Study Shows "Secret Questions" Are Too Easily Guessed
wjousts writes "Several high-profile break-ins have resulted from hackers guessing the answers to secret questions (the hijacking of Sarah Palin's Yahoo account was one). This week, research from Microsoft and Carnegie Mellon University, presented at the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, will show how woefully insecure secret questions actually are. As reported in Technology Review: 'In a study involving 130 people, the researchers found that 28 percent of the people who knew and were trusted by the study's participants could guess the correct answers to the participant's secret questions. Even people not trusted by the participant still had a 17 percent chance of guessing the correct answer to a secret question.'" Schneier pointed out years ago how weird it is to have a password-recovery mechanism that is less secure than the password.
Password safe , add the question and give a randomly generator combination as the answer. Problem solved.
To be fair, most of the systems I have seen that have secret question type security don't let you in on the basis of the secret question, they email a replacement password to you, and only use the secret question to reduce DOS attacks and minimise the sending of plain-text passwords. Surely in that case it's only an issue if the cracker has already compromised your email account?
Quidnam Latine loqui modo coepi?
That's the Bible, Genesis 1:1.