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Judge Invalidates Software Patent, Citing Bilski
bfwebster writes "US District Court Judge Andrew Gilford (Central District of California) granted a summary judgment motion in DealerTrack v. Huber et al., finding DealerTrack's patent (US 7,181,427) — for an automated credit application processing system — invalid due to the recent In re Bilski court decision that requires a patent to either involve 'transformation' or 'a specific machine.' According to Judge Gilford's ruling, DealerTrack 'appears to concede that the claims of the '427 Patent do not meet the "transformation" prong of the Bilski test.' He then applied the 'specific machine' test and noted that, post-Bilski the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences has ruled several times that 'claims reciting the use of general purpose processors or computers do not satisfy the [Bilski] test.' Judge Gilford analyzes the claims of the '427 patent, notes that they state that the 'machine' involved could be a 'dumb terminal' and a 'personal computer,' and then concludes: 'None of the claims of the '427 Patent require the use of a "particular machine," and the patent is thus invalid under Bilski.' DealerTrack apparently plans to appeal the ruling. Interesting times ahead."
What is "non-mathematical software"?
His argument is simple: (1) math cannot be patented (2) all algorithms are math (3) all software is one or more algorithms and so follows that software cannot be patentable.
While I agree with the sentiment, this isn't good logic. Since software is a combination of algorithms, the combination of those algorithms may be non-obvious and novel.
I want SW-patents to go the way of the dodo as much as the next /.'er, but the above struck me as aking to A) atoms cannot be patented, B) all machines are made of one or more atoms, ergo machines cannot be patented.
Any combination of algorithms in software is itself an algorithm. Knuth isn't arguing obviousness or novelty; he's arguing that software isn't patentable subject matter at all, no matter how non-obvious or novel it may be.
But isn't that exactly the kind of software that *doesn't* deserve patent protection because of how mundane and obvious it is?
The position is pretty explicit. The past law was such that if it were a business process or describing an algorithm in the traditional sense (the bulk of software patents do this...) then it wasn't patentable- same goes for that which resides in nature. Bilski puts it back to where it was prior to all the fun and games when it was thought that it was a "good idea" to allow patenting damned near anything. It's not throwing the baby out with the bath water- it's fixing part of what's been broken for a while now.
I am not merely a "consumer" or a "taxpayer". I am a Citizen of the State of Texas
I want SW-patents to go the way of the dodo as much as the next /.'er, but the above struck me as aking to A) atoms cannot be patented, B) all machines are made of one or more atoms, ergo machines cannot be patented.
There is a distinct difference between Knuth's logical progression and yours. It's a matter of a few words, which may seem nit-picky, but what manner of logic doesn't boil down to pure semantics?
Knuth's "software cannot be patented" argument:
* Math cannot be patented.
* Algorithms ARE math.
* Software IS a series of algorithms strung together (as an aside, a series of algorithms interacting is itself an algorithm)
* Ergo, software cannot be patented
Your counter-argument via analogy:
* Atoms cannot be patented
* Machines ARE MADE OF one or more atoms strung together
* Ergo, machines cannot be patented
Note the emphasized words: ARE versus ARE MADE OF. Math is not a tangible object, so there is no concept of "is made of" in that context. Atoms are tangible, albeit on a microscopic scale. Still, that's enough to say that a machine IS MADE OF specific atoms. However, you cannot say that a machine IS an atom. You can say that a machine IS a group of atoms, but that's not enough to warrant a patent; a machine is more than that. The group of atoms is crafted into unique and complex shapes, and those shapes are put together and mechanical force is applied to make it accomplish a task. That is what warrants a patent.
I know exactly what you are about to think: aren't you doing the same thing to the series of algorithms? The answer is no. Math cannot be "crafted" into a "shape". It can describe a shape, but it is intangible. No mechanical force can act on math, and a solid object cannot be "made of math". An algorithm, quite simply, IS math; no more, no less. You can string together as many algorithms as you like, but all that does is create one larger algorithm. The same cannot be said about a physical object consisting of multiple atoms strung together.
The end result of a software may fall under another system, like copyright or trademark. But the underlying logic is all math, and that cannot and should not fall under patent.
"The USPTO replied by defining non-mathematical software to be patentable while purely mathematical software is not."
Huh? This is completely wrong.
The USPTO has been arguing against the patentability of software since, well, software was first invented. And its main rationale is that the USPTO is ill-equipped to examine software patent applications. Of course, that argument is quite laughable these days, since it has been obligated to examine software patents since State Street Bank v. Signature Financial Group (1998)... it raises many more questions about the USPTO's recalcitrance to get with the times and meet its legal obligations... i.e., the sharp incompetence and chronic failure of the USPTO administration in managing the day-to-day operations of the organization.
The only "definitions" that have been applied to the field were created by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), the appellate court that is solely empowered to hear appeals of district-level decisions in patent cases. That body (and its predecessor, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)) have issued many different tests over the patentability of software. None have been satisfactory.
There is only one constant holding in the range of varying CAFC decisions over the years: software cannot be categorically rejected as a class of patentable subject matter. This would be a flat contradiction of 35 USC, the body of federal law that empowers the USPTO to issue patents.
But getting to the deeper problem: Software inventions cannot be categorically excluded from patentability because the technological spectrum of "method"-type inventions has a very smooth gradient. Consider:
Everyone seems to agree that a particular circuit is, and should be, patentable. And everyone seems to agree that a completely abstract solution to a completely abstract problem is not, and should not be, patentable. Fair enough.
The logical problem arises when someone (particularly opponents of software patents - Knuth, Stallman, etc.) try to draw a bright line in this list and say, "Everything above this list should be categorically excluded." The problem is that all of these embodiments accomplish the exact same thing in essentially the same way. Sure, there may be various ancillary advantages: cost of implementation, reconfigurability, speed, etc. But technically, they are completely fungible - they are technically equivalent. It is nonsensical and against the logic of technology to try to draw lines in the sand.
Shame on anyone who attempts to invent arbitrary distinctions in this field. In attempting to warp the business of software to suit your ends, you ignore the conclusions of Turing that form the basis of your area of technology.
- David Stein
Computer over. Virus = very yes.