to you : open source software, in it's current form, cannot defend against a concerted attack by any large groups of individuals. It can't be done. It doesn't have to be the chinese. It's a matter of time before isla
Oh that wonderful little drama again.
Had you followed that event a bit more closely, you would have known that little snippet of code had zero (yes, none, zilch) possibility of getting into Linus' branch, where all the public releases are made. In fact judging from your post I'd say you have no idea of what really happened at all.
Do you seriously think they only introduced one problematic piece of code ?
No. I think it's one less than that. It might surprise you, but unlike some proprietary software, the big oss projects aren't big piles of mysterious crap, the developers really do understand their code.
News of successful incursions will, for obvious reasons, not be released until untold damage is done
With countless diligent people like you keeping a watchful eye, I'm sure any news of successful incursions into free/open source software will be promptly released when it happens. Or perhaps even earlier than that!
... you need to choose a competent admin. Remember, security is a process, not a product ...
gd