Testing So-Called 'Unified Threat Managers'
snydeq writes "The InfoWorld Test Center has released vulnerability testing results for four so-called 'unified threat managers' — single units that combine firewall, VPN, intrusion detection and prevention, anti-malware, anti-spam, and Web content filtering in lieu of a relay rack stuffed top to bottom with appliances. The lab threw nearly 600 exploits of known vulnerabilities in a wide range of popular OSes, applications, and protocols, and despite being designed to thwart such threats, the UTMs as a class allowed hundreds to pass through. Why did the UTMs miss so many exploits? A lack of horsepower to perform the necessary deep packet inspection under load is suspected, as the lab pushed the limits of each unit's throughput with legitimate traffic. 'The upshot is, although the vendors have packed these devices with additional gateway security functions, clearly many UTMs are still strictly firewalls at heart.'"
Is it possible that single purpose security applications and appliances do a better job? In combining make various technologies in one device, how watered down was each individual component?
Focusing on doing one thing well yields better results than trying to do everything. Who'd have thought?
How could you do a credible review of Unified Security Appliances without including one from a tiny little networking company called Cisco?
It would have been nice to see how the ASA5500 series appliances stood up to the test.
-ted
I'm disappointed that they didn't include a Cisco ASA.
http://www.cisco.com/web/go/asa
I used to be a big SonicWall fan, until I joined a company that required IM messaging and used Vonage. Sonicwall causes a bunch of issues with AIM's protocol. IM will go into a blackhole, a user cannot connect, etc. We were using them at the small remote offices, but we replaced them with Juniper SSGs. The Vonage and AIM issues vanished once we switched over.
I'm curious how would these would stack up against an iptables firewall with PSAD, or other open source offerings?
Think Linux Firewalls which was reviewed a while back, and which I use to protect my home servers.
Tests like this usually favor the company that supplied the criteria and/or funding for the test. The results are exactly what you can expect. I'm sure that the other 3 companies tested could have supplied a criteria that favors them as well.
No, its not shocking that a tool for the job beats a "jack of al trades" - its shocking that the jack still missed third or more exploits. Hundreds out of 600? The odds are less that the janitor will break the server. ... heres the kicker, its happened before.
Having used Sonicwall products in the past, I can believe the results. They weren't the models tested but they were fairly effective for their price and performed well for a fairly small environment (around 100 or so employees). Sourcefire has some nice stuff as well. I'm sure other posters much more experienced with hobbitmon can chime in on the configuration and deployment of that but from what I've seen it was a nice component of home-built threat managers that also had snort and open-source firewalls on them.
It's the Ron Popeil/Billy Mays/Home Shopping Network sales pitch for IT Security: "It's a firewall, it's an intrusion prevention system, it will filter your web connections, it even provides anti-virus. But wait! It also acts as a router, and it even has a built in gigabit switch module. Now - how much do you think you're going to pay for this? Not $20,000 - not $15,000, not $10,000; no - all this can be yours for the low low price of $9995.95...."
It also makes julianne fries!
You sound an awful lot like the traditional UNIX big iron vendors.
Before they went bankrupt.
butwaitthere'smore!
server with dual processors and 8gb of memory to handle "unified threat management." for a company of 300 people. openvpn, shorewall, squid, all running on it (is it really unified at this point?) but to be honest the segmentation in practice is a fundamental. email still gets scanned somewhere else, and snort isnt a part of the box i built.
Good people go to bed earlier.
Ever heard of computer loaded with *nix and configured as a gateway/router/proxy with snort or something similar loaded? Back before you young whippersnappers came in with your fancy firewall appliances, that's what we had. And we liked it that way!
My blog
It seems to me - and the headline implies this - that a "Unified Threat Manager" is a firewall that has had Marketing's claws in it.
As Bill always said, "If you work in marketing, kill yourself."
Question everything
If a unified tool can be more easily configured securely than many best of bread applications
Sounds like a half-baked idea ;-)
Your Gnu box is missing something - let me poke around here - hmmmm - Gnu, Gnu, Gnu............ OH WAIT!!! WHERE'S YOUR OS KERNEL!?!?!??
There's your mistake. Gnu is not an operating system. Gnu is only a collection of applications that will run fine IF implemented on an operating system, such as Linux.
Download a real OS distro, dumbass.
"Windows is like the faint smell of piss in a subway: it's there, and there's nothing you can do about it." - Charlie Br
Ever heard of computer loaded with *nix and configured as a gateway/router/proxy with snort or something similar loaded? Back before you young whippersnappers came in with your fancy firewall appliances, that's what we had. And we liked it that way!
And still like it that way
Now get off your lawn?
Canada: The US's more awesome sibling.
Ever heard of computer loaded with *nix and configured as a gateway/router/proxy with snort or something similar loaded? Back before you young whippersnappers came in with your fancy firewall appliances, that's what we had. And we liked it that way!
Had? Liked? I think your tense is wrong.
My thoughts exactly. All any of these things do is take a look at packets going through it. A software application running on hardware. Given sufficiently powerful hardware (a cheap commodity these days) and sufficiently efficient software (the only big difference between the vendors), you can do all these things and more.
The notion of having a single point of failure "security" device contradicts one of the primary foundations of security principle: Defense In Depth. Multiple layers of security is essential in safe guarding your systems, placing them all one one unit is nothing short of moronic.
They should have used a control for this test. Put each of these unified conglomerations up against one good Sysadmin with a clue.
No one tool will ever be "THE Solution". No matter how many doodads are attached to a Swiss knife, some sack of warm tissue has to fire a few synapsis to put the knife to use. If the sack of warm tissue is lacking in the synapse department, he fails.
"Windows is like the faint smell of piss in a subway: it's there, and there's nothing you can do about it." - Charlie Br
Is when the products that are being used to protect your network, themselves have vulnerabilities.
I will use a large, very large company as an example. They make AV, they make IDS's (although crappy), they make firewalls, and they sell smaller stuff to the general public... It starts with a giant S....
Long story short, a few years back they had a vulnerability in the way their stack did deep packet inspection, this particular piece of code was shared across their entire product line. Well, their all in one device that did AV, content management, firewall, email, IPS etc etc used this particular piece of vulnerable code in each of those functions.... That essentially made the device useless till they patched the problem.
This is of course one of the arguments against using a single company for all your products, and in the enviroments I manage or design, I intentionally choose products from various vendors to prevent problems like the above from occurring.
I came, I conquered, I coredumped
What he's referring to as GNU is actually GNU/Linux or, as I've recently taken to calling it, GNU plus Linux.
Unified Threat Management is a dead end concept. We've been there and done that and we left it in the past.
With disaster recovery concepts, decentralized administration on the rise again, and cloud computing we once again come full circle to the whole reason we left mainframes for client server architecture.
"Who Watches the Watchman" is a line that comes to mind. The IDS should be keeping tabs on the Firewall, not part of the firewall. TRON should be an independent keeping tabs on the MCP not part of the MCP ;)
UTM mean a single point of compromise and failure. Even clustering a UTM configuration still has liability issue for configuration information. IN addition placing one IDS in DMZ and another in the green is problematic.
For IDS best practices have always leaned towards silent passive listening, not integrated into the firewall. Firewall goes down, so does the IDS. We must assume that a firewall going down is PART of an intrusion, thus the IDS should still function if the firewall is down...
This is similar to a multifunction fax\printer\scanner argument. If the damn thing shorts out you are out a fax\printer\scanner where as if they were separate components you'd have 2/3rds of your resources still functioning.
Now to the original post, they failed as a class. Why? Because exploits at the system level are never passed up to the high level services, all those components share a common blind spot because they are running on a common platform.
No shit.
This is why I still advocate a mixed environment\mix vendor approach. From the open source side I like a pair of IDS servers, one running Linux and one running NetBSD. I like layered firewalls also. I also like built in alarms to check for cross VLAN and subnet traffic. I firmly belive in darknets and honeypots too. I still advocate at least 2 antivirus solutions present in a campus network (more often this is either symantec\mcafee and either AVG\Avast)but most importantly I like distributed systems rather then consolidated appliances...
-=[ Who Is John Galt? ]=-
UTM = Universally Targeted Machine
So much from learning from the phrase "all your eggs in one basket..."
-=[ Who Is John Galt? ]=-
3 separate realms.
Policy to define what's allowed (you haz a policy, whether it is written down or even thought about).
Enforcement of that policy. FW, IPS, application fw. The higher in the stack the fw goes, the closer it should be in the net topology to the target it defends.
Audit the enforcement of that policy. IDS, stats, flow.
And rather than tie everything together, how about focus on the 3-4 sources that really kick ass? FW logs are not useful. Focus on what your targets are doing, not what the millions of bots are prevented from doing.
http://taosecurity.blogspot.com/ is your source for clear thinking on this subject.
I do not think much of a UTM test that does not include any products from TippingPoint, the current market leader.
You obviously did not take the time to read the article ... More $ doesn't always mean better!
I do wonder if they upgraded each of the four boxes from each the manufacturers before they did the testing though. Often, equipment as shipped has early release software, and it is expected that the IT techs upgrade ASAP when installing.