Is Arizona's Internet Voting System Safe Enough?

JMcCloy writes "Kevin Poulsen, senior editor at Wired News, asks readers 'Is internet voting safe?' and has a poll at the end of the article. So far, 32% responding actually think that internet voting is worth it, risks and all. It is scary how easily people can be persuaded to trust a system that is so vulnerable." The system described, used in Arizona in last year's election process, isn't just checking a box and clicking a button, but Poulsen lays out some scenarios by which it could be subverted.

Comments

Safe or not...

[sys.stdout.write]

I still refuse to believe that eventually we couldn't make Internet voting more secure than paper ballots.

I already consider online banking to be at least as secure as ATM transactions, and I see no reason why a properly designed online voting system couldn't be the same.

That being said, the current state of the industry is pathetic. For instance, not too long ago a Diebold machine was exploited by its anti-virus software. If you have anti-virus software running on your electronic voting system you're doing it wrong.

Work in a union shop?

[HornWumpus]

You better have voted correctly or you're going to get your legs broken.

Yes we need a secret ballot.

If you are fool enough to trust unions substitute employer, same answer.

Re:Full Results of Poll: ' Is internet voting safe

[Dare nMc]

I actually have the opposite view. I think the reason electronic voting is being done so poorly is to prevent allowing a true democracy strip the power from the current 2 party system.
While not simple to get right, a effective convenient secure system would make voting too simple. We could actually have more rounds of votes, and eliminate needing just 2 candidates at the beginning of the election. More issues could be voted on, more laws, quicker correction on corrupt politicans, etc, etc. Those in power have much more interest in preventing trust-able e-voting than not.

Good enough isn't good enough here

[gd2shoe]

We have to assume that if the Internet is secure enough for us to buy stuff, then it is secure enough for voting.

Not true, for several reasons. There are several additional security constraints on voting. For example, you cannot be allowed to prove how you voted. Therefore, you cannot receive feedback on how you voted. You can't "balance your checkbook", so to speak. They know this and can set the online balance to whatever they choose. That's without hacker involvement. Online purchases are actually much riskier than most people are willing to consider. "Identity theft" has skyrocketed, and compromising online purchases is one way that's done. Sure the transmission may be secure, but either the client or server may be compromised (and are, regularly). Banks have simply decided to live with a particular level of fraud. HTTPS is only a small part in the equation.

From a practical standpoint, only close elections can be stolen anyway.

Again, not true. The public only needs to belive that it was close. That's not too hard, really.

If a close election is stolen, then approximately the same number of persons disagree with the result as if the election were not stolen, so what difference does it really make from the standpoint of quality of outcome?

I see your point from a pragmatic point of view, but I disagree. I don't want to see people with power getting away with abusing us and grabing more power. It's the principle of the thing. Besides, we don't want to encourage corruption. Period.