Social Security Numbers Can Be Guessed
BotScout writes "The nation's Social Security numbering scheme has left millions of citizens vulnerable to privacy breaches, according to researchers at Carnegie Mellon University, who for the first time have used statistical techniques to predict Social Security numbers solely from an individual's date and location of birth. The researchers used the information they gleaned to predict, in one try, the first five digits of a person's Social Security number 44 percent of the time for 160,000 people born between 1989 and 2003. A Social Security Administration spokesman said the government has long cautioned the private sector against using a social security number as a personal identifier, even as it insists 'there is no fool-proof method for predicting a person's Social Security Number.'" Update: 07/07 00:01 GMT by T : Reader angrytuna links to Wired's coverage of the SSN deduction system, and links to the researchers' FAQ at Carnegie Mellon, which says that the research paper will be presented at BlackHat Las Vegas later this month.
they only put the last 4 digits on my paycheck!
It was pretty obvious when my sister and I received sequential numbers.
Naught Naught Naught Naught Naught Naught Naught Naught Two.
Damn Roosevelt!
Who needs to guess when it's so easy to get someone to just give you their social security number if you just present a vaguely legitimate reason? For instance, I could pretend to be hiring people for a new business I am opening. Pretty much every application I've ever filled out has asked for a social security number.
I could also see this technique being combined for some nasty phishing methods. Set up a fake credit check website, ask for their date of birth, the security question is their place of birth, and the last four digits of their social security number is their pin number. Using the technique of these researchers, you can guess a significant portion of people's SS numbers. 40% is probably a huge number for phishing, where most people avoid them, but by shear volume enough get caught to make money off it.
When I was young, the back of my social security card has a notice: "Not to be used for identification purposes" (or something similar). When I lost my original card and had to get a replacement, the notice was missing. Our government is solely to blame for allowing the private sector to use social security numbers as identifiers. Congress has had an overabundance of time to pass laws criminalizing the use of social security numbers by the private sector. In my opinion, Congress has been criminally negligent in allowing this to continue for this long.
Social security numbers should be used for one, and only one, purpose: to link an individual to social security benefits. Any other use should be a criminal offense.
It's even better than that. Consider that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure call for the redaction of all but the last four digits of an individual's social security number if it must be part of a court record (for example a discovery response).
Much of the discovery I have seen asks for the party's date of birth, place of birth, and social security number. While the rule "protects" the SSN from release by redacting the first five numbers, with a typical set of interrogatory responses, and the techniques pioneered by these researchers, I can get the holy trinity of identity theft information: SSN, DOB, and location of birth.
Even worse, most of the country now uses PACER for electronic filing in Federal Courts. For $.08/page, anyone can access filings in a Federal case. This seems ripe for abuse.
--AC
If we all have unique id numbers to identify us, then someone can impersonate us by knowing that number.
But of course, if we did not have unique id numbers to identify us it would be even easier for someone to impersonate us.
And however many digits the number is, and even if it is randomly-generated (as the article proposes) your id number is only as strong as the weakest link among those who have stored your id, meaning the used car dealer, the credit card company, the student loan office, etc.
It is guaranteed to fail since they all involve transmitting and storing the secret.
What we need is a national public key infrastructure, with keys stored on smart cards, or similar, along the lines of what they have in Belgium. Of course, even PKI fails in the face of social engineering, so we need citizens to be more aware of the risks as well.
I think 8e019226-9a00-41f4-b094-6f1545fd84a9 should be fairly easy to remember.
Because SSNs are supposed to be unique identifiers. Identifiers only. The problem is that they're also being used as the shared secret! There's nothing secret about an SSN, people, and there shouldn't be. I think at this point, the government needs to simply legislate the correct behavior, because companies like Comcast (who asked me for my SSN for 'security reasons' just the other day) just don't get it. Of course, getting the government to know the 'correct behavior' is yet another battle...
Change a digit or transpose digits in an SSN and you most likely will transform it into another valid SSN.
The SSN numbering system was developed in the mid 1930's. The modern mathematics of error control were published by Shannon after World War II. (His work or error control was related to work on cryptography.) By "modern" mathematics, I refer to the fact that there was some understanding of error control in old telegraph systems, but it wasn't developed systematically.
Credit cards have check digits that will catch some common errors in data entry. Computer and communications technology use error control in many ways. SSN's are still back in the 1930's.
Perhaps it is time to modernize them by at least adding check digits. Also, the prohibition against using them as personal identifiers should be strengthened and enforced.
Here is their grant and proposal abstract from the NSF. It sounds like they did exactly what they'd proposed to do- not every grant meets that metric! Theirs is a 3-year grant for a total of $386927.
There was a cute line in their FAQs:
It's psychosomatic. You need a lobotomy. I'll get a saw.
Not news to anyone who knows how SSN assignment works.
Yes it is. Knowing it's theoretically possible to figure it out is one thing. Someone actually demonstrating it can be done with high success rate is another. And it's news that matters because maybe this will force some change on the issue, dispels the illusion that it's a super secret identifying code that only you and X large organization knows. ...and maybe there will be a pony waiting for me at home...
The problem is that you're trying.
To extend, the problem the SSA mentions: using them as identifiers?
That's not what's causing all the trouble. You can do that all you like, and the only people you'll piss off are privacy advocates, worried about unwanted cross-correlation.
The *real* problem, as I note in a piece I wrote for RISKS DIgest last month, is people using knowledge of an SSN (or a mother's maiden name, or any other answer not *made up by the customer*) as an authenticator.
If it is discoverable, and you force a customer to use it, *you* ought to be responsible when someone does, and defrauds the customer, cause you were an accessory before, and now you're on notice; it's been posted here.
Have fun, retail authentication system designers. ;-)