Intel Patches Flaws In Trusted Execution Tech

An anonymous reader writes "Joanna Rutkowska's company Invisible Things Lab has issued the results of their research into flaws in Intel's Trusted Execution Technology (TXT), whose function is to provide a mechanism for safe loading of system software and to protect sensitive files. ITL describes how flaws in TXT can be used to compromise the integrity of a software loaded via an Intel TXT-based loader in a generic way, fully circumventing any protection TXT is supposed to provide. The attack exploits an implementation error in the so-called SINIT Authenticated Code modules and that could potentially allow a malicious attacker to elevate their privileges. Intel has released a patch for the affected chipsets, which include the Q35, GM45, PM45 Express, Q45, and Q43 Express." Here are ITL's press release (PDF) and Intel's advisory.

Comments

TPMs and related tech

[girlintraining]

It was true fifty years ago, and it's still true today: If I have access to the hardware, you're screwed. And thus far, there have been precious few non-trivial applications that have been unexploitable remotely at some point. Systems are amazingly complex and full of flaws because almost all modern software was built with security as an after-thought. The only difference these days between a "secure" system and an insecure one is that the secure system hasn't had its flaws discovered yet.

Re:TPMs and related tech

[pclminion]

It was true fifty years ago, and it's still true today: If I have access to the hardware, you're screwed.

Hardware safety is like thread safety. It originates at the lowest levels and percolates upward. In thread safety, the lowest levels are primitives like interlocked exchange. On top of this, we build spin-locks. On top of those we build critical sections. Etc. Hardware can be made secure by making it tamper-resistant. Cryptographic ICs can be rigged to self-destruct when somebody opens the package. Given a secure cryptographic chip, hardware security can be assembled on top of it. I'm not willing to go out on a limb and say that we have TRULY secure cryptographic chips, but if and when we do, we can built unconditionally secure hardware on top of them just like we build thread safety out of interlocked exchanges.

Re:Readme.TXT

[mirix]

Yeah really. Some dude in his Intel office:
"Hey Jim, you know what computing needs? more ambiguous acronyms. That would be just grand."

Not Trusting The User

[Anonymous Coward]

TXT is not about trusting you the user, its about not trusting you. You cannot be trusted not to copy that DVD or BluRay, so Intel and the media companies are arranging to take over your computer. With TXT installed you will not be allowed to do certain operations, and there will be no way around it even with administrator privileges. TXT is about taking away control of your computer and giving it to the big corporations. Only signed software can be installed, so there will be no way around the DRM. The trusted path from media to screen will be enforced by the hardware, and it will refuse to run if anything has been tampered with.

There is no reason why a user would ever want to have TXT installed on their machine, that cannot already be done with public key based security. The primary difference between traditional public key certificates and TXT, is that in TXT you are not trusted to have access to your own private certificate.